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CHA.P.rER I 
IN'l'RODUC'riON 
1. Statement of the Problem 
The problem of this dissertation is to investigate the role of 
norms in the sociological writing of Roman Catholics in America as a 
case study in the problem of norms and values in relation to sociology. 
The investigation will attempt to understand the Roman Catholic position 
in sociology, criticize it, and from it draw implications in estab-
lishing a frame of reference for a coherent approach to the study of 
human society and its processes, which combines the empirical and the 
1 
normative. 
While the study v1ll deal primarily with such problems as the 
sociological study of values, subjective valuation in objective socio-
logical writing, and the relation of sociology to ethics, the context 
will be the more inclusive problem of the role and nature of values in 
the total range of reality. It is on this level that the problem of the 
1see Paul Deats, "Thematic Va.l.ues and Universal Normsu (Unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1954) for a similar con-
cern. He concludes, 11There is no question in this study but that the 
separation between science and the study of values must be over-
come •• •• In short, science as now conceived cannot provide the norms 
we seek, nor can it compare cultures in terms of values. If it is to 
help us discover norms, it will have to be a different science, dealing 
with a more inclusive reality in terms of a more flexible method. u 
pp. 171-179. Cf. David Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology (N.Y.: 
Columbia University Press, 1953), pp. 430ft. 
1 
2 
study of human behavior and human values must be cJ.arified. The ulti-
mate i ssue seems to be whether or not there are universal, verifiable 
norms as a coherent part of the structure of reality. Such norms would 
cover a wide range. Methodological norms would govern the approach to 
studying reality and interpreting it coherently. Epistemological norms 
would govern the study of knowledge, especially the questions of how we 
know and what can we know. Metaphysical norms would govern the inter-
pretation of the nature of reality. Ethical norms would govern the be-
l havior of persons toward each other. 
This study, then, is not sociological in the sense that it makes 
use of sociological data in the manner of empirical research. Rather, 
it analyzes the sociological study and interpretation by Catholics in 
an effort to c.larify these broader philosophical issues . 
The importance of the problem is revealed in recent developments 
on the national and international scene involving the cJ.ash of ideolo-
gies. The question of the role of the scientist as a product of his 
particular culture bas been raised. The scientist has two essential 
roles which at times have been in conflict. They are the role of 
scientist and the role of citizen.2 Both natural scientists and social 
scientists have a devotion to their study as an approach to reality, 
which provides a potential common bond across cultural lines. Yet 
1 See Edgar s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy (N.Y.: 
Henry Holt and eo., [1925] 1951), p. 8tt. 
2 Clyde Kluckhohn, Mirror For Man (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Book eo., 
1949) 1 p. 264. 
3 
science itself has cultural roots,1 and the individual scientist faces 
the problems of the norms of his particular science, the application of 
his findings, and, especially for the social scientist, the limitations 
of his o1m socialization in attempting to understand people of other 
cultures. 
Several examples of these issues may be noted. The biological 
sciences offer an example of the clash between Russian and Western 
ideologies . Widely held theories of heredity have been called into 
question recently by Russian biologists prilllaril.y on the basis of the 
implications of the theories for the social norms of the culture. 2 
The history of anthropology gives another key example, for it 
reveals the movement from one type of analysis to another. The earlier 
type imposed the norms of the anthropologist on the culture being in-
vestigated, thereby influencing conclusions which later had to be cor-
rected in light of cultural relativism and its description of cultures 
as internally coherent.3 
lwilliam J. Goode and Paul K. Batt, Methods in Social Research 
(N.Y. : McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1953), PP• 19, 23. Cf. Herbert Butter-
field, The Origins of Modern Science (N.Y.: The MaCJiil.lan Co., 1951), 
p. 104; and Robert K. Merton, Social Theo¥, and Social Structure 
(Glencoe, ru. : The Free Press [i949J 1957 , pp. 531-627. 
2 
J. V. L . casser.Jey, Morals and Man in the Social Sciences 
(London: Longm.a.ns, Green and Co. , 1951), p. 172. 
3The problem, however, goes beyond this formulation, as in-
dicated by Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology, pp. 423-4291 esp. p . 428. 
Cf. Margaret Mead, "The Comparative Study of Cultures and the Purposive 
Cultivation of Democratic Values," and Louis Wirth, "Integrative 
Tendencies in Internati onal Relations," Per~ctives In a Troubled 
Decade, eds. Lyman Beyeon, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. Maciver (N.Y.: 
Harper and Bros . , 1950) . 
A third example may be drawn f'rom contemporary experience in 
the united States. In 1952, thirty-two social scientists prepared a 
brief tor the United States Supreme Court on the issue of racial seg-
1 
regation. For the first time in the history of the court, evidence 
of this kind was used as the basis of a decision. But prior to this, 
4 
Congress had voted not to include the social sciences in a bill approp-
riating money for the advancement ot scientific stud1es.2 In a sense 
this ebain ot events was a t'ulf1llment of Robert Lynd • s plea in 19363 
that the culture cries out tor iJamediate solutions and cannot va1 t until 
all the facts are in. The values of the culture become the presupposi-
tions of the science. 
There is ample evidence tbat American sociologists have long 
been concerned about the place of norms and values in sociologieal. 
analysis. Titles of articles in the American Sociologieal. Review and 
the American Journal of Sociology are one major index of this concern. 
Recent works by Gunnar~' Arnold Rose, Willi&m Goode and Paul Hatt, 
Howard Becker, and Talcott Parsons, to mention only a few, consider 
values to be important in the study ot society. 
This same concern bas been the burden of philosophers. J. A. 
1 
"The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegre-
gation: A Social Science Statement." Appendix to Appellant • s Briefs, 
School Segregation Cases Nos. 8, 101, and 191. in the Supreme Court ot 
the United States, Oct. term, 1952. 
2 Stuart Chase, The Proper Study of Mankind (N.Y.: Harper and 
Bros. [191Ja] 1956), pp. 6008. 
3Robert Lynd, Knowledge for Wbat? (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1948). 
5 
Irvillg writes that the problem of values is the central philosophie&l 
1 issue of the century. It was in 1885 that Herman Lotze called for an 
investigation concerni.Dg the nature and detel"JJination of value, some-
2 
thing which be said bad not yet been carried out. The result baa been 
a great many works on the philosophy of values frOJI many points of view. 
Clyde Kluekhohn, an anthropologist surveying the whole field of value 
theory, concludes: 
Rea41ng the volum.i.nous, and ot'ten vague and ditf'use, literature 
on the subJect in the various fields of learning, one finds 
values considered as attitudes, D.Otivations, objects, measureable 
quantities, sul:llftantive areas of behavior, affect-laden customs 
or trad1 tions, and relationships such as those between indi vi du-
als, groups, obJects, and events. The only agreement is that 
values somehow bav§ to do with normative as opposed to existen-
tial propositions. 
Most of the studies at some point consider the relationship of 
values to societ,.. "That some, if not all values, are in some sense a 
function of society, or of social relations is an indisputable fact .n4 
Brightman writes: 
!be data of ethics include all of the subJect matter of the 
social sciences. • • • Even social phenomena which conf'ront 
the indi vidua.l as brute facts that he did not choose are 
moral phenomena in at least two senses. A declaration of war, 
for ex:ample, in its relation to a citizen opposed to war, is a 
moral phenoaenon for that citizen, in so far as he assumes a;ay 
1 J. A. IrviDg, Science and Values (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 
1952), p. 3· 
~ph B. Perry, General Theory of Values (JI. Y.: LoDg~~&ns, 
Green and Co., 192()), p. $. 
3 Clyde IO.uekhobn, "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory 
of Action, " Toward a General Theoq, eds. Talcott Parsons and Edvard 
Shils (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 389-390. 
~erry, General Theory, p. lfOO. 
voluntary attitude toward it; and in itself it is moral, in 
so far as the momentous declaration involved decisions on 
the part of responsible statesmen.l 
6 
Social science supplies the raw material for the study of values, 
2 for values are social facts. As recently as Max Weber and Emile 
Durkhe~the recognition of values as important aspects of society bad 
its inception. Weber's study of the role of values in the development 
of capitalism3 and Durkheim's investigation of the place of values in 
social cohesion4 opened a whole new field of sociological inquiry. 
Growi.ng out of the empirical study of values in society has come 
the recognition that values play a part in the task of the investigator 
himself. The lifting of this problem to the fore has created wide con-
troversy within the social sciences and has necessitated a new appraisal 
of bithertofore allegedly inviolate objectivity of the social scientist. 
In general, social scientists who support a frank recognition of values 
state that since science discriminates between problems, judging one as 
more important than another, it thus rests on value-judgments. Further, 
it is suggested that science rests on postulates which are unprovable, 
e.g., the world exists, the world can be known, the world can be known 
1Edgar s. Brightman, Moral Laws (l'l. Y. : The Abingdon Press, 
1933), p. 69. 
2Emile Durkheim, ~e Rules of the Sociological Methgd, trans. 
s. A. Solovay and J. B. Mueller (Cbicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1950), p. 3· 
~ Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of capi talism1 
trans. T. Parsons (N. Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930). 
4 Emile Durkheim1 Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. 
J. W. Swain (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1915). 
1 through the senses, phenomena a.re causally related. Parsons states: 
I am far from beliertng tbat social or a:D.Y other science can 
live in a kind of philosophical vacuum, completely ignoring 
all philosophical problems. • • • The more the attempt is made 
to state the explicit or implicit m8jor premises of such 
arguments clearly a:D.d sharply, the more evident it becomes 
that t~ey are metaphysical rather than scientific proposi-
tions. 
J. V. L. Ca.sser)ey' suggests that sociology is more speculative 
7 
than many sociologists like to a.dm1 t. The empirical method is i..mportant 
for answering questions, but the questions themselves arise from theories 
and hypotheses which are prior to the investigation. 
It is the distinguishing characteristic of the social sciences 
that the subjects or agents of such intellectual activities 
are at the sam~ time bound up and one with the object ot the 
investigation. 
It is this recognition tbat led Max Weber to suggest the Verstehen 
method in sociology, which he defined as "the rational. understanding of 
motivation, which consists in placing the act in an intelligible and 
more inclusive context of meaning • .,4. 
While Weber saw no necessary conflict between the Verstehen 
method and the scientific requirement to be free of values, aore recent 
critics have raised questions at this point. If understanding takes 
1 Goode and Batt, Methods, p . 20 . 
2 Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Pure and Applied 
(Glencoe, n.J. . : The Free Press Q0949j 1954), p. 157. 
3easserle,; Morals and Man, p . 120. 
4. 
Max Weber, Theo ot Social and Economic Organization (N.Y.: 
Oxford University Press, 19 7 , p. 95 . More precisely, this is desig-
nated as erklarendes Verstehen, p. 94n. 
8 
plaee b~ reterenee to one's own experience, then the possibility ot pro-
jecting an additional element into the observed situation is real. As 
Gunnar Myrdal wri tea: "Biases in social sciences cannot be erased. si.m,ply 
by 'keeping to the tacts • and 'by refining methods ot statistie&l treat-
ment of the data. nl 
Dean Walter Muelder sums up the basic problem involved tor the 
social scientist in these vords: 
Values bave become not me.rely curious entities to be described 
in various settings but are viewed as powers capable ot creating 
an emerging vorld culture and providing tolerable justice and 
satisfaction the world round. Such values are pressing the 
scientist to go beyond his traditional Comtea.n positivism into 
~ 
more adventurous and difficult perspectives.' 
Among most sociologists today there is little argument that the 
values and biases of researchers and theoreticians must be accounted tor 
as variables in investigation. One ot the most recent statements bas 
been made by George Lundberg, generally considered to be a neoposi ti vist. 3 
The behaviorist is as interested as anyone in the t'ull exploi-
tation of the data of vishes, desires, and wb&~ men 'think in 
their hearts'--the phenomena of consciousness. 
1 Gunnar Myrd.al, An American Dilemma (N.Y.: Harper and Bros., 
1944), II, 1041. ct. below, Chapter II. 
~alter G. Muelder, "Norms and Valuations in Social Science," 
Liberal Learning and Religion, ed. Amos Wilder (li. Y. : Harper and Bros., 
1951), p. 98. 
3Lundberg prefers to call his position "natural science," 
although 'l'imashett in his recent book, Sociological Theories, calls 
him a neopositivist. See Nicholas 1'1mashett, Sociological Theory: Its 
Nature and Growth (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1955), p. 192. 
~ George Lundberg, "Is Sociology !oo Scientific?" Sociologus, 
9(Sept. 1933), 311. This is a key quotation in his recent article, "The 
Natural Science Trend in Sociology," Am. Jr. Soc., 6l(Nov. 1955), 195. 
But most contemporary work in sociology, even though it recog-
nizes the importance of values, i s implicitly relativ1stic.1 That is, 
it admits biases as necessary subjective components of human behavior, 
but it avoids the crucial questions of the validity of the values . The 
9 
more adventurous and difficult perspectives which Dean Muelder calls for 
are not apparent . These would seem to be in the realm of norms. 
It is precisely at this point that the Catholic sociologist is 
at an advantage . He is conditioned in his work by an explicit system of 
theological, metaphysical, and ethical norms. In the hierarchy of know-
ledge, the norms which govern sociological thought are derived from 
sources bearing higher authority than the empirical, i.e., the Church and 
Holy Scriptures. 
This is a primary reason for the choice of Catholic sociological 
writing for this study. Here we have a group o:f writers who not only 
espouse a seemingly coherent and articulate body of norms, but wbo make 
these plain as their assumptions . What appears to be a necessity in 
social science, i.e., the recognition of norms o:f some sort, is actually 
practiced by a group o:f producill8 sociologists. The problem will be to 
discover what the results of a combination of empiricism and normative 
analysis are. The approach of Catholics seems to involve more than a 
simple recognition o:f values . 2 
1 Cbapter II treats this in greater detail . 
~elvin J. Willi8JilB1 Catholic Social Thought (N.Y. : Ronald 
Press, 1950), seems to rest his case on the recognition of values. He 
does not analyze the problem of their validation. 
10 
In addition to the position of catholic fsociologists regarding 
norms, there are added advantages in choosing them as the object of this 
study. The development of sociology among Roman catholics is recent, 
although certain notable social scient ists in the earliest days of 
1 
sociology vere catholic. catholics have also been critical of sociology 
as pursued by non- Catholics, and this criticism serves to point up the 
problem with which this dissertation deals. 2 
2. Scope and Method 
A major investigation of Catholic social thought vas published 
in 1950 by Melvin Williams . 3 One of the author's endeavors is to sift 
f'rom a large mass of material the sociological thought of catholics . 
This involves the problem of defining sociology according to Catholics. 
His vork includes a survey of statements by philosophers, theologians, 
4 
moralists, and a variety of social scientists. catholics themselves 
until very recently have not distinguished sharply among the social 
1sociologists of other countries vho vere Catholics have bad 
greater recognition than their counterparts in America. For the European 
development, see Williams, catholic Social Thought, pp. 50-6o, and the 
brief summary in this chapter, below. 
2 See Chapter III. 
3wmiams, Catholic Social Thought. 
~ Ross, Review of Williams, Catholic Social Thought, Am. Jr. 
Soc., 56(1950-1951), 206- 207, notes that this vork does not include 
materials going much beyond 1940 and the founding of the American 
Catholic Sociological Society. Many important developments have taken 
place since then. This dissertation is especially concerned with the 
meaning and direction of these . 
11 
thought of these various disciplines. This dissertation will not endeavor 
to decide vhat is sociological in the thougbt of Catholics1 but, rather, 
vUl turn to a specific situation in which there has been a self-conscious 
effort to be sociologica.l. and where a non- sectarian development in sociol-
ogy bas served as a comparison and cont rast . This has taken place in the 
United States. 
For the purposes of this study, Catholic sociologists vill be 
considered to be those individua.ls who have (1) written about sociology 
(including criticism of non- Catholic sociologists), (2) writers who have 
studied specific social situations using sociological methods, (3) 
writers of' textbooks in sociology, (4) sociological theorists, i . e . , 
those who have attempted to make generalizations about social processes 
and relations on the basis of empirical study. 2 
This is somewhat arbitrary because one finds sociological in-
sights in writers who, according to these limitations, could not be called 
sociologists (Fulton Sheen, for instance) . Also, especially in the case 
of material which the writers call sociology, there may be questions as 
to the sociological nature of t he content. These problems are more in 
evidence in earlier works. The development of' sociology among Catholics 
in the United States has increasingly paralleled non-Catholic vork. 
!williams suggests criteria for distinguishing sociology from 
other social sciences in his conclusion. Catholic Social Thought, p. 426. 
2williams recognizes the danger of' reading into empirical studies 
the analyst's biases. Thus, he lays his groundwork for studying the 
social thought of' Catholics, especially the sociological aspects, on what 
Catholics themselves say about sociology. ~., p . 66. 
12 
The United states is chosen as the area of study for the following 
reasons: (1) there is here a body of sociological material produced by 
Catholics which is readily compared with non-Catholic material; (2) the 
development of sociology bas not been broken by unusual social upheavals 
w'hich might tend to inject special value conflicts, e .g., a cont'lict with 
the Communist party; (3) the great popularity of positivism among non-
Catholics makes the problem of norms more apparent; (4.) the inf'luence of 
American culture on Catholic thought heightens the tension produced by 
(3) above, but at the same time enables Catholics to be congenial to much 
of the sociology developed in the United States among non-Catholics.1 
The period from which these writings v1ll be taken for ana.lysis 
coincides with the establishment of the first department of sociology 
in a Catholic school of higher education, roughly the last sixty years. 
The term urole" as used in this study implies the concept of 
function. There is in the field of f'unctional. analysis in sociology a 
growing body of material that is suggestive for the method of this 
study. It must be understood, however, that f'unctional. ana.lysis as com-
monly used in sociology cannot be applied here in its entirety.2 Since 
it is couched in terms that apply to the functional relationship among 
items in a social structure, there are certain aspects that are not ap-
plicable to this analysis. This is true because this study is formally 
1For a discussion of the influence of American culture on the 
Catholic intellectual development, see Walter J. Ong, Frontiers in 
American Catholicism (N.Y. : The Macmil 1 an Co., 1957). 
~ basis for this adaptation of f\mctional analysis is found 
in Merton, Social Theory, pp. 19-6o. 
13 
not concerned v1 th the description and analysis ot society, but vi th a. 
particular approach to such a study. In a broad sense, it may be called 
1 
meta.sociologieal rather than sociological. 
'!'be term "f'lmctional" sba.ll mean the process by which one or a 
class ot variables contribute to the 118intenance or change of another 
one or class of variables in a universe of discourse. There are tvo 
basic implications in this definition. (1) There is no assum:ption that 
relationships in a. uniTerse of discourse DIUSt necessarily maintain each 
other. ~us, catholic norms may be judged to be dys:f'unctional. in the 
pursuit ot knowledge about society. ( 2) While there are important rela.-
tionships between the :f'unction vbich the data. serve and the 110tivation 
of the persons whose work is being studied, fUnction and motive are not 
identical. We are not inquiring primarily into the motivation ot 
Catholics in their particular use of norms. It may be, however, that 
the motivation ot catholics in their use of nol"'IB shows what the raJ18e 
of possibilities in the function of norms is. 
'!'he data. that v1ll be pertinent to a. f'unctional analysis must be 
chosen on the basis ot the theory suggested. This study is interested 
in the norms which Catholics may incorporate in their sociological work, 
rather than the philosophical and theological sources of these norms. 
1 Paul Fu:rfey uses the term "llletasociology" in a narrower sense 
to mean the study of sociology troa the standpoint ot its scientific 
quality, its relevance, and its practical application. (Paul B. Furtey, 
Tbe Scope and Method of Sociology [I. I. : lJarper and Bros., 1953] . ) The 
term is used here in a broader sense to mean, in addition to the study 
of these aspects of sociology, the ontological status of social phenomena, 
especially Talues. This is the sense in which Bi dney uses the tersa 
"Detaantbropology" with reference to culture. See Bidney, Theoretical 
Anthropology', pp. 163-164. 
14 
Such data does serve to clarity the meaning of the norms and may even help 
to establish that the catholic intellectual synthesis requi.res that these 
norms have a particular role. Likewise, sociologi cal data about catholics 
may clarity the problem of the role of norms in their sociological work. 
FUnctional analysis suggests the following procedure for the 
study: 
Chapter I: (1) The standarized item that is to be subjected to 
analysis must be specified. The term "norm" as herein defined fulfills 
this requirement. (2) The criterion of fUnctionality must be specified. 
It has been established that this study seeks enlightenment on the ge.n-
eral problem of knowledge about the most adequate approximation of the 
ideal relationships among persons in society. Norms are funct i onal to 
the degree that they facilitate this search in a coherent approach. 
(3) If there are other elements that also facilitate the purpose sug-
gested above, they must be recognized. Such would be statistical analysis, 
opinion polls, and other sociological methods in general use. (4) Biases 
on the part of the investigator must be stated. This does not mean, 
however, that fUnctional analysis is committed to a particular ideology. 
While efforts will be made to maintain objectivity, the hypothesis is 
that norms can play a significant role in the attainment of knowledge 
about human relationships in society. The conclusion will suggest hov 
norms must be conceived if they are to fUnction in this way. 
Chapter II: (1) What is the range of relationships that norms 
can have to sociological study? Three are suggested: (a) norms as 
propositions about sociological data, e.g., man and society; (b) norms 
15 
as propositions which judge the validity of human values; (c) norms as 
propositions which guide the methodology ot sociology. (2) 'ro what 
other sociological positions can that of Catholics be compared in their 
use ot norms? Perspectives &re established tor this purpose. 
Chapter m: (1) Insofar as motivation, theological and philo-
sophical sources, and sociological conditions are relevant, they are 
discussed. (2) statements about the role ot norms are diseussed, making 
use of the three t old perspec.t ive established in the previous chapter. 
Chapter IV: (1) 'rhe way in which norms e.re used is a.nal.yzed by 
reference to particular sociological works by Catholics. (2) Cor-
respondence between the use of nol'IIS and the results ot sociological 
studies is investigated. 
Chapter V: (1) The extent to which norms fulfill f'unctional re-
quirements is suggested. (2) The extent to which Catholic norms are 
f'unctional in sociological analysis is suggested. (3) A suggested point 
of view tor the role of norms in relation to sociology is set forth . 
It is not likely that this study vill be fully comprehensible 
without a statement ot the assumptions ot the writer. This is a some-
what ditficul t approach since the need to make assumptions clear is an 
assumption with which some sociologists would argue. Its validity is 
based primarily on the methodological portion of An American Dilemma by 
Gunnar Myrdal.1 It is his contention that social scientists inert tably 
~~ An American Dilemma, II. See Chapter II for a more 
extensive treatment of this position. 
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have value-.ludgments whether they are explicity recognized or not. It 
is a major canon of scientific method that all of the steps of research 
be made clear, thus avoiding the possibility of injecting a procedure 
or consideration which would not bear logical analysis. 
The background concern of this study is the problem. of the 
validation of ethical norms. In what sense are they validated? How 
are empirical studies related to the process of verification? That 
there are seTer&l approaches to reality is assumed, e.g., sense percep-
tion, reason, intuition, and revelation. It is further assumed that 
these approaches to reality complement and correct each other, the 
criterion of coherence being the final arbiter of claims to truth. 
Fina.11y, the study is grounded in the writer's concern for respect for 
personality as the norm of conduct.1 
3. Definitions 
In establishing definitions for this study, two important prin-
ciples are to be used. One is that of operationalism.. Robert Merton 
points out in an article on empirical research that one of the frequent 
defects in research is the lack of clearly defined concepts. Researchers 
find verifiable causal connections without ever determining the actual 
nature of the variables. He writes: "For a basic requirement of re-
search is tbat the concepts, the variables, be defined with sutticient 
clarity to enable the research to proceed. "2 This is the broad meaning 
1 The philosophical position followed here vU.l be the personal 
idealism of E. s. Brightman. 
2xerton, Social Theory, p. 115. 
of "operationalismtJ. although some social scientists have narrowed the 
2 
word to mean the establishment of a mathematical index tor a concept. 
This is clearly a bias which assumes that only statements which are 
subject to mathematical formulation are usable in empirical research. 
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But it will be the effort of this study to use consistently the concepts 
herein defined. 3 
A second principle of definition is stated by Brightman: 
• All definitions are attempts to describe or point out 
fundamental theoretical concepts. They are therefore to be re-
garded as hypotheses subject to correction. • • • Definitions 
are not4dogmas or embalmed truths. They are guides to investi-gation. 
It concepts are to remain operational, they must constantly be 
tested by experience, or else they eease to be so. SUch alterations of 
concepts, it they take place, must be clearly specified, along with the 
j ustitication found in experience. 
i. Value.--This study Will follow an interest theory ot values. 
That is, on the psychological level, value is to be understood as that 
which is "liked, desired, prized, enjoyed, preferred, or acknowledged as 
interesting, important, or worthy ot approval . "5 Thus, value is in the 
l 
Arnold Rose, Theory and Method in the Social Sciences 
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1954), p. 154. 
2Ibid. 
~or the importance ot operational concepts in sociological 
theory, see Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, p . 5. 
4 Edgar s. Brightman, A Philosopy of Religion (N.Y.: Prentice-
Hall , Inc., 1940), p. 88. 
5Brightman, Introduction to Philosophy, p . 141. 
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first instance a subjective experience. It is because of' a valuer that 
anything has value. Values are values f'or persons. On this level the 
value ~ be intrinsic, i.e., the valuer may value an experience f'or its 
own sake; or it~ be i .nstramental, i.e . , the valuer may value an exper-
ience because it contributes to the realization of' another or other 
values. On the subjective level the designation of' values as i .ntrinsic 
or instrumental depends on the interests of' the valuer. Bovever, on the 
objective1 level it is possible to establish a hierarchy of' values and 
to term some values intrinsic and others instrumental according to certain 
norms. Thus, f'or example, a man may like :money as an end in itself'. 
But reason and experience v1ll tell him that money as an end in itself' 
is destructive of' the valuer and according to the norm of' personality can 
be considered only an instl"UIIlental value. 2 
ii. Ideals and Norms. --All values must be subject to critical 
analysis and their claims to value must be considered in the light of' 
other experience. 1'hey must be veri:t"ied as true values. An ideal is the 
rationally held concept o:t" what a value ought to be, or a true value. As 
a guide to valuing, the ideal is eal.led a norm. Ideals and norms are 
lva1ues as herein defined are objective in tbat they may be 
criticized by reason, exist as a relationship between a subject and an 
object, and give rise to obligation. Norms are also objective in this 
sense, but norms are metapcysieal.ly objective as well as logically, 
epistemologically, and socially objective. B,y metaphysically objective 
we mean that they transcend given historical content. See Bidney, 
Theoretical Anthropology, pp. 457-~3; and George F. Thomas, Christian 
Ethics and Moral Phllosopy (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), 
pp. 428-429. 
~ s. Brightman, Nature and Values (lfashville, Tenn. : 
Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945), p. 70. 
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true it they stand the test ot a coherent appeal to all releYant exper-
ience. As used in this study, a norm is taken to mean a standard or 
guide. It is a "rational. concept of what ought to be in some area of 
intrinsic value. ,J. A norm itself is instrumenta.l in that it is a guide 
for realizing true value. In this study we shall be dea.ling with such 
norms as the belief about the nature and purpose of the universe, of God, 
of man, of society, the nature and verifiability of Truth or truths, norms 
of human conduct and r:4;ht thinking, and what is good. As Dewey s~s: 
Reterence to a norm may roughly be taken to discriminate the 
philosophic ~ the natural sciences. The latter aim simply 
to describe phenomena and explain them in terms of laws or 
principles homogeneous with the facts. The explaining prin-
ciples are, moreover, mechanical, having to do with conditions 
of manifestation in time . In the philosophic sciences, facts 
are interpreted with reference to their meaning or value--
their significance from tl::e position occupied, or part played, 
by them in the tota.l makeup ot ex;perience. The standpoint is 
moreover, teleological, since the interest is not in the con-
ditions of origin, but 1n2 the :f'ultillment of purpose in realizing their appropriate values. 
Part of the problem of the dissertation will be the relationship 
between science and norms. 
iii. Experience.--Tbe word experience will be used to designate a 
wider concept than sense ex;perience. It will mean all conscious exper-
ience: perceptions, memory, knowledge, beliefs, hope, reasoning. 3 
iv. Coherence . --The rational norm which is the ultimate appeal 
1 Brightman, Introduction to Philosopq, p. 142. 
2 John Devey, "Norm and Normative," Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Psychology, ed. J. Baldwin, II, 182. 
3 Brightman, Moral Laws, p . 56. 
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ot the study is that of coherence, .ean1ng a "comprehensive, synoptic 
view of all experience. " The eohereAce theory otters the following 
criterion: any proposition is true, it it is both self-consistent and 
coherently connected vi th a system of propositions as a whole. The 
working test of truth is maxiwum coherence. The very facts of exper-
ience indicate that this cannot be a static situation. Irev experiences 
require a revision of propositions. 
v. Sociology.--Hunti.ngton C&1rns wrote in 1946, uUntU socioJ.o-
gists themselves define the obJect of their study it v1J.l have to be 
assumed that socioJ.ogy is what men who call the:JilSeJ.ves sociologists 
vrite about. nl The problea which Cairns points to is probably not 
solved u witnessed by the recent symposium edited by John Gillin 
2 
entitled For a Science of Soaial Man. The probJ.em involves both the 
proper object of study and the methodology. The nature of sociology is 
also a central problea for the Catholic sociologist a. Williams attempts 
to answer this question as a conclusion to his study of CathoJ.ic Soci&l. 
Thought. Paul. Furf'e;r' s study is of a more profound nature and is meant 
3 tor sociologists in general. We shall discuss these works in greater 
detail at J.ater points. This study does not propose to supply an answer 
to the question of the nature of sociology, although a consideration of 
1 Huntington Cairns, "Sociology and the Social Sciences, " 
Tventieth Century Soc1ol9fl, eda. G. Gurrttch and w. E. Moore (lf.Y. : 
Philosophieal Library, 19 ), pp. 4-5. 
2 John Gillin, For a Science of Soaial Man (N.Y.: The Maemillan 
eo., 1954). 
~ey, Scope and Method. 
2J. 
the role of norms is certainly indispensable to an answer. 
Talcott Parsons defines sociology as being "clearly concerned 
with the observation and analysis ot human social behavior, that is, the 
interaction ot pluralities of human beings, the forms their relationships 
take, and a variety of the conditions and determinants of these forms 
and changes in them. ttl Sorokin' s detini tion is substantially the same: 
"A genera.l.izing science of socio-eultural. phenomena revieved in their 
2 generic forms, types, and manifold innerconneetions . " Much less specific 
is the detinition given in the Dictionary of Sociologr:3 ~e scientific 
studJ" of the phenomena arising out ot the group relations of human beings. " 
Giddings and Baldwin writing in the Dictionary ot Psychology and Philoso-
~ ref'lect an early stage in the devel.opDent of sociology in a discus-
4 
sion which emphasizes a philosophical and theoretical approach. Coming 
before the extensive development of empirical methods in sociology this 
is not surprising. 
A definition quoted by many Roman Catholic writers is that ot 
Gustav Gundlach: 
~cott Parsons, "Psychology and Sociology, " For a Science of 
Social Man, ed. Jolm Gillin (B.Y.: The MaOII.illan Co., 1954), P• 68. 
~gan Wilson and William Kolb, Sociological Analysis (N. Y. : 
Harcourt Brace and Co . , 1949), p . 3 . 
3 Henry Fairehild, ed. , Dictionary ot Sociology (Ames, Iowa: 
Littlefield, Adams ana. eo. , 1955), p. 302. 
4 
James Baldwin, ed.. , Dictionary of Psychology and Sociology: 
(N.Y. : The Macmillan Co., 1911), pp:544ff. 
Sociology is that factua.l and empirical science which bas as 
its formal object the social process of integration whereby 
men are united to form social structures and which, in par-
ticular, studies and classifies the proximate causes of this 
integrative process .l 
The similarity of this definition to those of Parsons and 
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Sorokin is evident. It is in relation to sociology thus defined that 
most Catholic sociologists make their positions clear. Thus, Ross 
defines sociology as treating of "man's relations with his fellowmen--
studying human society 1 its customs, institutions, and their develop-
ment at all times and places. "2 
While these Catholic definitions seem to coincide with the ttnder-
standing of sociology as an empirical science typical of non-sectarian 
writers, most Catholic writers mean more than that . According to Furfey, 
there are two ways of looking at sociology: narrowly, as a purely 
inductive science (as above), and broadly, as also deductively resting 
on the postulates of other sciences, such as ethics and moral theology. 3 
Furfey' s definition in the narrow sense remains empirical, but 
his broader definition poses the question of the relationship between 
sociological theory and philosophy and theology. Insofar as sociology 
~anz Mueller, "Some Rem6rks on the Logic and Grammar of 
Sociology," Am. Oath. Soc. Rev., 10(1949), 1· 
~ Ross, "Sociology and the Catholic," Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 
1(1940), 6. 
3Paul Furfey, 1Value-judgments in Sociology, 11 Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 
7(1946), 86. In his recent work, 'rb.e Scope and Method of Sociology, 
Furfey recognizes the great difficulty in defining sociology. There he 
begins by accepting as sociological whatever is taught under the name, 
contained in periodicals 1 books, etc. 1 and material presented before 
sociological societies . See p . 2. 
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for catholics rests on postulates drawn from ethics and moral theology, 
and insofar as Catholic ethics and theology are distinctive, it may be 
legitimate to infer that there is a distinctive Catholic sociology. 
This dual. role of sociology is evident in much catholic writing. 
Both Fitzpatrick and Ross bear this out in emphasizing the responsibil-
ity of the sociologist vho is a catholic for inductive and empirical 
research.1 Ross asks, "Are ve catholics to aim at being first class 
inductive scientists and nothing more? LePlay vas of this type. " Ross 
doubts if there have been others like LePlay, and, deploring the fact 
that there have not, points to the need for catholics in "pure inductive 
2 
research." 
On the other hand, there are Catholic writers who think there is 
a need for and a possibility of a Catholic sociology as called for by 
Pope Pius xr.3 Cavanaugh writes: 
From my experience in catholic graduate schools of sociology 
and in classes of a state university not specially known as a 
radical school, I believe the two sociololies, Catholic and non-
sectarian, can never reach common ground. 
There is a vast abyss separating the two sociologies, according 
to Cavanaugh, mainly in terms of underlying postulates, as regards the 
existence of immutable social laws, the nature and rights of man, and the 
1Joseph Fitzpatrick, "Catholic Responsibilities in Sociology," 
Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 26(1951) 1 384-396. 
~oss, "Sociology and the catholic, II P• 7. 
3 Joseph Russlein, Social Wellsprings (Milwaukee: The Bruce Co . , 
1940), II, 183-184. 
4Frank Cavanaugh, ''Modern Sociology," Commonweal, 18(1933)1 
156-157· 
end of marriage, among others. 
!his vas in ~933 . 'fen years later, in his Presidential Address 
before the .American Catholic Sociological Society, Father Hartnett called 
for a Catholic sociology which combines three elements: the determi.na-
tion of goals found in the Catholic value system, the consulting of 
experience through systematized observations of sociology, and the formu-
lation of prudent judgments on t he basis of the maJor premises of the 
goals and the -.inor premises of the .eans (systematized observation} •1 
Ross sharpens the issue in her reply to Hartnett, obJecting to 
the Society becoming a ''propaganda organization." She emphasizes the 
scientific responsibility of the sociologist "as a scholar who gathers 
facts • • • about social groups and social relations, analyzes them, 
2 
correlates tbem, and then comes to certain conclusions about them." 
The problem of definiDg the scope of sociology is recognized by 
Catholics, but the issues are clearly enough drawn to indicate that the 
problem turns primarily on the role of nol'llS and, beyond this, the nature 
of the specific norms. 
4. Summary of Research 
Professor Melvin Williams has made a very valuable survey of the 
Catholic contributions to social thought, including the social sciences, 
1 
Robert c. Hartnett, "A Postwar Reconstruction Program for the 
A. c. S. s.," Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 4(1943), ~03-~04. 
2 
Eva Ross, "The Socio~ogist ' s Contribution to Postwar Recon-
struction," Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 4(~943), 3, and Comment on article by 
Hartnett, All. Cath. Soc. Rev., 4(1943), 108. 
in his expanded doctor's thesis, published under the title, Catholic 
Social Thought . In it he summarizes from an historical perspective a 
vast amount of material, which Father Paul Furfey of the Catholic 
University of America calls a unique contribution: "The task of sum-
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marizing in a s ingle volume the varied contributions of Catholic scholars 
to all the social sciences . ul This volume has been a primary stimulus to 
the present study. It is essentially historical rather than analytical . 
It covers the whole range of Catholic social thought, of which sociology 
is a part, and as such is a valuable source of Catholic material up to 
1949, although material since 194o is not extensively used. 2 
In Part I, Williams shows the background and development of 
Catholic social thought, beginning vi th the thought of St. Thomas and 
influenced by the reforms associated with the breakdown of the feudal 
system and the changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution. He calls 
the application of Catholic social principles to the problems of society, 
"social Catholicism • .,3 Williams says: 
This aspect of social thought resolves itself into a type of 
social doctrine based upon the Catholic conception of the 
natural law and social philosophy in general . The doctrines 
of social Catholicism represent a unified pattern of thought 
which has developed out ~f the wider sociophilosophical system 
of the Church tradition. 
\iilliams, Catholic Social Thought, p. v . 
2 Eva Ross, Review of Williams, pp. 206-207. 
3williams, op. cit ., p . 36. 
4 Ibid., p . 36. 
These basic princip1es have been set forth in the social 
encyclicals of Pius XI and Leo xrn. This viewpoint begins with the 
nature of the individual and extends to the nature and function of the 
family, doctrines concerning the laboring cl.ass and labor, private 
property and ownership, the responsibility of the state for social 
betterment, and the principles of charity and justice.1 
The Church and other Catholic institutions and agencies, as 
well as f'ai thf'ul individual leaders, all have ded.icated and 
continue to dedicate themselves to the task of' building a more 
orderly society by following these doctr~es and by furthering 
the social bonds of justice and charity. 
Williams notes that these principles have a direct bearing on 
the developuent of sociology among Catholics . In fact, social Catholicism 
may be considered a fruitful field for sociological investigation. Of' 
Catholics as sociologists in relation to social Catholicism, he states 
that it is the duty of the sociologist to teach these principles in order 
that the students may understand social conditions and work construe-
tively in society. The main task of the Catholic social thinker is to 
develop appropriate approaches to new social situations based on the 
fundamental and unchangeable princip1es of religion. 3 
Part II surveys the contributions by Catholics to sociological 
theory. This is really an attempt to sift out of' the voluminous work by 
Catholics on various social problems material that might in some sense 
be called scientific. Williams quotes Sorokin and notes that Catholics 
1Williams, Catholic Social Thought, p. 36. 
2 3 40 Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., p. . 
also approve of the judgment that the worlaJof some Catholic sociologists 
"o:t'ten contain the most valuable scientific observations, statements, 
and hypotheses. ul This could be said, of course, ot many who have 
written about society, even those who antedate modern science by cen-
turies and some who are not scientists . We might seriously question the 
scientific sociological value of such contributions apart from sound 
empirical research. It is only in a special sense that these earlier 
thinkers can be called sociologists. 
Williams builds on the approach of Part II by suggesting a line 
ot development of scientific sociology among Catholics, turning to the 
early founders in the person of such men as Frederick LePlay, French in-
vestigator of family life in Europe, whose work is recognized generally 
as empirically sound. Williams' criteria tor selecting founders of 
scientific sociology among Catholics are as follows: 
(1) Originality in developing a system of theories and methods; 
{2) the degree of influence which the individual student exerted 
upon his contemporaries and successors; (3) specialization of 
study and research; {4) the quality and quantity of actual 
scientific sociological research; (5) the pioneering spirit and 
enthusiasm represented in such activities as teaching, organizing 
scientific sociological groups, conduct~ research, and outlining 
plans tor further sociological pursuits.2 
On the basis of these criteria he lists founders from various countries, 
beginning with LePla.y in France (1805-1882). It was under his influence 
coupled with the encyclical Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo XIII that the idea 
ot a Catholic sociology began to take place. others whom Williams 
1Will1a.ms, Catholic Social Thought, p. 48. 
2 Ibid., p . 50. 
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considers to be founders of Catholic sociology are J. D. J. Aegenent of 
Leyden, who was the first to write a sociology textbook outlining a 
Catholic system of sociology. While he thought of sociology as a 
branch of mora.l philosophy or ethics, he recognized the possibility of 
empirica.l study .1 Sandor Giesswein in 1luDgary, writing primarily as a 
reformer, sav the importance of the sociopsychologicaJ. assumption of the 
rea.lity of both the individual and society, an insight which Williams 
sees as a foretaste of the work of Cooley and Ellwood.2 Max Scheler did 
important work in the sociology of knowledge, a.long which lines he might 
have developed ideas similar to Karl Mannheim, according to Williams . 
Osva.ld Nell - Breuning' s unique contribution is the suggestion that the 
social sciences have a relati Te autonomy in an approach to reaJ.i ty, their 
main function being empirical research. 
Of course Nell - Breuning would not advocate complete autonomy 
for any science , for such license might conceivably lead to 
contlicting ends, especially if such freedom is interpreted 
as the right to proceed trom any hypothesis regardless of its 
moral or scientific basis .• •• True ends finally condition the 
quality of any science, and to the extent that these ends moti-
vate and stimulate social research, to that extent they take 
on a truly scientific character.3 
Gustav Gundlach in Germany followed Nell - Breuning in this 
respect and defines sociology as a factual and empirical science . This 
point of view has found following in the United States, which Williams 
says "shows promise of important sociological trends when certain basic 
methodological problems have been worked out. "4 Since Williams wrote 
!williams, Catholic Social Thought, p . 52. 
2 Ibid., p. 53· 3Ibid. , p. 56. 4 Ibid. , p . 57. 
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Father Furf'ey has produced an important vork, The Scope and Method of 
Sociology, which is an attempt to work out the methodological problems. 
In England and Ireland the development of sociology among 
Catholics has not taken the empirical direction apparent in other 
countries . Sociology is regarded there as a synthesis of religion, 
politics, jurisprudence, history, economics, and philosophy. The 
Catholic sociologist can readily be distinguished trom the non-sectarian 
sociologist with his frequent positivistic and materialistic position. 
Promi~.nt in this development have been Father T. Slater, Father Lewis 
Watt, and Father Edward Cahill. studies by Christopher Dawson make use 
of empirical approaches which bring together several social sciences. 
His work is not systematic sociology, but it does contain many sociologi-
cal insights •1 
Sociology among Catholics in America, says Williams, begins 
with Professor William Kerby, whose point of viev followed Tery much 
that of the English school, i.e . , in emphasizing the religious and ethi-
cal aspects of the science. Be spoke of a Christian sociology. Be 
represents what Williams calls the synthetic school of thought. other 
leaders in American Catholic social thought have been John A. Ryan and 
Francis Baas. Early Catholic social thought vas taken up with economic 
problems, which the writing of these men reflect. Kerby's synthetic 
approach has lately been penetrated by the German influence vi th its 
emphasis on the relative autonomy of sociology.2 
Williams suggests that a survey of the development of sociology 
~illiams, Catholic Social Thought, pp. 59-6o. 
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among Catholics reveals four emphases: (1) sooial philosophy, having 
its basis in traditional Catholic social philosophy; (2) social 
Catholicism, stressing Christian principles and social reform; (3) 
synthetic (philosophical) sociology, stressing the interrelation of the 
two above-mentioned emphases, while seeking to establish a more organized 
and systematic approa.oh to "social science"; (4) empirical sociology or 
the sociational school, which would delimit the subject matter of sociol-
ogy to the process of "sociation • .,1 
It is these last two emphases that bave characterized recent 
sociological development among Catholics . The situation in America 
roughly approximates a contention between these two points of view. It 
v111 be the task of a later chapter of this dissertation to suggest the 
most recent developments in this controversy. 
It becomes more obvious in the main portion of Williams 1 work 
what his essential problem is. It is that of identi.fying the forma.l 
obj eet of sociology so that it 71JB.Y' be distinguished froll other social. 
sciences. Williams 1 study covers Tirtua.lly all of the Catholic work in 
the social sciences in this effort. It is his contention, for which he 
finds support in Catholic approaches to the social. sciences, that the 
methodology of the social. sciences is one, and that it is the formal 
object of each science which distinguishes it. 
Williams concludes that all social. science for the Catholic bas 
a unity of thought which is deeply rooted in Catholic tradition developed 
by St. Thomas and the scholastics. Yet despite this unity Catholic 
lwilliams, Catholic Social Thought, p. 65. 
social thought bas been influenced by socio-historical movements, which 
have tended to develop a 11dialectical and apologetic point of view toward 
much of the modern emphasis upon materialism, sensualism and humanism 
which has seemingly been out of harmony with the general sociophilosophi-
cal system of the Catholic tradition . ,.1 On the other hand, Catholics 
have sought to meet the social problems while preserving the values of 
the religion. 
This latter emphasis produced the great social encyclicals of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which have become the "social :f'ra.me-
work for guiding modern catholic social theorists and practitioners in 
2 
their social thought and planning. " 
While in some respects the social thought stimulated by the 
encyclicals is the logical consequence of and antithesis of anti -
Catholic, anti -religious, and nat uralistic social thought, the study 
shows that the encyclicals and the social ideas growing out of them were 
not produced to take the place of empir ical studies of the social process 
and interhuman relations, but merely to supplement, strengthen, and guide 
man in his endeavor to know more accurately the facts concerning himself 
and his social needs .3 
Five principles underlie most of the social thinking of Catholic 
students of the social sciences: (1) the setting forth of the Catholic 
philosophy of society; (2) explaining and instilling the social principles 
of the Church; (3) applying these sociophilosophical principles in an 
1 
Williams, Catholic Social Thought, p . 419. 
2Ibid., p. 42o. 3Ibid. , P• 420. 
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effort to ameliorate social ills; (4) criticizing "anti-Catholic, anti-
religious, and unchristian theories of social life and human relations; " 
and ( 5) discovering and synthesizing the pertinent facts of social 
1 
relations. 
The nature and purpose of sociology according to Catholics is a 
major finding which Williams summa.rizes in relation to two schools ot 
thought, the synthetic and the sociational or empirical. Combining the 
tvo the following emphases appear: 
Sociology studies: (1} the interrelations of all social (re-
ligious, anthropological, economic, and psychological) phenomena; 
(2) the interrelations of all social and certain non- social 
(geographical, biological, and theological) phenomena; (3) the 
interrelation of social and nonsoc~al phenomena in one phase of 
(sociation in) the social process . 
Finding this scope similar to nonsectarian sociologists, Williams 
suggests that the most fundamental aspect of sociology is methodology. 
The task of sociology is to develop a methodology that vill be acceptable 
to all sociologists. The methological frame of' reference which Williams 
outlines for Catholic sociologists after his survey of Catholic social 
thought is as follows: he refers to it as a system of values, which are 
"fundamental in the synthesis of Catholic sociological thought. u3 
(1) Man is not interested in proving that which has already 
been proved; he is interested, however, in "understanding" in 
what ways phenomena exist, tbat is, in understanding the way 
thi.Dgs are which are. (2) All purely speculative sciences such 
as phUosophy and ethics are concerned with the ideal. (3) 
The field of all the empirical sciences is in the realm of secon-
dary causes--empirical reality. (4) The :field ot all social 
1Williams, 
2 Ibid . , p. 
Catholic Social Thought, p. 420. 
3 422. Ibid. , p. 424. 
cultural. sciences is society and culture. (5) All knowledge 
or attainment of intellectual truth comes f'rom "sense"--f'rom 
the hama.n capa.ci ty to think and reason in light of experience • 
(6) Religious feelings and belief's, philosophical, ethical, 
and metaphysical appreciations and valuations constitute some 
of the experiences of man. These experiences are given a 
value • • . become intertvined vi th other experiences • . • 
forming a system of values • •. • Therefore the seem1ng)y non-
social, the truths which one accepts, because of the value given 
to them in social lite, are social facts 1 and to that extent 
empirical, reaL (7) The integration of' these seemingly 
abstract values with the commonly accepted social values (such 
as education and recreation) constitute one's frame of refer-
ence or system of' values in relation to which an individual 
makes judgments, performs acts, and so on • ••. Thus the 
reality of all phenomena, as one 11understands" it, exists in 
human experiences because these phenomena constitute value. 
(8) Knowledge is attained through the intellectual processes 
of' deduction e.nd induction, which are part of experience. 
(9) Through this naturally inter-related process of deduction 
and induction one consciously or unconsciously gai.ns "under-
standing" or "insight. " (10) Experience is a continuing process. 
Thus knowledge is always relatfve, but always becoming more 
in accordance with the actual. 
On the basis of this Williams suggests the need for a broader 
definition of sociology. 
If science be viewed as all endeavor to ascertain all facts 
and all their interrelations, and if we accept the view that 
sociology is a science, then we must say that sociology is 
all endeavor to ascertain all facts of' the social process and 
their interrelations.2 
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Williams feels that Catholics are in a good position to pursue 
what he calls the broader approach to sociology. This broader approach 
is basically a synthesis of deduction and induction and the recognition 
of' values as social facts. This, he says, is really more scientific 
than the approaches of many non-Catholic sociologists. 
lwilliams, Catholic Social Thought, pp. 424 - 426. 
2Ibid., p. 426. 
There will be occasion later to criticize these findings in 
greater detail, but at the present, it seems important to note that 
Williams is not dea.ling with the basic argument between Catholic and non-
Catholic sociologists. The argument is not whether or not va.l.ues are 
social facts~ but rather will all values be treated as social facts, i.e., 
subjected to comparison, criticism, and scrutiny with the possibility 
that they be judged to be wholly subjective or nonrational. For the 
Catholic, some values are not subject to this treatment. They are norma-
tive. When Williams states that there should be an environment of free 
competition between opposite biases,1 he is suggesting something that is 
not altogether acceptable to the Catholic theological position. 
lwilliams, Catholic Social Thought, p . 433 · 
CHAPTER II 
PERSPEariVES ON THE ROLE OF BORMS IN SOCIOLOGY 
1. Introduction 
In approaching the study of the role of norms in the sociologi-
cal writings of any one person or group of persons, it is necessary to 
establish the perspectives by which the general problem is to be viewed. . 
Thus, this chapter will investigate the normative implications of the 
developing science of sociology. 
The explicit or implicit relativism which is demonstrably a 
part of many sociological points of view is both logically and ethically 
inadequate . Such considerations bave suggested the possibility that 
the multiplicity of values which persons hold may be subject to some 
1 process of verification. The self-refUting nature of relativism 
presses the rational mind to search tor the assurance that communica-
tion is possible and that experience has continuity. 2 What is more, 
the continued. existence of mankind may depend in large measure on an 
answer to ethical relativism. 
1See Ray Lepley, Verifiability of Value (N.Y. : Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1944). Ct. Cornelius L. Golightly, "Social Science and 
Normative Ethics," Jr. Phil., -44(1948), 516. 
2Morris Cohen and Ernst Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and 
Scientific Method (N.Y. : Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1934), p . 352f1'. 
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Values have been a concern tor philosophers as vel.l as socio-
logists. This study assumes that Tarieties of approaches to reality 
ms:y be separated for the convenience of a division of labor and because 
1 different kinds of data are subject to different kinds of methodology. 
However, the 110re far-reaching resolutions in problems of understanding 
reality come through a coherent approaoh. 2 For this reason, it is un-
likely that the problem of values vUl move closer to solution as long 
as it is confined to only one kind ot analysis, e.g. , sociological . 
!his chapter, therefore, draws the philosophical and ethical implications 
of major sociological perspectives on the problem of values .3 
4 tives: 
The present approach v1ll be to deal. with three major perspec-
i. Postulates about the subject matter of sociology. --This is a 
problem of the relationship between the .knower and the data he apprehends. 
Historical.ly, the recognition that the sociologist's values may infiuence 
what he sees is the turning point f'rom social speculation to sociology. 
~t is, refined techniques. Logic and consistency are pre-
sumably necessary to all orderly thinking. 
2 See detinition on pages 19-20. 
3 Social scientists sometimes recognize the importance of such an 
approach. See Clyde lQ.uckhohn in Toward a General. Theory of Action, eds. 
'fal.cott Parsons and Edward Sbils, pp. 388-433; and Howard Becker, 
Through Values to Social Interpretation (Durham, B.C. : Duke UD.iversity 
Press, 1950). 
4 Furfey, Scope and Method, suggests a similar division, pp. 15-16. 
Cf. Furfey, "Value-judgments in Sociology," pp. 83-95. 
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Various aspects ot the problem are suggested in such terms as "the 
sociology ot knowledge, ,J. "value-tree sociology, "2 "the role ot biases, u3 
4 
and "the presuppositions ot science." The effect ot most analyses and 
solutions bas been to lf$ve the choice ot values on a subjective plane. 
The result is tbat conclusions have only hypothetical T&l.idi ty because 
another set of value premises might change them. The pri.mary reason for 
makjng value-judgments explicit is to guard against hidden biases.5 
At its deepest leTel we face the issue ot the metaphysical founda-
tiona of the science. Says Whitehead: 
Thus the certainties of science are a delusion. They are hedged 
around Yith unexplored limitations. OUr handling ot scientific 
doctrines is gontrolled by the dif'tuse metaphysical concepts 
ot our epoch. 
The question may be raised, tor instance, whether a concept of man is 
not an important consideration in studying human behavior. Yet such 
basic issues otten go 1manaJ yzed. 
The sociologist is faced, then, with the requirement to establish 
norms Which will. tacili tate the movement of the investigation toward a 
~1 Mannheim, Ideology and Ut<?pia, trans. Louis Wirth and 
E. A. Shils (B.Y.: Harcourt, Bruce and Co., 1951). 
~ Weber, The Methodology ot the Social Sciences (Glencoe, Ill. : 
The Free Press, 1949). 
~, An American Di.lemma, II, 1035-lo64. 
4 
Edgar s. Brigl:rtman, "The Presuppositions of Experiment," The 
Personalist, 19(1938), 136-143. ---
5Golight1y, "Social Science and Normative Ethics," p. 513. 
6 
Altred N. Whitehead, Adventures ot Ideas (N.Y.: The Maamillan 
eo., 1933), p . 198. 
fuller apprehension of rea.li ty. Some values are certainly to be prefer-
red to others in this process . By wb.e.t norms shall this choice be made? 
ii. Va.lues as data. --The second maJor perspective bas to do with 
values as the data of sociology. Most sociologists consider values to 
be important aspects of human behavior. Indeed, the measurement of 
va.lues has a prominent place in sociologica.l investigation. These may 
be variously described as "emotive" or "rational. ,1 
The con:f'usion of terminology itself points to a need for clari-
f'ying the nature of values . While sociologists may not legitimately be 
called on to supply the full range of data and analysis to facilitate 
such a pursuit, they can hardly ignore the problem., and at least should 
be consistent with whatever theory of values is implied in their concep-
tualization . The ethics of science itself implies a devotion to values 
which the scientist could not relativize by merely calling them actions.2 
iii. Sociology and ethics. --'lhe third major perspective is con-
cerned vi th the relationship between sociology and ethics. In considera-
tion of the effect of biases in distorting sociological thinking, it may 
be suggested that one solution ~ lie in the direction o! the ways in 
which ethics and sociology can facilitate rather than impede each other's 
work. In addition, the coming together of cultures through economic 
exchanges and through genera.l communication and travel, and the apparent 
1For a discussion o! these different usages, see Franz Adler, 
''The Va.lue Concept in Sociology," Am. Jr. Soc., 52(1956), 2:72-2:79· 
2 AB does Adler, ibid., p. 2:79. 
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need for basic understandiog, have forced on the modern world the need 
to face ethical issues of international community. Here, again, we see 
the need to go beyond a sterile relativism. 
2. Postulates About the Subject Matter of Sociology 
i. The cultural roots of sociology. --The earliest attempts at 
sociological investigation emphasized the need for objectivity, following 
the lead of the natural sciences . August Comte (1798-1857) and Herbert 
Spencer (1820-1903) were both convinced that the methods of natural 
science applied to a study ot society could increase man's knowled&e and 
1 
control. Indeed, it is in this relation to methodology that such men 
as these are considered to be among the first sociologists. Their 
conscious espousal of positivism marks the transition from social specu-
lation to sociology. It is important to note, however, that the objec-
tivity for which early sociologists called was 11mited.2 The history of 
sociology clearly reveals a continuing struggle tor objectivity} 
But even this drive for objectivity appears to be rooted in the 
changing value orientation of the age in which it began. The situational 
inf'luences in social philosophy duriog this period of transition are 
apparent. 
1 Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, pp. 104ft. 
2 Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, p. 349. 
3Florian Znaniecki, Cultural Sciences (Urbana, ill.: The 
University of illinois Press, 1952), p. 11. 
4o 
Natural science supplied the hope that equally simple and concise 
formulae as those o:f' Newton and Ga.lileo could be found to explain and 
control social and political phenomena. Earl ier Bacon and Descartes had 
laid the groundwork for natural science by their emphasis on induction, 
sense data, and skepticism.1 At the same t:i:me the traditional social 
structure vas breaking down and with it the beliefs and values inherent 
in it . As Maciver writes: 
A survey of the social philosophies o:f' antiquity reveals that 
the birth of sociology required a naturalistic as opposed to 
a theological conception o:f' human society; a clear distinc-
tion betveen the state and society; and a scientific, or 
positive, interest in the forms and processes of social re-
lationships, as contrasted with a legalistic or normative inter-
est in the right order~ of these relationships or the general 
well being of society. 
The medieval period in Europe vas not favorable for the growth 
o:f' sociology. The distinction betveen the secular and the ecclesiastical 
order obscured the distinction betveen the state and society. The eon-
eept of the law as revealed and of nature as passively receiving its 
imprint was an imped:i:ment to the growth of sociology. "A preeondi tion 
of sociology is a concept of society as an independent focus of scientific 
interest. u3 This became possible only when an adequate method developed 
and when the religious philosophy vas called into question. 4 Thus 
1 Harry E. Barnes and Howard Becker, Social Thot§ht From Lore to 
Science (Washington: Harran Press, 1952), I, 562. 
2 Robert M. Maciver, "Sociology," Eney. Soc. So., XIV, 232. 
3 Ibid.' p . 234. 
4 Golightly, "Social Science and Normative Ethics," p. 506. 
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sociology developed out of the interrelation of two important develop-
ments which bave a direct bearing on our problem: 
(1) The changes taking place in society, with altered power 
relationships, new economic relationships, and attendant changes in 
value orientation. 
(2) The rise of a new philosophy breaking the bonds of medieval-
ism and laying the basis for science in genera1.1 
Robert Nisbet very cogently argues for another source of socio-
2 logical interest. This he sees in the philosophical conservatism 
reacting to the French Revolution, industrialism, individualism, and 
secularism redi recting attention to these traditional and communal areas 
of society tbat the rationalists had neglected or disparaged. Comte and 
LePlay gave the main expressions of this concern which Durkheim later 
incorporated into a more scientific framework. The present-day problems 
and hypotheses of social order, group integration and disintegration, 
and the nature of personality are rooted deeply in the conservative 
tradition, rather than in the liberal-radical ideas of the nineteenth 
century, says Nisbet. Such figures as Burke and deBonald saw in the 
French Revolution the 
culmination of a historical process of social atomization that 
reached back to the beginning of such doctrines as nomi naJ ism, 
religious dissent, scientific rationalism and the destruction 
of those groups, institutions, and intellectual certainties of 
the Middle Ages . 3 
~utterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, pp. 1-14. 
~obert A. Nisbet, "Conservatism and Sociology," Am. Jr. Soc . , 
52(1947), 167ft. 
3Ibid. , pp . 168-169. 
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We must be careful not to be misled by the present emphasis on change, 
which has its roots in evolut ionary thought. According to Nisbet, this 
influence has been exerted from a minor position. 
There is here a disagreement as to the roots of sociology, and 
it is perhaps admissible that even conflicting sources could contribute 
to its rise.1 The question at hand, and most important tor this inquiry, 
has to do vi th the r elation of sociology to historically conditioned 
ideas, regardless of the diversity of these ideas. 
The development of sociology in America further illustrates the 
influence of styles of thought2 on the science. The intellectual charac-
teristics of sociology in America are colored by the historical situation 
and the prevailing ideas . Albion Small in 19073 spoke of the investiga-
tion of human behavior for the purpose of realizing the highest "spirit-
ual possibilities of human beings . " Along with others of his day, such 
as Lester Ward and Edward c. Hayes, Small saw social change as evolution-
ary progress . 4 Charles Ellwood is representative of the melioristic 
interest of sociology in America. 5 The results of industrialization and 
urbanization were evident in the numerous social problems to which these 
1see Behice Bo ran, "Sociology in Retrospect," Am. Jr. Soc . , 
52(1947)' 312 . 
~ote Karl Man.nheim' s use of the term in Essays in Sociology and 
Social Psychology (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 74-79· 
3Albion W. Small, "Points of Agreement Among Sociologists, 11 
Publications ot the American Sociological Society, 1 (1907), 55-71 . 
4Roscoe c. Hinkle and Gisela J. Hinkle, The Development of Modern 
Sociology (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday & Co., 1954), p. ll. 
5Ibid., p. 12. 
1 
men gave their attention. 
ii . The sociology of knovledge.--Fev, if any, sociologists today 
would deny this sociological interpretation of sociology. What is less 
clear is its meaning for sociology as a self-conscious discipline. For 
instance, Karl Mannh.eim in The Diagnosis of Our Time says, "Sociology 
in its historical origins is a secularized, perhaps the moat secularized, 
2 
approach to the probl.em of human life. " Ernst Manheim in a review of 
Maquet's analysis or Karl Mannheim raises the question: 
Does this mean that sociologists, because of the sensate origins 
or their universe of discourse, confine th..eir inquiries to 
aspects of a sensate culture, that, for example, only ~sts 
may meritoriously advance the understanding of 1'hamism? 
We are dealing here With the special field of inquiry known as 
the sociology of knowledge (Wissensoziologie), which has developed 
markedly in recent years . Although there are numerous antecedents, 
probably the twentieth century should be considered the period of its 
development as a speciality. uKnowledge" as used in such studies must 
be broadly interpreted to include ideas, ideologies, juristic and ethical 
beliefs, philosophy, science, and technology. Its central concern is the 
relationships between such knowledge 'and other existential factors in the 
1 See Kurt Wolff 1 "Notes Toward a Sociocultural Interpretation 
of American Sociology," Am. Soc. Rev. , 11 (1946), 545-553. 
2Karl Mannheim, The Diagnosis of Our Time (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1943), p. 116. 
jErnst Manheim, Review of Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, 
Am. Jr. Soc. , 57 (1951-1952), 530. 
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society or culture. . . . ,,1 
As Robert Merton notes, the sociology of knowledge, while it has 
many precursors, as a distinct discipline has been especially developed 
in Germany and France . 2 Only within the last ten years have Americans 
devoted much attention to it . Merton's suggested reason is significant: 
With increasing social conflict, differ ences in the values, 
attit udes and modes of thought of groups develop to the 
point where the orientation which these groups previously had 
in common is overshadowed by incompatible differences. 
. . • Within a context of distrust, one no longer inquires 
into the content of beliefs and assertions to determine whether 
t hey are valid or not, one no longer confronts the assertions 
with relevant evidence, but i .ntroduces an entirely new ques-
tion: how does it happen that these views are maintained? 
Thought becomes :f'unctioualized; it is interpreted in terms of 
psychological or economic or social or racial sources and func-
tions . • • • And throughout runs the basic theme of the unwitting 
determination of ideas by the substrata; the emphasis on the 
distinction between the real and the illusory, between reality 
and appearance in the sphere of human thought, belief, and 
couduct . 3 
Wissensoziologie has a long prehistory, which has been related 
to the philosophical problem of the objectivity of knowledge. Its 
systematic development has two r oots, one in French and the other in 
German sociological thought. Among the French sociologists, Emile 
Durkheim in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life 4 gave a brilliant 
analysis of the social sources of the fundamental categories of thought . 
\terton, Social Theory, p . 456. 
2 Cf. Barnes and Becker, Social Thought, p . 927 . 
~erton, Social Theory, pp. 457- 458. 
4 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms . 
The main body of the vork vith its functional analysis of religion is 
concerned chiefly Yith so- called primitive mental processes, vhich 
exhibit quite clearly, according to Durkheim, their dependence on the 
social experience of the group. 
The German development has been more consistent and self-
conscious . Among these contributors 1 Karl Mannheim bas achieved Vide 
recognition, although there is no common agreement regarding the merit of 
his work . While the weakness of Mannheim 1 s empirical vork has been called 
into question, little has been done by other sociologists to develop re-
search along these lines. Maquet considers the vork of Pi tirim Sorokin 
to be better grotmded in empirical study than that of Mannheim, but Mann-
heim 1 s vork has the advantage of facing the philosophical pr oblems involved 
in the sociology of knowledge. It should be noted that Sorokin' s point of 
view is a reversal of most sociology of knowledge in that he sees the 
maJor premises of the culture determining the nature of the culture.1 
The point in question at this juncture, however, is not the merits 
of various approaches to the sociology of knowledge, but rather the 1m-
plications of some of its major theses for the problem of relativity. 
For this purpose Mannheim' s vork may serve as a model, although it is 
recognized that there are numerous variations in method and conclusions 
among the sociologists of knowledge. 2 
1
see Franz Adler, "The Range of the Sociology of Knowledge 1 " 
Modern Sociological Theory, eds . Bovard Becker and Alvin Boskoff (N.Y.: 
Dryden Press, 1957), pp. 396-423, esp. 4o9. 
2 
See Arthur Child, "The Existential Determination of Thought, " 
Ethics, 52(1942); "The Problem of Imputation in the Sociology of Know-
ledge," Ethics, 51(1941); "The Theoretical Possibilities of the Sociology 
of Knowledge, 11 Ethics, 51(1941). 
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Mannheim states his hypothesis thus: "The principal thesis of 
the sociology of knowledge is that there are modes of thought which 
cannot be adequately tmderstood as long as their social origins are 
obscured . ,.1 
Central to Mannheim' s analysis is the concept of ideology. 
Ideological thinking emerges in response to the socio-historical. situa-
tion of the th.inker . But whereas tormer theories considered the essen-
tial relationship that between the individual and his particular setting, 
Mannheim sees ideology as a sys tem of thought reflecting a social set-
ting . Thus it is that he states: 
Strictly speaking it is incorrect to say that the single in-
dividual t hinks . Rather it is more correct to insist that he 
participate~ in thinking further what other men have thought 
before him. 
Mannheim is concerned not so much with the distortions that are the 
result of deliberate efforts to deceive as he is with the ways in which 
men viev the world according to their different social settings. 3 This 
is a crucial consideration in the present crisis of thought which has 
produced the "vague, ill-considered, and sterile forms of relativism with 
regard to scientific knowledge which is increasingly prevalent today. u4 
Mannheila does not think that the sociology of knowledge supplants 
~eim, Ideology and utopia, p . 4. 
2Ibid. , p . 3· This statement has been seriously challenged by 
critics. See Arthur Child, "The Problem of Imputation," pp . 200-219. 
~eim, op. cit., p . 238. 
4 Ibid. , p. 237. 
epistemology or gives support to r elativism. 
It is important to notice that these tvo types ot inquicy 
are not necessarily connected and one can accept the empfrical 
results without drawing the epistemological conclusions. 
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This disclailller, however, bears closer scrutiny. One can hardly suggest 
such a basic concern without implicating a theocy ot knowledge, both as 
to its origin and nature. Mann.heim himself says: 
The next task ot epistemology, in our opinion, is to over-
came its partial nature by incorpor ating into itself the 
multiplicity of relation.ships between existence and validity 
(Sein and Geltune) as discovered by the sociology of knowledge . 
• • . A nev kind of epistemology is called for which will 
reckon wit~ the facts brought to light by the sociology of 
knowledge. 
As Maquet says: "Mannheim 1 s system gives the lie to those who assert 
t hat the sociology and the philosophy ot knowledge move on completely 
separate planes. n3 
It is precisely in these connections, then, that the sociology 
ot knowledge must be analyzed tor the purpose of this dissertation. 
Northrop states, in his introduct ion to Maquet: 
Values turn out not to be objective, irreducible data appear-
ing as common factors through different cu1 tures. Instead, 
one's philosophical theory of t he u1 timate nature of reality 4 and of man as a factor in reality detines one 1 s values . • • • 
Maquet continues: 
1Mannheim, Ideology and utopia, p. 239. 
2 Ibid. ' p . 264. 
3 Jaques Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, trans. John F . Locke 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1951) . 
4 Ibid., p. xv. 
If the sociology of knowledge succeeds in sboving positively 
the social determination of ideas-- and especially if the determin-
ation reaches the fundamental aspects of knowledge--it1seems, indeed, that it raises urgent problems for philosophy. 
Yet Mannheim, as previously quoted, 2 suggests that the sociology 
of knowledge may be an approach to overcoming relativism. We have, then, 
two contradictory implications for our problem in the sociology ot 
knowledge. One is the avowed purpose ot Ma.nnheim in his studies, i.e. , 
to contribute to a solution of the problem ot relativism; the other is 
stated in Maquet 1 s judgment that relativism may be an unavoidable con-
elusion ot the sociology of knowledge . 
The problem of relativism is readily apparent. If mental produc-
tions derive from social settings, then, in as much as social settings 
vary, so will mental productions. What is more, a rigid interpretation 
ot such a view leaves one with no criteria of validity. 
The first consideration in dealing with this problem involves a 
searching analysis ot the conclusions ot the sociology of knowledge itself. 
That is, is it in tact true that such a connection exists between the 
ideas of men and the existential base? In Mannheim' s work, the weakest 
point seems to be in stating precisely what the connection is. Robert 
Merton suggests that Mannheim1s analysis is limited "by his failure to 
specify the ~ or ~ of relations between social structure and know-
ledge. "3 It is not clear how the social base in:fluences the thought; 
1 
Maquet, The Sociology ot Knowledge, p. 11. 
2 
Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 237. 
3 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 498. 
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neither is it clear wby several modes of thought will be current although 
1 
they conflict logically. 
A second consideration in facing the problem of relativism that 
seems to be inherent in the sociology of knowledge is the solution posed 
by Mannhei.m himself . That this theory is not conceived in a mechanistic 
fashion is basic. He is very cautious in avoiding a determinism. Thus: 
The analyses characteristic of the sociology of knowledge are, 
in this sense, by no means irrelevant for the determination of 
the truth of a stateaent; but these analyses . . • do not by 
them.sel ves :f'ully reveal the truth because the mere delimi ta-
tion of the perspectives is by no means a substitute for the 
immediate and direct discussion between the diverge~t points 
of view or for the direct examination of the facts. 
Of Mannheim's thought Merton says: 
Situationally determined thought no longer signifies inevi-
table ideological thought but implies only a certain "proba-
bility" that the occupant of a given place in the social struc-
ture will think in a certain !asbion.j 
The final point in the problem of relativism tor Mannheim is his 
concept of truth. Note first that Mannheim says that the skepticism of 
relativism compels self-criticism: 
This is the point where the political problem-complex of 
ideology and utopia becomes the concern of the sociology of 
knowledge, and where the scepticism and relativism arising out 
of mutual destruction and devaluation of the divergent politi-
cal aims becomes a means to salvation. For this relativism 
and scepticism compel self-critici~ and self- control and lead 
to a new conception of objectivity. 
This self-criticism invol.ves basically an uncovering of the 
~erton, Social Theory, p. 502 . 
~eim, Ideol.ogy and utopia, p . 256. 
~erton, Social Theory, p. 505. 
4 Mannheim, Ideology and utopia, p. 4.2. 
ideological nature of thought: 
They uncover unconscious motivations in order to make those 
forces which formerly ruled ther more and more into objects 
ot conscious rational decision. 
It is clear that Mannheim does not conceive of truth in static 
terms and that tor h1..m the search for ultimate truth detached from the 
values and position of the subject is abortive: 
The prevailing philosophic view which cautiously admits that 
the content of conduct has been historically determined, but 
which at the same time insists upon the retention of eternal 
forms ot value and of a formal set of categories, is no longer 
tenable. 2 
And again: 
There is, then, no norm which can lay claim to formal validity 
and which can be abstracted as a constant universal formal 
elaent t'rom. its historically changing content.j 
Over against relativism Mannheim suggests the concept of rela-
tionism, which signifies that "the elements of meaning in a given situa-
tion have reference to one another and derive their significance from 
this reciprocal interrelationship in the given frame of thought. ,4. 
Hence it bas become extremely questionable whether, in the 
flux of lite, it is a genuinely worthwhile intellectual problem 
to seek to discover fixed and imlu.table ideas or absolutes. It 
is a more worthwhile intellectual. task perhaps to learn to 
think dynaaically and relationally rather than statically. 5 
OUt of context many of Mann.heim' s statements sound extremely 
relativistic. His explicit disavowal of relativism, however, forces us 
to grapple with the basic i.llplications of his thought. The substitution 
of relationism for relativism is a maJor aspect of the argument. By 
1Mannheim, Ideology and utopia, p. 43. 2Ibid., p. 72. 
3Ibid., p . 73· 4Ibid. , p. 76. 5Ibid., p. 77. 
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itself, however, it does not seem to offer much hope. It may be a dif-
ferent name for the same thing. However, one must take in consideration 
Mannhei.m.' s dynamic concept of truth. Relationism is conceived of in the 
functional terms introduced in Chapter I . The process of discovering 
truth is that of recognizing the existential elements that illuminate 
it at any historical moment but which are not in themselves absolute.1 
Mannheim nowhere denies that absolutes may exist; what he does deny is 
that they are given in the mind of man. Rather, man's struggle is to 
gain greater objectivity by a recognition of the ideological nature of 
his thought . As Northrop says in his introduction to Maquet: 
It is becoming clear that man through knowledge can be some-
thing more than a loudspeaker for the particular class or the 
provincial culture in which circumstances happen to place him. 
Nature exists one and the same for all. men, as well as the many 
classes and cultures. Hence there is another knowledge and 
its attendant norms than either class or culture.2 
It must be noted that Northrop's hope for the validation of 
knowledge lies in a different direction from that of Mannheim. He 
outlines a process of verification that depends on the reduction of 
value statements to truth statements that can be tested by natural 
science.3 He says: 
The reduction of problems of value to problems of fact must 
be possible if any normative statements are cognitive and true, 
1It may be noted that critics of Roman Catholic ethics feel that 
catholics absolutize given historical content in their concepts of 
ethical. norms . See Daniel D. Williams, What Present-day Theologians 
Are Thinking (N. Y. : Harper & Bros., 1952), pp. 73-74. 
(N.Y. : 
2Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, p . xix. 
3F. s. c. Northrop, The Logic of Science and the Humanities 
The Macmillan Co., 1947), P• 32. 
rather than merely persuasive and hortatory. For to say a 
statement is true is to answer a question of tact .1 
Ma.nnheim' s work covers many years and involves changes in 
theoretiea.l. formulation influenced by his own social circumstances. 
Keakemeti admirably describes this development when he writes: 
Underlying this concept of structure was, then, a meta-
physical, quasi-religious belief in the creative function of 
history. Not that man was to be looked upon merely as a pas-
sive participant in the process, as a tool or product; man's 
activity, his striving, was precisely the stuff of which the 
structural process vas made. But still, that active striving 
had to be based upon a faith, and the core of this faith was 
the idea of history as a posi~i ve, creative, and in a sense 
all-powerfUl, ultimate force . 
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But the problem of interpreting historic reality assumed a new 
tom tor Mannheim when totalitarianism emerged as a dominant trend. 
History could produce destruction. 
For this, it was no longer sutticient to seek inspiration 
and guidance within the historic process as such. One needed 
extra-historical principles to resist and correct the aberrant 
forces which history brought to the tore. It became particu-
larly important to explore the conditiQns on which freedom ot 
individual action and choice depended.j • .• 
In other words: we must adopt a value-position, as it 
were, outside the stream of history, in order to direct that 
stream into safe channels. • • . But communion vi th history 
will no ~onger be sufficient to make us discover what should 
be done . 
In the Diagnosis of OUr Time Mannheim writes: 
Neither democratic tolerance nor scientific objectivity demand 
that we should never take a stand tor what we believe to be 
~orthrop, The Logic of Science and the Humanities, p. 32. 
~eim, Essays in Sociology and Social Psychology~ pp. 1-2. 
3Ibid. , p. 3. 4Ibid., p. 6. 
true, nor that we should avoid discussing the final values 
and objects of life.l 
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iii . Freedom from value-ju.dgments . - -Max Weber was one of the 
first sociologists to came to grips in a formal way with the problems of 
value- judgments in methodology. The problem naturally arises when Weber 
postulates that the data of sociology, i . e., the action of actors, is 
normatively oriented and that there are many possible normative systems . 
The consequent dilemma lies in the fact that this applies also to the 
sociologist himself. Weber ' s solution is to assert that the scientist 
can and must distinguish between his own subjective preferences and the 
logical elements of the science, which are universal . 2 As Parsons 
interprets : 
And: 
Even though a value element enters into the selection of the 
material of science, once this material is given it is pos-
sible to come to objectively valid conclusions about the causes 
and consequences of given phenomena free of value judgments and 
hence binding on anyone who Wishes to attain
3
truth, regardless 
of what other subjective values he may hold. 
Thus, in spite of the relativity introduced by the concept of 
Wertbeziehung Weber maintains both that it is possible to keep 
value- judgments logically distinct from those claiming objective 
validity, and that the latter judgment can be made With con-
fidenc~, escaping the subjectivity inherent in all value judg-
ments . 
1Mannheim, The Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 67 . 
2Barnes and I!ecker, Social Thought, p . 896. Cf. Ma.x Weber, 
The Methodology of the Social Sciences, p . ll . 
3Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, ID. : 
The Free Press, 1949), p. 594. 
4 
Ibid., p. 594. 
The price of this position, however, is conditional solutions 
only. The scientist cannot establish the goal. He can only suggest 
the means to achieve a predetermined end •1 
It can never be the task of an empirical science to pro-
vide binding norms and ideals from which ~rectives for im-
mediate practical activity can be derived. 
Barnes and Becker point out that Weber's own activities suggest 
that he means to restrict the sociologist only as sociologist, and in 
other roles he is at liberty to make value-judgments.3 
More recently sociologists have come to realize that freedom from 
value- judgments is a difficult accomplisbment. In several i'mporta.nt 
ways values are so closely bound up with the work of the sociologist 
that their removal involves more tban mere determination or separation 
of roles. As Whitehead s~s: "Knowledge is al~s accOIIIplished with 
accessories of emotion and purposes."4 
Goode and Hatt point out that facts are evaluated in terms of 
their theoretical relevance . Facts gathered at random are of little 
significance. Facts do not speak for themselves and consequently they 
must be "theoretically relevant. n5 
l:aarnes and :Becker, Social Thought, p. 897. 
2Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, pp. 13 and 52. 
~es and Becker, Social Thought, p. 898. Cf. Weber, The 
Methodology of the Social Sciences, p . 1. 
4 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p . 5. 
5Goode and Hatt, Methods in Social Research, p . 8. 
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We are not here primarily concerned with a full delineation of 
the relationship between fact and theory, a consideration vital to 
science .1 But it is germane to this study to point out that one aspect 
of this relationship is a choice of facts based on a decision as to 
their value for the particular study in which the sociologist is engaged. 
Obviously, this is not mere subjective preference, although it may be; 
the choice is guided by logic, intuition, 2 and axiology. Nevertheless, 
it is the scientist who invests the facts with meaning according to his 
theoretical f'ramework. Thus what appears to be wholly objective, i.e . , 
the facts, becomes amenable to a process in which values are involved. 
These theories--a system of hypotheses--contain, of necessity, 
no matter how scrupulously the st~tements of them are presented, 
elements of a priori speculation. 
We have only to look at the many sociological theories of the 
past to realiz·e the biases possible in this process . 4 The ideal of pure 
science is one that has seldom, if ever, been achieved. For either the 
scientist has had his problems forced on him, or he has decided himself 
that one topic is more worthy of his interest than another. There is no 
quarrel with the scientist•s right to such a choice, but it must be made 
1
see Whitehead, Adventuresof Ideas, and Cohen and Nagel, An 
Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, p . 215ff. 
2used here to mean the immediate apprehension of reality. See 
The Dictio:£1 of Philosophy, ed. De.gobert D. Runes (N.Y.: Philosophical 
Library, n.d. , p. 149. 
~d.al, An American Dilemma, p . 1041. 
4 Ibid. , p . 1045. Gene Weltfish, "Science and Prejudice," 
ScientifiCMonthly, 61 (1945) , 212. 
perfectly clear that it is a choice. l-iany possible in.fiuences govern 
this choice. To mention only one: 
It should, furthermore, be pointed out that the int'luence of 
the value jud.gments of colleagues is likely to be greater 
than the general public. This is a consequence of the fact 
t hat the scientist ' s products are generally "consumed" by other 
scientists, and scientific fields are likely to be rather close 
knit fraternities . The importance of this fact is illustrated 
by a statement from the director of the Institute for Advanced 
Study, who is quoted as having said that gossip is the life-
blood of physics. That evaluation by colleagues may be 
"informed" evaluation does not remove the fact that value judg-
ments are inseparable from the selection of scientific problems. l 
Perhaps no one has better delineated this problem for the social 
sciences than Gunnar ~1yrdal in his treatment of "biases. " 
The social scientist, too, is part of the culture in which 
he 11 ves, and he never succeeds in freeing himself entirely 
from dependence ~n the dominant preconceptions and biases of 
his environment . • • • 
Against the most honest determination to be open-minded on the 
part of all concerned and, primarily, on the part of the 
scientists themselves, the need for rationalization will tend 
to influence the objects chosen for research, the selection 
of relevant data, the recording of observations, the theoreti-
cal and practical inferences drawn and the manner of presenta-
tion of results.3 
Myrdal ' s suggestions for mitigating the influence of biases 
involves, basically, attention to logical inference, repetition of experi-
ment by others, awareness of the problem of bias itself, and an explicit 
statement of such biases.4 
• • • Biases in social science cannot be erased by "keeping to 
the f~cts 11 and by refining methods of statistical treatment of 
data. 
1Goode and Hatt, Methods in Social Research, pp. 23-24. 
~dal, An American Dilemma, p . 1035. 
3 4 5 Ibid. , PP• 1035-1036. Ibid. , PP• 1036-1043. Ibid. 1 p . 1041. 
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In the final analysis, these contribute no solution to a funda-
mental problem. With Myrda.l, we are le:f't with no criterion for deter-
mining the relative value of the norms which guide the scientist in his 
choice of values. Conceivably the scientist ' s choice of values may 
contribute to the destruction of his scientific work, as in the case of 
science in certain countries under authoritarian control.1 If this is a 
problem for the physical sciences, it is even more acute for the social 
sciences, for they deal with social values more directly. The choice of 
ends may more subtly insinuate itself in such a way as to destroy the 
basis of science. We may hypothesize at this juncture that the nature 
of science is such that it can fUnction properly, i.e., according to its 
awn logic, only in an atmosphere of free inquiry. For support of this, 
we may consider the presuppositions of science. 
iv. The validity of presuppositions. --Professor Brightman bas 
vri tten that it is not necessary for every experimenter to be a meta-
physician, "but if human culture is to survive worth:f'ul.l.y, or is to 
achieve unity, it is important that no worker in any field should assume 
an attitude which tends to prevent him or others from grasping the 
meaning of his work. n2 Every experiment, then, which he defines as "a 
series of exact observations, carried out under controlled and repeatable 
conditions, with the purpose of discovering verifiable laws," is subject 
1
see Max Weinreich, Hitler ' s Professors {N.Y.: Yiddish 
Scientific Institute, 1946) . 
2 Brightman, "The Presuppositions of Experiment," p. 143. 
to certain pr esupposi tiona . These are as follows : 
(l) An experimenter 1 some person or self. 
( 2) The unity of self. The same self must be in control 
throughout . 
(3) Observed data. Only the data of consciousness can be 
investigated. 
(4) A purpose . Aimless behavior is not experiment . This pur-
pose evaluates the experiment intrinsically and organizes the available 
instrumental values . 
(5) Validity of reason. "Nature properly consulted always gives 
a response . " Reason cannot be invalidated because the attempt itself 
involves the use of reason. 
(6) Memory. In this sense recognition is essential for without 
it simple recall is useless . 
(7) Time. Every experiment is in process in one direction. 
(8) An objective world. In fact, the subjective cannot be postu-
lated without it. 
( 9) Society. Every self is achieved in society . l 
We have here, then, certain basic assumptions which the experi-
menter as well as his society take for granted. These are all prior to 
experimentation and constitute a set of norms over which the experimenter 
lA more limited list of presuppositions may be found in Goode and 
Hatt , Methods in Social Research, p. 20; Read 13ain, "The Scientists and 
His Values, 11 Social Forces, 3l (l952) 1 l06- l09; Znaniecki, Cultural 
Sciences, p . 115; Wolfgaog Kohler, The Place of Value in a World of 
~ (N. Y.: Liveright Pub. Co., l938 ), P • 36. 
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bas no choice by the very nature of his task. 
Professor Brightman suggests that exper:iJnentalism actually 
presupposes the main principles of personalism, for "unless persona.l.i ty 
is val.ued all else is devalued. ,,l Such considerations indicate at least 
that an increasingly important task of the exper:iJnenter, in whatever 
field, is to do more than to make his biases clear. He is confronted 
with the necessity to evaluate his biases, or anyone else's, for that 
matter. In fact, as George Thomas points out: 
The pursuit of truth by the scientist or philosopher would be 
meani ngJ ess unless he could presuppose the existence of fixed 
and final truth as the goal of his efforts. 2 
Florian Znaniecki in his Cultural Sciences, 3 in the same vein, 
declares that traditional metaphysics bas been the greatest deten-ent to 
the advancement of the cultural sciences.4 Naturalistic metaphysics has 
either ruled man out as the proper object of scientific analysis or it 
bas reduced man to the level of the material, thus involving itself in 
hopeless circularity. Idealistic metapbysics5 also bas created prob-
lems: ". . . In the realm of cul. ture, in which idealistic philosophers 
are primarily concerned, their dominant interest in ideals rather than 
in facts bas impeded scientific progress. ,,6 
1Edgar S. Brightman, Persons and Values (Boston: Boston 
university Press, 1952), p . 18. 
2 Thomas, Christian Ethics and Moral Philosop}ly, p . 464. 
3Znaniecki, Cultural Sciences, p . 94. 
4 5 6 Ibid., p. 92. Ibid. , p. 9(). Ibid., p. 91. 
6o 
Znaniecki suggests, however, that cultural sciences1 can avoid 
metaphysical problems by proper attention to induction. In the case of 
attitudes, for instance, instead of arguing about the objectivity or 
subjectivity of the phenomena, the cultural scientist should treat them 
as proper data of investigation. 
Anything that can be experienced by human individuals is an 
empirical datum and as such can be scientifically investigated; 
but no scientific investigation of any datum can determine vhat 
this datum really is. For the task of the scientist is not to 
define the true essence of the data he investigates, only to 
observe factual relationships among them and to discover what-
ever order exists in their relationships. 2 
It is a real question vhether cultural sciences can avoid 
metaphysical problems merely by ignoring them and paying attention to 
the operational. method. Evidence for this judgment is supplied by 
Znaniecki himself vho admits that the function of the philosopher of 
values is "the most urgent of all functions vhich thinkers can perform, 
though perhaps more difficult nov tban ever before, requiring an unusual-
ly broad histor ical knowledge of human values and a rare mastery of 
philosophic methods . u3 For this task "noneval.uative scientific know-
ledge of culture is indispensable. "4 Such a relationship between the 
philosophy of values and cultural sciences is a promising suggestion. 
Znaniecki, however, fails to drav the obvious implications, for he 
1Znaniecki defines "cultural sciences" as those vhich deal vi th 
the universal category or cultural order as well as "all specific orders 
vhich students of culture have discovered or vill discover. " It is in 
contradistinction to ''natural sciences. " Cultural Sciences, pp . 9-10. 
2 3 4 Ibid. , p . 151. Ibid., p. 173. Ibid., p . 173. 
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concludes that the "validity of ideals cannot be tested. ,,1 He goes no 
further than to suggest : 
• • • Sociologists would function as intellectual leader s in 
the ceaseless course of differentiation and integration of 
social roles and social groups throughout the world. By per-
forming this function, they would indirectly contribute to the 
continuous cr eative growth of new varieties of cultural sy~tems 
and the enrichment and diversification of individual lives. 
Like many other sociologists, Znaniecki is convinced by the 
contemporary historical situation that attention to "universal standards 
of valuation which would be applicable to all human values u3 is a neces-
sary enterprise; yet he is not prepared to commit the cultural sciences 
to a vigorous place in this pursuit. 
The perspective presently under consideration through a discus-
sion of the socioJ.ogy of knowledge, the possibilities of a value-tree 
sociology, and the role of biases has attempted to show that the rela-
tionships between the social sciences and human values is complex, per-
mitting neither a simple elimination of values as subjective, nor a 
simple recognition as a means at avoiling biases.. In order to avoid the 
dilemma of relativism on the one hand and irrelevance on the other, there 
is a need to explore the possibilit ies of a science committed to values 
and tot heir validation. 
3. Values As Data 
i . Sociological interest in norms . - -The next consideration has 
to do with the nature of values as seen by sociologists. Most of the 
1 
Znaniecki, CUltural Sciences, p . 90 . 
2~., p. 419. 3~., p . 173· 
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writing on values in sociology bas to do with rules and beliefs in 
society that are normative.l The assumption is almost universal that 
among groups of people there are to be found value patterns which are 
normative, i.e., regulative for that group. Even extreme relativists 
(such as Ruth Benedict in anthropology) emphasize the internal unity of 
2 
cultural systems on the basis of shared values. 
Writers like Durkheim have emphasized the moral authority of 
shared values. The. concept of "collective consciousness" developed in 
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life involves the idea of the 
social source and sanction of values in an extreme form. 
George u. Mead, along with Charles Cooley and Ellsworth Faris, 
pioneered in investigating the process of value transference. The self 
is essentially the mind acquiring a set of values on which it bases its 
self-evaluation.3 
Only the extreme positivists have minimized the importance of 
the value concept. 4 Because values are subjective, they are not available 
1As Kolb says: "Realists and nominalists, voluntarists and 
positivist, historical theorists and functional theorists all have to 
deal with norms and values, either as means of explanation or as things 
to be explained away." William Kolb, "The Cbanging Prominence of Values 
in Modern Sociological Theory," p. 93. Reproduced from Modern Sociologi-
cal Theories in ContinUity and Change, edited by Howard Becker and Alvin 
Boskoff, by permission of The Dryden Press, Inc. Copyright 1957 by 
The Dryden Press. 
2Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin 
and Co., 1934). 
3George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1934). 
~olb, op. cit., p. 100. 
for empirical analysis, excepting as they are reflected in action. 
Their study and prediction through the analysis of action makes the 
1 
concept of value superfluous • 
. • • In short, the valuations of individuals, singly or in 
aggregate--can be known only f'rom their actions. Thus aetion 
is the only empirica.l.ly knowabl.e aspect of value. Whether or 
not value has other aspects is a question ~hat the natural 
science sociologist must leave unanswered. 
For most sociol.ogists, however, values are important, especially 
those which are normative, i.e., which grow out of social interaction, 
creating consensus and guiding behavior. 
Thomas and Znaniecld' s The Polish Peasant in Europe and the United 
states, publ.ished in 1.918, is generally considered the first systematic 
treatment of T&.lue as a concept in American sociology. 3 In their "metho-
dological note" the authors define values as objects having accessible 
content and meaning for the members of the social groups. They were 
particularly interested in "rules of behavior" as values, although they 
recognized the existence of individual values . Values are distinguished 
from attitudes, the latter referring to the "subjective orientation of 
the members of the group toward values . "~ There is a basic confusion 
1Ad.ler, "The Value Concept in Sociology," p . 279· 
2 Ibid., p. 276 . 
3w. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecld, The Polish Peasant in 
Europe and the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1918:Y920); Kolb, "The Changing Prominence of Values," p . 94. 
4 
Kolb, ''The Changing Prominence of Values," p . 9~; see Thomas 
and Zna.niecld, op. cit. 1 I, 21-22. 
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introduced by Thomas and Zna.niecki in their distinction between values 
and attitudes on the basis of objectivity and in postulating that at-
titudes will be reflected through appropriate action, for there is no 
guarantee that a value will produce a uniform attitudinal response,1 
even though the value may produce appropriate action. 
It is apparent that the authors' use of the word "object" 
introduces a semantic contusion. If they mean objectify in the psycho-
logical sense of the mind's abUi ty to objectify, i.e. , to think of as 
apart from self, the distinction between value and attitude is unneces-
sary in the sense in which they make it, for value is a form of attitude 
toward anything, be it concrete datum or abstract idea. 
William Kolb in criticizing Thomas and Znaniecki rightly calls 
for values to be considered in an attitudinaJ f'rame of reference, giving 
the concept a "dynamic motivational" content. But his own treatment 
lacks clarity mainly because of another contusion. This is the con:tu-
sion ot the concepts ltvalue" and ''norm. " The problem in using the 
concepts interchangeably is that there are many discrepancies between 
individual value attitudes and group norms. By failing to distinguish 
ltvalue" and "norm" Kolb is faced With the necessity of calling individual 
attitudes about group norms something. When values and norms agree, 
there is no problem--call individual values "normative orientations" or 
some such term. When they disagree there is a semantic problem. Indi-
vidual attitudes are still regulative of individual action, but they 
1 Kolb, "The Changing Prominence of Values, " p. 95. 
1 
are not normative in the group sense. 
Sophisticated use of value theory would seem to call for a 
distinction between "value" and "norm." .. Value," referring to the 
quality invested in any experience, should be used to describe such an 
attitude, be it individually held or group enforced. "Norm" should 
refer to the considered standard by which such attribution is judged. 
Thomas's and Znaniecki's rules are, then, in the category of norms. As 
KOlb says with reference to the use of the value concept by psychologists: 
For the social psychologists of the postwar decade to use the 
concept, it was first necessary for them to shift emphasis 
from the social attitudes that objective value evoked to those 
that they manifested. It was the great contribution of the 
social psychological theorists of this period that they saw 
that some of the social attitudes of the person were the sub-
jective aspects of the objective values, and that the inter-
nalization of these values was a fun~ion of the process of 
socialization within the human group •••• 
There are two important theoretical aspects of this transition. 
The first of these makes it possible to view values as having 
both an objective dimension, toward which actors singly and col-
lectively can orient their attitudes and actions, and an attitud-
inal dimension, which constitutes an element of orientation.3 
1Terminology is a serious problem at thi s point because the 
philosophical definition of norms does not coincide with the sociologi-
cal. Sociological terminology seems to refiect a positivistic bias 
which makes the discussion of normative validation difficult in a 
sociological frame of reference. 
~e problem remains for the social scientist, however: How 
to analyze values? The positivists are in a strong position when they 
suggest that actions alone are available as the indicators of at-
titudes. Experience, however, tells us how frequently we act contrary 
to values. Psychoanalytic theory supports this contention. One approach 
is that of verstehende sociology after Max Weber. Here again, though, 
actual techniques have not been refined. See Kol.b, "The Cbangin8 
Prominence of Values," p. gr. 
3Kolb, ''The Changing Prominence of Values," p. gr • Reproduced 
from Modern Sociological Theories in Continuity and Cba.nse, edited by 
Howard :Becker and Al. vin Boskoff, by permission ot The Dryden Press, 
Inc. l".t\n'V1"i uh+. 1 0"7 'hv ,.., ... n-.. ~ ....... n-..ft-
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Kolb, in dealing with the concept of values, sees another prob-
lem that takes on significance when we accept a concept of norms. He 
questions the "tendency to believe that human beings viewing values 
objectively see them as agreed-upon and shared attitudes rather than as 
realities transcendi.llg attitudes." 
If we know anything from social history, it is that, over 
most of the span of human existence, human beings have re-
garded moral values and mores as real.l 
The question he does not answer is what is meant by "real. " 
Not only is it true to experience, but it is also coherent to suggest 
that moral values may be real in the sense that they reflect the truth 
about what human relationships ought to be, or stand the test of coher-
ent normative judgment. This need not contradict the realness of 
existing values as objective rules for behavior. 
It is the great merit of Talcott Parsons to have assigned a 
functioDal. role in social organization to values, which meets the 
limitations of another early approach to values, i.e., the theory of 
interlocking interests so prominent in evolutionary and mechanistic 
approaches to sociology. As he says: 
A social order resting on interlocking of interests alone, 
and thus ultimately on sanctions, is hence hardly empirically 
possible though perhaps theoretically conceivable, given the 
order as an initial assumption.2 
According to Parsons, not only does an actor have a general 
1Kolb, "The Cbanging Prominence of Values," p. 100. Reproduced 
from Modern Sociological Theories in Continuity and Cba.nge, ed1 ted by 
Howard Becker and Alvin Boskof'f, by permission of The Dryden Press, Inc. 
Copyright 1957 by The Dryden Press. 
2Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, p. 4o4. 
evaluative orientation, but ultimately his orientations and actions 
must be organized. This is the fUnction of moral values, which system 
1 
of values becomes desirable ends to be sought. 
Few sociologists, if any, suggest what may be the true source 
of moral values. Kingsley Davis suggests religion, but only as a 
fiction which the actor suppJ.ies. 2 It may be asked whether it is 
coherent to dismiss as fioti tious the basis of moral norms on which a 
society actually operates because tbat basis is not subject to empirical 
verification. It seems to be a gratuitous concession to positivism to 
recognize the fUnction of moral norms but consider them to be rationa-
lizations. As Kolb points out: 
On the other hand, it man's cognitive orientation to the non-
empirical world results in his imputation to that world of a 
system of meanings 1 and if his cathexis of these meanillgs is 
determined by his attitudes of reverence and awe toward non-
empirical objects, then these meaniDgs can give rise to a 
system of moral norms and can f'urnish the basis of their 
compellillg legi ti.ma.cy. 3 
If this is a scandal to sociology as a scientific discipJ.ine, 
one need go no further than to "claim ••• that the birth and the 
content of value-systems are rooted in man's orientation to the non-
4 
empirical world." 
1KoJ.b, "The Changing Prominence of Values," p. 115. 
p. 547. 
21C1Dgsley Davis, Human Society (N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1949), 
3Kolb1 op. cit., p. 118. Reproduced from Modern Sociological 
Theories in Continuity and Cba.nge 1 edited by Howard Becker and Alvin 
Boskoff, by permission of The Dryden Press, Inc. Copyright 1957 by 
The Dryden Press. 
4 Ibid., p. 118. 
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11. The multiple aspects ot values.--Clyde Kluckhohn bas made 
important contributions to value theory by way of social science. 
l Writing in Toward a General Theory of Action, he places values squarely 
in the field of attitudes, but desires at the same time to define them 
in such a way as to make them susceptible to scientific investigation. 
Whil.e supporting neither the moderate position ot Ray Lepler regarding 
the identification of fact and value, nor the extreme position of 
Lundberg, 3 he argues for the intimate relation of tact and value. They 
are, however, conceptually distinct. In order to clarity these rela-
tionships he introduces the concept ot cathexis as distinct trom valua-
4 
tion. Cathexis is the desired; valuation, the desirable. 
Value synthesizes cognitive and cathectic elements in orienta-
tions to an objective world . ••. Values define the limits of 
permissible cost of an expressional gratification or an instru-
mental achievement by invoking the consequences of such action 
for other parts of the system and for the system as a whole. 5 
Value may be defined thus: 
A value is a conception, explicit or fsPlicit, distinctive 
of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable 
which influences the selection trom available modes, means, and 
ends of action. • • • 
A value is not just a preference but is a preference which 
is felt and/or considered to be justified--''morally" or by 
reasoning6or by aesthetic judgment, usually by tvo or all three of these. 
1nuckhobn, ''Values and Value-Orientations." 
2 Ibid., p. 391. p. 393· 
4 Ibid., p. 395. p. 394. 
6 Ibid., pp. 395-396. 
These quotations justifY the suggestion that in terms of the 
initial definitions of this study the concept "value" in lG.uckhohn is 
more properly designated "norm." Had he used the word "norm" to 
designate what he now calls "value, 11 he would perhaps not be under stress 
in identifYing cathexis as distinguished from valuation. He is certainly 
straining when he says that mere preference (cathexis) is restricted to 
"selections which are neutral . " He illustrates: 
Of course, if Smith justifies his preferences for spinach in 
rational or pseudo-rational terms of vitamins, mineral content, 
and the like, it becomes by definition one of his values .l 
It is questionable if Smith, or anyone, has preferences which are not 
in some way justified. Smith may like spinach just because he likes the 
taste, in which case the preference is based on an aesthetic value. The 
distinction between cathexis and valuation is valid only if one considers 
them to be tvo aspects of the same experience, i.e., one, cathexis as the 
bare psychological experience, and the other, valuation as the experience 
in its relation to the personality as a whole. 
The term "disvalue" can be introduced only as a normative con-
sideration. The person may value an experience that may be judged a 
disvalue according to a normative proposition. He may even have reasons 
for the preference. But Kluckhohn has already established that rationali-
zation distinguishes valuation from cathexis; 2 yet valuation can only be 
based on established and accepted values. It would be truer to experience 
and analytically more correct to speak of conflicting values as being 
1IO.uckhohn, ''Values and Value-Orientations," p . 397n. 
2 Ibid. , p . 397n. 
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brought under the judgment of norms which determine the value to be true 
or false, rather than to establish a separate category of subjective 
value experience that normative judgment rejects and call that cathexis .1 
On the whole Kluckhobn does a real service to social science in 
his very clear analysis. The problems presented here are suggested 
primarily in the concern for a coherent solution to the problem of 
relativism. Kl.uckhobn ' s emphasis on the experience of valuation and its 
normative orientation ~emphasis on this very important aspect of 
human experience in such a way as to encourage the study of values with 
a view to solving the problem. Indeed, his search for universal values2 
is certainly a logical continuation of his analysis. 
This is clearly put by Howard Becker: 
In discussing values at the human level, therefore, it 
should be possible to handle the issues involved in such a way 
as to require frequent use of the term "norms.'' Indeed, if it 
were not so cumbrous a way of putting it, it would be quite 
proper always to speak of human activity as essentially ''know-
ing-desiring-norming."3 
Golightly's analysis of Kluckhohn indicates that Kluckhobn' s 
treatment of values is not altogether tree of relativistic implications. 
Golightly suggests that values are justified by an appeal to established 
value norms which cannot be validated. These norms can be vindicated 
only by an appeal to practice. 
1 Kluckhohn, '~alues and Value-Orientations," pp. 399-4oo. 
2~., pp. 417- 418. 
3Howa.rd Becker, "CUrrent Sacred-Secular Theory and Its Develop-
ment," Modern Sociological Theory, eds. Becker and Bosko!!, p. 14o. 
The appeal to practice, or course, initiates the circular 
process whereby valuations inevitably lead back to a re-
examination of our beJ..fefs and our desires, and still again 
to their consequences. 
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iii. The metaphysical illpl.ice.tions of sociological definitions 
of values.--Franz Adler in a recent article raises metaphysical issues 
which are also pertinent. He reduces concepts of value to four basic 
types: 
(A) Values e.re considered as absolutes, existing in the mind 
of God as eternal ideas, as independent validities, etc. (B) 
Values are considered as being in the object, material or non-
material. (c) Values are seen as located in man, originating 
in his biological needs or in his mind. Man by himself or 
man in the aggregate, variously referred to as group, society, 
culture, state, class, as2seen as "holding" values. (D) Values e.re equated with actions. 
:E:xamples of (A), according to Adler, e.re to be found especially 
among catholic sociologists and in the writings ot Pitirim Sorokin. In 
this connection Paul Farf'ey, a catholic, def'"lnes value as "the quality 
of recognized desirability founded in goodness." Quite possibly such a 
statement might be taken also to embody (C), inasmuch as Furfey suggests 
that man can recognize value. Even (B) may be incorporated, as when he 
says, "A val.ue as defined depends upon the real goodness of the object." 
Adler fails to note that Furf'ey expressly points out two levels of 
conception, concrete and abstract, the latter statement embodying the 
abstract meaning.3 
1 Golightly, "Social Science and Normative Ethics, 11 p. 245. 
2 Adler, "The Value Concept," p. 272. 
3Furfey, Scope and Method, p. 89. 
Type (B) is represented. b7 Howard Becker's statement, "any 
ob'ject ot any need . .,1 "This conception sees value as arising in the 
object where and when desire or need points to it."2 Adler does not 
suggest that Becker probably includes (C), since he attributes the 
function of valuing to the individual. 
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Type (c) reverses type (B) and locates value in the human being, 
as a subjective experience ot attaching value to objecta. This is often 
expressed. as attaching meanillg, especially collective meaning which may 
be given in the situation, as in the case of Durkheim. 
Type (D) is the position of the positive or natural science 
sociolcgist. As George Lundberg sqs: "WbateTer people do under these 
circumstances will constitute their valuing--their values."3 The only 
meaning available to the scientist is that which is implied in aetion. 4 
According to Adler, both A and B lead to circul.ari ty in reasoning 
because apart tram the expression and satisfaction of needs in persons 
~cker, Through Values to Social Interpretation, p . lOn. 
2Adler, uThe Value Concept," p. 273· There is contusion in 
Adler' s presentation at this point . His explanation includes both a 
concept of value as inherent in the object and as brought into existence 
by the valuer. "Thus, 'value' is said to be something outside the in-
diTidual that comes into existence by the value-giving activity inside 
the individual." This confusion is also seen in Adler's reference to 
Lundberg: "Natural science sociologists have also used actions as in-
dicators of values but generally in connection with a thought of value 
as attached to objects (B) rather than as residing in the human mind 
(C)." Thus Lundberg says tba.t ua thing bas or is a value if and when 
people behave toward it so as to retain or increase their possession 
of it . " p. 276. 
3aeorge Lundberg, Can Science Save Us? (lf. Y.: Longmans, Green 
and Co., 1947), p . 100. 
4 Adler, op. cit., p. 277. 
73 
the capacity of an object to satisfy needs is not observable. For this 
reason it is necessary to point to something other than the object as 
the source of value. If, on the other hand, value is not located in 
the individual but comes into being by his action, then this amounts to 
1 
saying that a value is what is valued. 
Type c, in locating values in man, suggests that value precedes 
action. Values thus conceived are psychic states which are not open 
to observation. The closest one can come to knowledge about values 
understood in this way is introspection. Thus the ''interpretive" or 
"verstehende" sociologists attempt to achieve knowledge by empathy. 
Even so, they find it necessary to find an empirical referrent. 
lO..uckhohn, for instance, appeals to an operational definition of value 
as a starting point. He first of all sees patterned behavior and from 
it infers value conceptions. In this way those who adhere to C tacitly 
accept the need to appeal to actions tor any knowledge of value. 2 
The major conclusions Adler arrives at in the article under con-
sideration are: 
(1) The value concept adds nothing to sociological study, since 
the only experience available for empirical observation is action.3 
(2) The value concept i s not only superfluous, but may "slow 
down" the advancement of the social sciences much the ve:y "instinct" did 
1Adler, 
2 Ibid., 
"The Value Concept," p. 273 . 
pp. 275-276. 3 Ibid.' p. 275. 
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in psycbology.1 It is, thus, an ex post facto explanation rather than 
a truly operational concept. 
Adler raises problems which cannot easily be shrugged off. 
Sociology is noticeably lacking in a methodology :for the study of 
values apart from the observation of action, verbal or ot herwise. Indeed, 
it may be a question whether there needs to be any disagreement among 
sociologists at this point . What, precisely, does the interpretive 
sociologist ' s concern :for values add to the natural science approach? 
It may be answered that, if nothing else, it adds an appreciation of the 
object under consideration as a mor al, valuing person. 
At this point the moral responsibility of a science is located. 
It is precisely the :failure of scientists i .n this regard that bas led 
them t o lend support at times to anti -personal values. This is not to 
accuse natural science sociologist s of subverting human dignity, but the 
logic of relativism tends to do so. Indeed, the positivist is the weak-
est when he is faced with the question why he makes the choices he does . 
The value concept keeps alive, at least, the concern for ultimately 
right action, even though sociologists may decline the responsibility of 
contributing to the discovery and validation of norms. 
Of equal significance is the question sociologists must ask 
themselves about what it is they are observing. Contrary to Adler and 
Lundberg, this has important implications. The natural science sociolo-
gists, by their emphasis on observing behavior and the avoidance of a 
lAd.ler, "The Value Concept, " pp. 218-279. 
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value concept, imply a concept of man inconsistent with their own self-
attitudes as scientists, capable of rational choice, and as citizens 
capable of moral decision, and as persons capable of aesthetic apprecia-
tion. 
4. Sociology and Ethics 
Of great practical significance in the problem of the role of 
norms in sociology is the question of ethics. The biases which may enter 
into the study of sociology have already been discussed. It has been 
noted that such biases will most likely have ethical implications. 
Professor Brightman and others have indicated that there are fundamental 
ethical judgments implicit in science itself. These are, at least, 
respect for truth and for persons.1 
It has been noted, too, that the ethical neutrality called for 
by Max Weber, while born of a legitimate scientific concern for objec-
tivity and a keen awareness of the problem of the investigator ' s biases, 
is not easily achieved. In fact, it may be impossible. 
If the relationship between sociology and values is not simply a 
matter of keeping the two entirely separated, then we are faced With a 
complex problem of working out their respective functions in relationship 
to each other. Suggested approaches to the solution of this problem Will 
be a part of the conclusions of this study. At this point, we may raise 
what appear to be significant questions. 
What criteria are to be the basis for judging a social situation 
1Brightman, "The Presuppositions of Experiment. " 
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to be a social problem? 
In the application of sociological knowledge, what is the rela-
tionship between the purposes of the group using the knowledge and the 
sociologist who supplies it? 
What is the social responsibility of the sociologist in his 
method of investigati on and reporting? 
What is the relationship between the findings of sociology and 
the goals of society, i.e. , can sociology contribute to the determination 
of goals? 
i. The cri teria of social problems. --The definition of a social 
problem admittedly involves many considerations . Most ot them, however, 
are related to two basic elements: what is meant by "social" and what 
is meant by "problem. 11 The present concern is with the latter, although 
the importance of the fo.nner i s not ainimized. It bas been noted that 
social science received a maJor impetus from an interest in social reform. 
Here in America, Dean Muelder notes, social science has come full cycle 
from the position of the Christian social gospel movement ot fifty years 
ago, so that today i nterest i n social problems is again an important 
source of stimulus to research.1 
.Sociologists for the most part agree that the definition of a 
social problem must be made i n terms of values. Jessie Bernard suggests 
that there have been, in general, three types of criteria applied in 
determining whether or not a situation of stress vas to be judged a 
1Muelder, "Norms and Valuations in Social Science," p . 104. 
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social problem.1 These have been a "humanitarian-sentimental" criterion, 
a "utilitarian" one, and one which she calls "dysfunctional.ity. n2 All 
of these have an implicit or explicit appeal to norms of mme sort. 
The 11humanitarian-sentimental" is concerned with the avoidance of pain 
or suffering. :Bernard notes that, "Abundance raises the standard of the 
humanitarian criterion always higher. "3 Not only that, this criterion 
is that of the reformer rather tban the person directly involved. Simply 
because people may learn to adjust to a problem does not mean that it 
ceases to exist, according to this standard. 
The ''utilitarian" criterion considers a situation to be a social 
problem because it is expensive to the rest of the society. This ~Y 
be in terms of money or convenience. This criterion ignores what social 
problems do to the individuals involved and concentrates on what the 
social problems do to society as a whole. 
Drunkenness, for example, would be a social problem in the 
lower socio- economic classes because it would involve 
entanglement With the law and the community burden of taking 
care of the man's family; it would not be in the upper socio-
economic classes because there would probably be no ent~e­
ment With the law and hence no burden to the commnn1ty. 
The emphasis may vary from "the greatest good for the greatest number 
of people" to the matter of "cost." 
"Dysf'unctionality" defines social problems in terms of the 
lJessie :Bernard, Social Problems at Midcentury (N.Y.: Dryden 
Press, 1957) , p. 104. 
4Ibid. , pp. 104-105. 
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functioning of society as a whole . Anything within the group that 
threatens its functions is a problem. Events or conditions from without 
are not, strictly speaking, social problems. In some instances, they 
may str engthen the function of the group. On the other hand, they may 
1 
reveal serious weaknesses that could be considered social problems . 
In each of these three maJor criteria there are normative 
premises . In the case of the "humani tarian-sentimental 11 the norms are 
largely middle class standards of health, sanitation, child- rearing, 
sobriety, and thrift. 2 In the case of the "utilitarian," the norms may 
be, as already noted, the more abstract one of the greatest good, or of 
monetary cost. In the case of "dystunctionali ty, " the norm is the status 
quo and, in fact, might be judged to be a curious identification of 
means and ends loaded with knotty ethical problems. 
Many writers are less specific than Bernard and seem to avoid 
the problem of standards by definitions lacking in specificity. An 
example is that of ClaJ:ence Case in a. popular book of readings in social 
problems: 
A soeial problem, a.s the term is herein understood, means 
any social situation which attracts the attention of a con-
siderable number of competent observers, and appeals to them 
as calling for readjustment or remedy by social, i.e . , col-
lective, action of some kind or other. 3 
1 Bernard, Social Problems at Midcentury, p . 106 
2 
Ibid., pp. 98-99. 
3CJ..arence Case, "A Definition of a Social Problem," Social 
Problems in America_, eds. Alfred McC. and Elizabeth B. Lee (N.y. : 
Henry Holt & Co .,Ci942l l955), p. 1· 
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Obviously, case does not intend to get into a value controversy. 
Social problems for him are whatever the people call social problems. 
This is hardly scientific, and opens the door to uncriticized va.lue 
judgments of all sorts . If', as Case suggests, the observers are compe-
tent, then presumably something determines their competence. This 
something reduces itself to a set of criteria such as reason, coherence, 
social detachment, and others . As Paul Furfey points out, there is a 
social philosophy of social pathologists and when sifted out of the 
literature is a "kindly philosophy, tolerant of differences, more 
anxious to control by persuasion than force. " It is a secular, humani-
1 tarian philosophy. 
The conclusion is unavoidable that in their refusal to come to 
grips with the nature of social problems in a truly inclusive way, 
social pathologists are something short of scientific and at the same 
time run the risk of inconsequential i f not sometimes detrimental vork. 
ii. The use of sociological lmovledae.--A growing emphasis in 
sociology is the application of sociological concepts and techniques to 
social situations not necessarily considered social problems. These may 
be in terms of general community betterment and planning or in terms of 
private manipulative situations . 
Alvin Gouldner, in an article in Social Problems, 2 raises some 
1 Bernard, Social Problems at Midcentury, p . 121. 
2 Alvin Gouldner { "Explorations in Applied Social Science, " 
Problems, 3(1956), 169-181. Social 
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pertinent questions in this regard. Speaking of applied sociaJ. scien-
tists he asks: 
. • • In the event of employment by a client whose values differ 
from those of the group whom the applied scientist is asked to 
change, w1 th whose values and to whose ends shall the scientist 
conform? 
••• Suppose the client does not know what his vaJ.ues are, or 
suppose he does not know in what priority to order his val.ues? 
• • • What of the client who pursues vaJ.ues which may be some-
what incompatible-- e .g., desegregation vs. political stability?1 
He concludes: 
If' the postulate of' a value-tree social science is not an 
accurate description of what applied social scientists do, 
and, above al.l, if this postulate is not translatable into 
clear-cut, unambiguous, operational directives, facilitating 
the applied scientist ' s solution of his professional problems, 
then the postulate itself--if not operationally meaningless--
would seem to be in need o! consideration (sic) respecifica-
tion. 2 
To Gouldner ' s three questions may be added another: What of the 
applied social scientist whose client wishes to use his services for 
purposes of which the scientist personally cannot approve? 
The very unity of personality places strains on the social 
scientist in such situations . Gouldner rightly suggests that to be 
scientific in the traditional sense is probably impossible. Value 
choices cannot be avoided. 
iii. The ethics of experiment.--The social responsibility of the 
investigator in his methods of research is aa ill.portant ethica.l consider&-
tion. If the investigation of human behavior deals to any extent with 
a study of human values, and if values are factors in motivation, then 
1Gouldner, "Explorations in Applied SociaJ. Science," p . 175. 
2Ibid. 
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it is necessary to ask what effect the analysis of values will have on 
the valuer. Will he, for instance, on becomillg aware ot the values 
involved in the action of others make any decisions regarding his own 
values, either directly or through decisions to act? Will he be led to 
assume that some values are more important than others because they are 
the subject of analysis?1 
Obviously the sociologist cannot avoid misunderstanding and 
misuse of his work. He cannot control the way in which his work Will 
be used. Nevertheless, there are important considerations . For 
instance, Margaret Mead, in her book, Male and Female, 2 declares: 
When one wr1 tes in a way that is easily accessible to all 
interested citizens, I believe one should put oneself in those 
readers ' place, and not force them either to accept or to 
reject interpretations the implications of which they would 
not have chosen to hear had they been tully aware of them. 3 
Her footnote is more specific : 
This is one of the serious crit icisms that can be levelled at 
the way in which the Kinsey r eport was permitted to become a 
best- seller. 'l'he sudden removal of a previously guaranteed 
reticence has left many young people singularly defenseless 
in just those areas where their desire to conform was p~otected 
by a lack of knowledge of the extent of non-conformity. 
This is perhaps not so much a. criticism of Kinsey or of the 
publicizers of his work as it is a criticism of an ethical situation 
l Social scientists implicitly assume that they are contributing 
to knowledge, and thus it may be deduced that they are interested in 
challging or achieving values . 
~ga.ret Mead, Male and Female (N. Y. : William Morrow & Co., 
1949). 
3 Ibid. , p . 450 . 4 Ibid., p . 450n. 
that depends on ignorance to enforce its standards. In contrast, 
Seward Hiltner, ~iting from a religious point of view, considers the 
1 
report to be of great value as data for the study of ethics. 
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CUriously, both Mead and Kinsey make the same assumption about 
traditional ethics, i.e. , it is a form of negativism. Mead, from an 
anthropological point of view, lets this stand as the fact about our 
culture . Kinsey believes that this fact tells him that a new ethical 
point or view is required, one which considers sex to be a "normal 
biologic function . n2 
Kinsey's point of view is more fraught with problems, although 
the ethicist who is a Christian would certainly want to go beyond Mead 1 s 
implicit positivism at this point. Kinsey' s suggested interpretation of 
sex in largely biological terms is a onesided view of human nature which 
is refuted by most sociological, anthropological, and psychological 
points of view. 
In so far as he implies the irrelevance of facts to morals, 
he is mistaken .•• The question is as to whether the advocacy 
or a view of sex as a "normal biologic function, acceptable in 
whatever form it is manifested, 11 is itself' a particular content 
with moral and social implications and dimensions .•• In so 
far as a view of sex as a "normal biologic function 11 should be 
set against any cultural, ethical, or legal view of sex, then 
it would have to be rejected. 3 
1 seward Hiltner, Sex Ethics and the Kin.sey Report (N.Y. : 
Association Press, 1953) . 
2Alfred Kinsey, Wardell Pomeroy, and Clyde Martin, Sexual 
Behavior in the Human Male (Philadelphia: w. B. Saunders, 1948} . 
3Hiltner, Sex Ethics, p . 150. 
Both the refusal to come to grips w1 th axiological issues and the 
advancing of suggested solutions that fail to take into account philo-
sophical questions are a distinct cba.llenge to the ethicist. What is 
more, the transfer of respectability from the scientific work to the 
unscientific conclusions raises questions about the scientist's relia-
bility. 
iv. Sociology and social goals. --There remains the problem of 
the relationship of the "is" to the "ought" in human experience. Some 
individuals, either through ignorance or the desire to justi:f.y them-
selves, will equate the two. There w11l be those, for instance, for 
whom the Kinsey report vill torm a rationalization of simil.ar modes of 
behavior . While few thinking people would accept the relationship as 
illustrated, the "is" and the "ought" in more sophisticated ways have 
1 
been the subject of serious discussion. 
This is one of the aspects of the dualism of fact and value 
which was heralded. in the modern world by Kant with his sharp distinc-
tion between the theoretical reason and the practical reason.2 Theo-
retieal reason consists of the principles by which the mind understands 
sensation. Practical reason consists of the principles of moral obli-
gation. "Is" and "ought" are in their own separate realms, although 
~ote especially Richard N. Bender, Prolefomena to the 
Derivation of Moral Laws from Psychol~ical. Dataunpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Boston university, 1952 • 
2 Brightman, Nature and Values, p. 22. 
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Kant partly mitigated the dualism by considering value to be more funda-
mental than nature •1 The result of this dualism in modern thought has 
often been "a disciplined knowledge of :f'act and the most arbitrary and 
subjective feelings about value."2 
Many sociologists :f'it this description. We have already noted 
the natural science trend in sociology which considers the value concept 
super1'1.uous. The e:tteet of this position is to equate the "is" and 
the "ought" by implication, although when pressed few would deny their 
own private judgment of the value or disvalue of' certain existing social 
situations. 
Science as presently interpreted by most sociologists is not 
competent to deal adequately with this problem, although there are those 
who are calling for a social science more adequately equipped to deal 
vi th the axiological issues of' our time. 3 As Maciver says: 
If' in the judgment of' the investigator the consequences are 
undesirable it becomes for him a task wholly consonant with 
principles of science to examine in turn4 the available methods for mitigating or removing their source. 
5. SUJDIIai7 
This survey of the maJor problems involved in the study of' norms 
1Brightman, Nature and Values, p. 23. 
2 Ibid.' p. 24. 
3In addition to Muelder, already cited, see Robert M. Maciver, 
The More Perfect Union (B. Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1948), pp. 276-279; 
IO.uckhohn, Mirror For Man, pp. 264ft.; and Bidney, Theoretical Anthro-
pology, pp. 416ft. 
~civer, op. cit., p. 279. 
and values from a sociological point of view suggests the following 
propositions by way of summary: 
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i. The history of sociology reveals that concepts employed by 
sociologists and explanations of human social behavior reflect styles of 
thought current at particular times . 
ii. The sociology of knowledge suggests that existential in-
fluences on thought are inevitable and, :further, that this recognition 
requires both a concept of t ruth as related to history and the knowledge 
of t ruth as expanding and dynamic rather than absolute . 
iii . Styles of thought are to be thought of as functionally related 
to truth, 1. e., instrumental and active in the apprehension of t ruth. 
i v . The relational or functional approach to styles of thought 
suggest that the mere recognition of biases without subjecting them to 
critical comparison and analysis leads either to relativism or to 
absolutism. 
v. Such biases should, instead, become part of an analysis not 
only in terms of accounting for them as variables, but also in terms of 
considering them candidates for norms. 
vi. The fact that certain biases have a normative relationship 
to scientific methodology, as revealed in the presuppositions of experi-
ment, suggest the possibility as well as the need for dealing construc-
tively with biases. 
vii. The many concepts of values and norms used in sociology 
suggest the need for a coherent concept of value for sociology which 
includes subjective as well as objective aspects . 
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viii. The differentiation between "value" and "norm" provides such 
conceptual clarification and suggests at the same time the relationship 
of the validating process to the relativity of values . 
ix. Because all sociological positions regarding the meaning of 
value have metapbysica.l implications, further reason is supplied for an 
approach to values not confined to a narrow empiricism. 
x . These theoretical questions are directly related to practical 
guidance for human behavior. 
xi. Such guidance is iJIIplicit in most sociological work, and the 
sociologist's choice is between irresponsible suggestion of guiding 
principles and the truly scientific task of experimentation and valida-
tion. 
xii. Such a requirement suggests a functional relationship between 
"is" and "ought" in which the "is" sheds light on the possible content 
of the "ought," and the "ought," so illuminated, becomes progressively 
validated in the form of guiding norms . 
CHAP.rERIII 
TRENDS Aim ISSUES II AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGICAL WRITING 
1. Historical Development 
i. Introduction.--The developing sociological interest of 
American catholics is part of the whole story of the development of 
1 
sociology in America, although for significant reasons the contribu-
tiona of catholic sociologists to American sociology are limited. These 
reasons are: (1) a preoccupation with the principles of Catholic social 
philosophy as the source of guidance in dealing with social concepts 
and problems; (2) a distrust ot sociology in general with its Comtean 
origins and continued positivist bias; and (3) the failure to partici-
pate significantly in the intellectual development of American culture 
largely because of (a) an overriding concern tor the needs of a pre-
d()ll!inantly immigrant constituency, 2 and (b) a defense mentality stimu-
lated b,r anti-Catholicism and an essentially liberal society.3 
1 see Luther L. Bernard and Jessie s., Origins of American 
Sociology (N.Y. : Thomas Y. Crowell, 1943) • 
2 
J. T. Ellis, American catholics and the Intellectual Life 
( ChiC8€;o: Heritage Foundation, 1956), pp. 25-28. 
3El.lis, American catholics, pp. 56- 57· Cf. Joseph P. 
Fitzpatrick, "Catholic Responsibility in Sociology," pp. 384-396. 
Cf. Gustave Weigel, "American Catholic Intellectualism--A Theologian's 
Reflections," Rev. of Pol., 19(1957), 275-307, esp. 289 and 304. 
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Few empirical studies by Catholics have been sociologically 
definitive, and Catholic contributions to sociological theory have been 
rare. Indeed., Professor John Donavan considers the many statistical 
studies by Catholics "pre-sociology" rather than "direct contributions 
to systematic knowledge of human behavior and social organization.'~ 
Nevertheless, a central theme of Catholic sociological concern, namely, 
the role of values and norms in sociological writing, has proven to be 
a crucial issue in contemporary sociology. Catholics have long been 
concerned vith this issue, and the present state of sociological thinking 
among Catholics is a result of a constant struggle vi th it. 
Catholic sociologists are by no means alone in their concern for 
values and norms in sociology, but because they are committed. to a body 
of doctrine that is not only systematic but normative, they have been as 
a group unique in certain aspects of their approach to sociology. 
Catholic sociologists are self-conscious about their theological and 
2 philosophical norms. 
To appreciate the present state of Catholic sociological writing 
in the united states, it is necessary to consider same of the background 
in the development of Catholic social thought and action. 
ii. The Colonial Period to Rerum Novarum. - -Catholics trace 
1John D. Donovan, "American Catholic Sociologists and the 
Sociology of Religion," Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 15(1954), 107. 
~illiams, Catholic Social Thought, p. 133, passim. See also 
Mary R. Chisholm, Ideological Im!>lications of Current Definitions of a 
Social Problem (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1948), p. 193. 
their social concern in the United States back to the colonial period. 
However, they are frank to state tbat contributions to social thought 
1 during this period vere fev and individual in nature. Some broad soc-
ial efforts vere rooted in a "distinctively Catholic point of viev," such 
as The Reverend Gabriel Ricbard's2 plan for Indian education and The 
Reverend Demetrius Gallitzin ' s3 idea of the patriarchal community. A 
tract on usury produced by The Reverend Jeremiah O'C&llagban vas circu-
lated, but "on the vhole, there vas no comprehensive presentation of 
social problems drawn from the Scriptures, dogma, scholastic philosophy, 
and tradition. . •• " Men like the Ca:aolls., TbODeS Fitzi.mllons, Roger 
Taney, William Gaston, Robert Walsh, Matthew Carey, and others made con-
tributions to American social thought, but "without drawing on the 
disti.ngu.isbably Catholic fund of social doctrines."4 
In the early part of the nineteenth century, Catholics as a group 
gave little support to social movements, being i.nfiuenced strongly by 
Catholic thought in Europe . 5 European Catholics vere mostly conserva-
tives vho resisted the advance of popular government and vbo viewed such 
movements as "communist insurrection encouraged by antiChristian liberals, 
Freemasons, and other designing men bent for their ovn profit on the 
1
celestine J. Neusse, The Social Tho~ht ot American Catholics 
(Westminster, Md . : The Newman lk>ok Shop, 19 5), p. 286. 
2Gabriel Richard (1767-1832), French Priest. 
3Demetrius Gallitzin (1770-184o), Austrian Priest . 
4 Neusse, op. cit., p. 286. 
5Tb.eodore ~d, The story of American Catholicism (If. Y. : 
The Macmillan Co., 1941), p. 295. 
overtbrov ot society. ,.J. Until late in the 1880 1 s, Catholics opposed 
militant social reform. James Roosevelt Bayley, Bishop of 13altimore, 
in 1874 called labor unions worse than secret societies.2 But at the 
same time in a practical way both clergy and laity were in the midst of 
a mighty struggle to improve the position of the Catholic poor. 
'fhe 186o 1 s and 1870 1 s were marked b;y a recognition of the in-
creasi.Dgly urban nature of the Catholic population and the threat this 
posed to physical and moral well-being. 3 From the middle of the century 
on important societies were organized to meet these urban problems. 
These were The German Catholic Central Society in 1885, the Society of 
St. Vincent DePaul in 186o, the Irish Catholic Benevolent Union in 
1869, the Catholic Total Abstinence Union in 1872, the Catholic Young 
Men 1 s lfational Union in 1875. The Paulists, under the convert, Isaac 
Hecker, though primarily missionary in character, were active in the 
soeial field through the publication of the Catholic World, which crusaded 
tor better social conditions.4 
This first stage of the development of Catholic social action in 
America, beginning with sporadic, individual interest and culminating in 
1 
A. J. AbeD., "Origins ot Catholic Social Reform in the United 
States: Ideological Aspects," Rev. of Pol., 11(1949), 294. 
2 Ibid.' p. 295 . 
3 Ibid., p. 295. Bumerous articles of the period attest this 
concern. For eumple, see "The Sani tar;y and Moral Condition ot New 
York City, t• Cath. WorJ.d, 7(July, Aug . , 1868), 553- 566, 712-714; "The 
Charities of Bew York, " Cath. Vorld, 8(Bov., 1868), 279-285 . 
4 Ibid., p. 297. 
the organization of societies, came to an end in the first serious 
ideological struggle among Catholics in the United States. This was 
1 
the struggle over the Catholic recognition of the Knights of Labor. 
The traditional stand of the Church against secret societies coupled 
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vi th a llisrepresentation of the situation to the Pope by Europeanizers 
in America created a situation in which the trade union organization was 
about to receive Papal condemnation. In 1886, at the height of the 
controversy, Cardinal Gibbons visited Pope Leo XIII to gain cle.rifica-
tion on the Church's position on the labor question, especially trade 
unionism. This visit cul.lllinated in the vindication of the social Justice 
point of viev developing rapidly in the Un1 ted States and the recognition 
2 
of the Knights of Labor. The ensuing encyclieal, Rerum Bovarum, sub-
titled "The Condition of the Workingman," issued in 1891, ushered in a 
nev period in Catholic social thought. Of it .Joseph HussJ..ein writes: 
Ellbodied in the Rerum Novarum is the sum total of modern 
Catholic social thought that had developed since the birth 
of the nev Industrialia, together Yith the wisdom of past 
centuries of faith, and the authoritative teaching of the 
Scriptures. 3 
iii. Social Catholiciam. - -According to Catholics, Rerum Nova.rum 
1 For a Catholic labor leader 1 s viev, see Terrence Powderly 1 
1'he Path I ~od (li.Y.: Colwabia University Press, 1940). 
2 J'ohn Ireland, The Church and Modern Society; (N.Y.: 1896), 
I, 104.-lll; and Henry J. Browne, The Catholic Church and the Knights 
of Labor (Washington, D. C. : 1949), PP• 12-33, cited in Abell, pp. 298 
and 306. 
3Husslein, Social Wellsprings, I, 164. 
was little short of revolutionary at a time when Liberal.isa was rampant.1 
~e Church recognized that social iDJustice as well as evil Jlell vas the 
cause ot industrial strite. 
However, the Church vas motivated not only by altruiBll, but also 
by the need to Sl.q)p<)rt the vorki ngam in order to keep hill trom leaving 
the Church. The Standard, a siDgle tax paper:-, quoted a Catholic durillg 
the time vi th reference to another current issue, Catholic support ot 
Henry George's program: 
. • • To torbid Catholics to participate in discussion and 
decision would be to acknowledge "the truth of the accusation 
by our enemies that Catholics are not and cannot be truly loyal 
to the civil authorities of thei.r country. n2 
A further movement in the direction of accommodating the 
Catholic position to the American situation was the holding of congresses 
in 1889 and 1893 in Baltimore and Chicago to discuss the Church's rela-
tion to social and intellectual movements. It was also, in part, an 
attempt to coabat the influence ot Peter Paul Cahensley, who vas leading 
a movement to isolate Catholics from others in America.3 The congresses 
sanctioned co-operation vi th non-Catholics in ~~&tters of social refol'Jil 
such as Sunday observance and temperance. 4 
1Huss1ein, Social Wellsprings, I, 164. 
2 AbeD, "Origins of catholic Social Reform, II p. 300 . 
3Ibid., pp. 301-302. ct. JohnJ. Meng, "Cahenslyism: the First 
stage, 1883-1891," Catb. Jlist . ReT., 31(1946), 389-413, and "CahensJyism: 
the SecondCnap"t-er,• Catb. Jlist. Rev. 32(1946), 302-340. 
4 Ibid., pp. 302-303. 
Catholic interest in social movements during the later 
nineteenth century is best understood as one aspect--perhaps 
the most important aspect--of the process by which a uniquely 
authoritarian Church accommodated itsf-! to a uniquely :free, 
liberal, and individualistic society. 
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The accommodation was possible because of a distinction which 
liberal social philosophers made betveen liberal theology and liberal 
policy, repudiating the former but accepting the latter. The theology 
ot the Church is essential and divine, but the policy is human and 
accidental. The theology must never cbange, but the policy must always 
2 
change. This is the principle which ultimately made possible Catholic 
entrance into the field of sociology proper. 
With the turn of the century came the gradual trensi tion to a 
more scientific approach to social problems. On the one hand, the 
federation of Catholic charitable societies3 spelled the end of nation-
alism and turther liJilited the conservative European influence. On the 
other hand, social action was viewed more as social work4 than philan-
throw. In this respect the development of social work in other than a 
Catholic context was a parallel. Herbert stroup, tor instance, con-
siders the founding of the lfew York School of Social Work in 1898 the 
1Abell, "Origins of Catholic Social Reform," p . 304. 
2Ibid., p. 305. 
31901, American Federation of Catholic Societies. See John 
O'Grady, Catholic Charities in the United states {Washington, D.C . : 
National Conference of Catholic Charities, 1930), and Ellis, .American 
Catholics, p. 131. 
~or the history of the Bational. Catholic School of Social 
Service, see L. R. Lawler, Full Circle (Washillgton, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1951). 
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starting point of modern social work, Yith its emphasis on social 
conditions as deterministic: of problems and trained persOJlXle]. as required 
1 tor the handling of complex problems. 
ID 1917 Father John J. Burke, editor ot the catholic: World, 
c:alled a meeting at the Catholic: oniversity ot America of delegates tram 
sixty-eight dioceses and twenty-seven national Catholic: societies, which 
resul. ted iD the founding ot the llational Catholic: War Council. This 
f'uDc:tioned as "a highly effective medium in almost every phase of Catholic: 
participation in the war effort. • • • "2 ID 1919 this organization vas 
established on a permanent basis and the l18llle c:haDged to the Wational 
C&thol.ic: Welfare Counc:u,3 and later to the Bational catholic: Welfare 
Conference in order to avoid mounting European Catholic: opposition to 
its i.llportaDc:e as a mouthpiece of the American hierarchy. The Confer-
enc:e nov bas departments, bureaus, and sections which deal vi th almost 
every iJiportaDt phase ot Catholic: interest and policy. 4 Of these the 
Social. Action Department bas bad the greatest influence on the national 
c:onsc:iowmess. Its first director, Jolm A. Ryan, vho continued until 
p. 6. 
1uerbert Stroup, Social Work (B.Y. z American :Book eo., 1953), 
2 
Ellis, .Aaeric:an Catholics, p. 139. 
3Tbe lasting ac:hievement of the :National catholic Welfare Council 
vas the Bishops' Program tor Social Reconstruction, iasued by its Adm.i.Di-
strative Comlll.ittee in 1919, vhic:h ~ feel ranks with the great Papal 
social encyclicals. See Donall Cam,pion, "The Sociology ot Catholics 1D 
America," Social Theorists, ed. Cl.e~~ent Mibanovic:h (Milwaukee: The Brw::e 
Publisb.ing eo., 1953), p. 354. 
4
mis1 op. cit., pp. 140-141. 
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his death in 1945,1 was a maJor transition f'1gure in the development ot 
sociology aJIIODg Catholics in the United states. 
iv. The emergence ot sociology and its eary cbaraeteristics.--
At this point the tocus is sharpened, and while the history of Catholic 
social action continues as a develop~~ent ot deepening interest in and 
intluence on the national lite in its manitold aspects, sociology begins 
to be distingUished tran social thought and action. 
It Catholic social action in general is the seedbed ot sociology 
among Catholics in the United states, the Catholic University ot America 
in Washington, D.c., is the place where it vas nurtured and brought to 
tlover. 2 The first person ot importance in sociology in this develop-
ment was Father Willi am J. Kerby, who in 1892-1894- had studied under Dr. 
Thollas J. Bouquillon. His work included such subJects as COIIIIIluni.sm, 
Socialisa, Poverty and Reliet, Property, Commerce and Wages, Ethics ot 
the Faaily, Justice, 'l'ellperance, Riatory ot Charities, Crime, Correction 
and Punisblaent. The emphasis vas both theologica.l and sociologieal..3 
In 1895, the School ot Social Sciences was established under the F&cul ty 
ot Lav, With three departllents: Ethics-Sociology, Political EeonolliY, 
and Political Science-Law.4 
1EUis, .American Catholics, p. 142. 
2 
En. J. Ross, Basic Sociology (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing 
eo., 1953), p. 8. 
3 Bernard Mulvaney, .,The Department ot Sociology ot the Catholic 
University ot America, 1894-1955," .Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 16(1955), 266. 
4 ~., p. 266. 
Dean W1lliam c. Robinson said of sociology in 1897 that it could 
not yet be called a science but i s distinctly philosophical. Sociology 
vas transferred to the School of Philosophy in 1897, as 1Ddicated in the 
Rector • s Report of that year. !bat same year Father Kerby took u;p duties 
as Assistant Professor of Sociology with two students and two courses.1 
The first advanced degree in sociology was given in 1904. In 1906 Kerby 
becaae Professor of Sociology and Head of the Department, in which capa-
city he served until 1933. 
Father John A. ~began teachi.Dg at Catholic Un1 versity in 1915 
1l1 Moral Theology and did not teach in the Department of Sociology until 
1932, al. though tor years he taught Industrial Ethics in his own depart-
2 
ment. In 1937 he began tea.cb1 ng tull time in the Departaent of Sociology 
when it vas transferred to the new School of Social Science. 
Ryan's interests in the social field were broad, but economics 
dom1 nated these. ~ course in econoaics which he taught in his first 
assigmaent at St. Paul Semina.ry he described as consisting of "a brief 
introd.ucticm to Economic History and an elementary course in Political 
EconOIIiY. " In this connection he treated many ethical problems. 3 He vas 
concerned with the elim1.na.tion of inJustice in the socia.l system, espec:1al-
ly as it aff'ected the "propertyless wage earners spoken o:r by Pope Leo 
~vaney, uThe Departm.ent of Sociology, 11 p. 267. 
2Ibid. 
~trick W. Gearty, ~e Economic Thought of Monsignor John A. 
~ (Washington D.C.: The catholic University of America Press, 1953)1 
p. 31. 
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XIII. nl His Distributive Justice, published first in 1916, vas bailed 
by catholics and non-catholics alike aa an outstanding treatise on the 
ethics of economic reform. 2 
Be was active in the formulation of the Bishop's Program of 
Social Reconstruction of 1919, which conta1 ned many proposals he had 
advocated tor years, including mi.n1llUDl wage and chlld labor legislation, 
social insurance against unemployment, sickness, accidents and old age, 
public housing projects, legal enforcement of the right of labor to 
organize, control of monopolies and curtailment of exce.ss protits.3 The 
program vas adopted by the tour bishops cam.prising the executive com-
mittee of the Ba.tiona.l. Catholic War Council . When the successor to this 
Council, the National catholic Welfare Conference, came into being in 
1920, Ryan became the first director of the Social Action Department and 
served as such until his death. 
In 1925 the present head of the Sociology Department at catholic 
Utliversity, Paul B. Fu:rtey, began to teach sociology. 'l'he department 
vas transferred f'rom philosop~ to the Graduate School of Arts and 
Sciences until 1937, vhen it began operating in the nev School of Social 
Sciences vi th Father Furtey as Bead of the Department. Nearly halt ot 
the lite of the department had been spent in the School of Philosop~, 
1Gearty, Economic Thought, PP• 32-33· 2~., P• 36 . 
3Ibid., pp. 38-39· ct. Bishops ' Program of Social Recon-
struction:A General Review of theProblems and SUrvey of Remedies 
(20th American ed. j Washington, D. c. : National cathOlic Welfare Con-
terence, 1939). 
and only two men have headed the work of sociology, Fathers Kerby and 
Furfey.1 
Kerby is considered by most American Catholic sociologists to 
be the founder of sociology among Catholics in the United States. until 
the last decade most Catholic sociologists trained in the United States 
2 have studied under Kerby or his students. 
The main theme of Catholio social thought at the beginning of 
the twentieth century was the relation of the Church to social reform. 3 
The social reform movement and academic sociology were so closely related 
that many Catholic sociologists .. considered it their duty as teachers 
and writers to stress social and ethical principles as well as to study 
social facts and problems."4 Thus, well into the century sociology was 
considered by most Catholics in the United states to be a ''practical, 
socioethical study of social problems and conditions ... 5 
Along vi th this tendency to associate sociology and social 
reform was the tendency to think ot sociology as a normative science. 
Kerby spoke of a "Catholic Sociology" which incorporated the Catholic 
normative system into the sociological methods of observation and re-
search. Such a figure as Jobn A. Ryan, writing voluminously about socia.l 
problems as an astute student of society, helped to keep sociology, in 
the sense that most non-Catholics thought of it, Within the orbit ot 
~ulvaney, "The Department of Sociology, .. p. 274. 
~illiams, Catholic Social Thought, p. 61. 
3 Ibid.' P • 34. 4 Ibid., p. 35· 5 Ibid.' p. 61. 
1 
norms. 
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Bishop Francis Haas, student of Ryan,2 rather effectively com-
bined the social reform and sociological concerns in his writing. Haas 
became head of the School of Social Science at Catholic University when 
it was established in 1937, at which time Ryan began to teach in the 
School's Department of Sociology.3 Baas's work, Man and Society,4 is 
illustrative of his approach. His purpose in writing it was "to examine 
the facts and trends of contemporary society in their moral setting, and 
to show their 88reement with sound principles of social welfare. "5 While 
the author writes with philosophical and theological norms plainly stated--
for example, the first chapter treats man as body and soul--it is note-
worthy that he evidences an understanding of society that goes consider-
ably beyond early notions based on charity alone . He recognizes the 
social forces that impinge on the individual and the importance of social 
organization as a controllable factor. 
In 1931 Pope Pius XI issued the encyclical letter, Quadragesimo 
1The following works by John A. Ryan are illustrative: 
Declining Liberty (N.Y. : The Macmillan Co . , 1927); Questions of the Day 
(Boston: Stratford, 1931); Distributive Justice (N.Y. : The Macmillan 
Co ., 1935); A Better Economic Order (If. Y. : Harper and Bros. , 1935); 
with Francis J. Boland, catholic Principles of Politics (The Macmillan 
eo ., 1940) . 
~illiams, Catholic Social Thought, p . 62 . 
3 Ge.a.rty, Economic Thought, p . 35 . 
4 Francis J . Haas, Man and Society (N.Y. : Appleton- Century 
Crofts, [1930} 1952) . 
5Ibid. ' p. vii. 
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Allno, in which he set forth a prograa for the reconstruction ot soeiety 
on the basis of the corporate society. !he encyclical was written in 
celebration ot the fortieth anniversary of Berum llovaram, and as such 
reiterated and acclaimed the principles laid dawn by Leo XIII, especial-
ly his defense of the workers against both liberalism and sociali sm and 
his clear definition of the rights and duties of both capital and labor •1 
Pius XI recognized that stemm:i ng f'rom Rerum Nova.ru:a, a truly Catholic 
social science has developed in the interveni.Dg years. L1 ttle by little 
Catholic social principles have been accepted and the right of workers 
to organize more widely acknowledged. He suggested that it is necessary 
to see that it bas been the combined etforts of capital and labor that 
have produced wealth, and that to allocate to either what appears to be 
its own is a false dichotollization. The basic criteria for distribution, 
then, is the common good ot all. At the present time, this distribution 
is detective, and the result can only be disastrous. Tvo things are 
required in such a s i tuation: the reform of institutions and the cor-
rection of morals . There must be a Just diTision of rights and duties 
among institutions tram the State downward, based on the principle of 
subsidiarity. This means less government control and bureaucracy. A 
new order JIUSt be based on vocational diTisions organized together in a 
corporate fashion . Human society DNSt becc:mae "truly social. and organic." 
To use the economic real.JI as an example, the labor contract must become 
a kind of partnership in which laborers share to some degree in the 
~or text and comment see Husslein, ed., Social Wellsprings, 
II, 174-234. 
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profits. In &ll spheres there must be this same co-operation, which is 
the tru.e nature of the corporate society. The aim IIUSt be JII&JdllllDD self-
determination and maximum self -regulation in the spirit of mutual 
justice and charity. 
!rhe program is adm1 ttedly quite general, and the Pope leaves it 
1 to the political and econanic experts to actualize it. 
This letter stands as another high water mark in Catholic social 
thought and has served to encourage Catholic social thought and action 
and, more especially 1 sociological vork. 
v . The American Catholic Sociologica.l society. --During the years 
from the beginning of academic sociology among Catholics i n the United 
States, there vas a smal.l but steady stream of articles, dissertations, 
and books in which an effort was made to justify sociologica.l vork by 
Catholics, to understand the vork of Catholics in relationship to soci olo-
gists in general, and to provide a theoretical foundation for sociology. 
As v1ll be shown later, this gave rise to certain major issues which serve 
to expose the genuine problems involved in the development of sociology 
among Catholics . It also gave rise to a self-consciousness and a sense 
of fraternity on the part of Catholic sociologists. The Reverend Ralph 
Oallagher in 1938 said: 
l.nusslein, ed.1 Social Wellsprings, II, 175-176. More detailed 
commentary on this encyeliC8i and Rerum Novarmn is to be found in Joseph 
c. Russlein, The Christian Social Manifesto (Milwaukee : The Bruce Pub-
lishing Co., 1931), and Phili p Hughes, The Popes' New Order (B.Y. : 
The Macmillan Co. , 1944) . 
There is such a thing as a Catholic Sociology, tor sociology 
is not 1n the tul.l sense of the vord an exact science.l 
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With this statement, Gellagher bad keynoted the organization of 
the American Catholic Sociological. Society for vhich he spoke as its 
founder and first president. 2 :Behind this statement vas a graving 
awareness that non-Catholic sociologists vere making implicit and expli-
cit value-Judgments vhich vere unacceptable to Catholics.3 Although 
the suggestion tbat tbere can be a Catholic Sociology bas been seriously 
challenged Yithin the Society, there is a basic concern for presup-
positions, vbich has continued to represent the official position of 
the Society. 
Sister Jeanine, a recent president of the Society, said in her 
1956 presidential address: 
our society vas founded on the conviction that Yi thin 
the wider field ot scientific sociology there was a set ot 
problems of both theoretical and practical nature, of par-
ticular concern to Catholic sociologists. In general these 
problema bave to ao with the social relations of Catholics in 
American society. 
She then called for the "recognition b;y Catholics themselves of the 
sociological implications of the Catholic thought pattern," or "bov do 
1 John J. Kane, "Are Catholic Sociologists a Minority Group?" 
Am. Oath. Soc. Rev., 14(1953)1 2-12. 
2aaymond w. Hurray, "Presidential Address, 19391 " Am. Cath. Soc. ~., 1(1940), 39· 
3Kane1 "Are Catholic Sociologists a Minority Group?" Cf. 
Theodore M. Remelt, Final Moral Values In Sociology (Washington, D.C.: 
'fhe Catholic Universi't7 of America Press, 1929). 
4 Sister M. Jeanine, "The Catholic Sociologist and the Catholic 
Mind," Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 17(1956), 2. 
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catholics define a given social situation with reference to catholic 
beliefs and externalize tbat definition 1». their actions in a given 
situation? ,.1 
Article II of the Constitution of the Society reads: 
The purpose of this society shall be to stimulate con-
certed study and research among Oltbolics vorkiDg in the field 
of sociology; to create a sense of solidarity among catholic 
sociologists; to present the sociological implications of 
catholic thought; and to encourage its members to recognize 
their professional responsibilities as sociologists.2 
Along with the fo,mc11ng of the American Catholic Sociological 
Society a new periodical was introduced, The American catholic Sociologi-
cal Review, first published in 1940. It has been published continuously 
to the present and has been a maJor vehicl.e :tor the expression or 
Catholic sociological interest and research. Since its inception, there 
bas been a new trend among Catholic sociologists marked especially by an 
increasing emphasis on empirical st~ and methodological sophistication) 
2. MaJor Issues in the DeTel<?pJRent of 
Sociology Among catholics 
i. Introduction. - -As the brief, foregoing historical per spec-
tive suggests, one of the central problems of catholic interest in 
sociology has been in understa.M1 ng the nature of sociology in relationsh:q) 
1
sister Jeanine, "The catholic Sociologist," p . 3· 
2 American Catholic Sociological Society, Report of the First 
Annual Convention, Dec. 26-28, 1938. 
3 Eva J. Ross, Review of Will.iams, p. 206-207. ct. Brother D. 
Augustine, "The Scientific Catholic Sociologist, " Am. Ca.th. Soc. Rev. , 
18(1957), 2-7. 
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to theology, philosophy 1 ethics, and social action. This problem is 
complex and has at least the following foci, as Catholics analy-ze 
their position: (1) the relative autonomy of' socm.logy; (2) the proper 
object of sociology; (3) the place of empiricism in sociology; (4) the 
presuppositions of sociology; and (5) the catholic criticism of sociology. 
An understanding of these issues is crucial for an interpretation of the 
sociological point of view of Catholics vi th reference to the role of 
norms. 
Professor Williams' conclusions regarding the schools of thought 
among Catholic sociologists is the startin8 point of this analysis . 
According to him, there are three schools of thought •1 They are they 
LePlay school, the synthetic school, and the sociational school. 
Frederic LePlay (18o6-1882), a French sociologist, believed that 
sociology should, on the one band, discover facts and, on the other band, 
should combine these :facts vi th the social teachings of the Church in 
order to effect reform.2 The outstand ing contribution of LePlay was 
his methodology, 3 for be was among the first to formulate a scientific 
method for analyzin8 social institutions. His work was done primarily 
on the family 1 for which he established three categories of investiga-
tion : place, work, and people. Under these be subsumed his "nomen-
clature" or analytical divisions of each category-. This refinement of 
lwilliams, Catholic Social Thought, pp. 66-67. 
2 Ibid. , p . 67. 
3Mary E. Healey, "LePlay' s Contribution to Sociology: His 
Method," Am. Catb. Soc. Rev., 8(1947), 97-110. 
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the subject matter of sociology was a specification of the generally 
held dictua that social science .uat observe social tacts. He defined 
the family as the basic social un1. t and the family buc58et as the 
"quantitative expression ot family lite . 11 The lasting contribution ot 
Lel'la,- vas this eapirical aethod which is regarded as a fundamental con-
1 
tribution to sociological research 1n general. 
The synthetic school is characterized by a three-told synthesis: 
(l) sociolog,- is a synthesis ot the subject liB.tter of all social sciences; 
(2) sociology is a synthesis of all the available aethodology for studyil:lg 
man and society, e.g., statistics, comparison, philosophy, history, and 
experi.mentation; and (3) sociology is brought within the tramevork ot the 
Catholic system of knowled8e and thus becames part of the general intel-
2 leetual synthesis. 
The sociational school lim1 ta the stu.dy of sociology to an area 
apart tram tba.t studied by other social sciences, nuaely, the integrsting 
and disintegrating processes that occur between men in groups and struc-
tures.3 'rhis school voul.d &l.so limit sociology to eapirieal study, and 
that not to deteraine the essence ot social phen~, but their tunc-
tion.4 
~tiria Sorokin, Cont:;r.ra.ry Sociological Theories (li.Y. : 
Harpers & Bros. , 1928), pp. 62- • 
2w1lliams, Catholic Social Thought, p . 92. 
3Franz Mueller, "The Fol"'lal Object of Sociology," kia. Cath. Soc. 
~., 1(1940), 61. 
4 ~., p . 61. Ct. Williams, Catholic Social Tbous:ht, p. 92. 
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Keeping in Jlind the discussion or the Catholic derinition or 
sociology in Chapter I and the tentatiYe hypothesis advanced there, that 
there i s really onl~ one point or view UODg Catholics in sociology, 
Williaas' thesis is subject to restudy. There appears to be rar more 
agreement aaong Catholic sociologists theaael Yes than Wllliaaa • thesis 
indicates. It should be noted that since Williams wrote, a great deal 
ot discussion has taken place aaong Catholics which baa serYed to clarit'y 
their position. Nevertheless, the isaues are more coapl.ex than the 
si.llple division ot schools or thought indicates. 
The LePlay school. can bard.ly be considered a separate one in a.ny 
analytical aenae. That la8I1Y Catholic sociologists point with justifiable 
pride to his accoaplishllents and desire to emulate his aehieveaents can-
not be denied. But it C&Dllot be called a school in the same sense as 
the reu.ining two. Williau hiaaelr says: 
B1 br1 ng:f ng together sound philosophical outlook vi th an 
objective scientific aetbod into a well-integrated systea or 
sociology, LePl.ay established hiaaelr as the rorerwmer or 
the present-~ synthetic school. or Catholic sociologists. l 
He finally states that "among Catholic contemporary sociologists there 
are essentially two diUerent approaches to sociology. "2 It seems justi-
tiable, thererore, not to deal with a "LePl.~" school or thought, al.tho\Jgh 
lwilliaas, Catholic Social Thought, p . 68. 
2 ill!·, p. 4a. Sorokin speaks ot a LePlay School in the sense 
ot promalgat"ing a speciric method, rorsulating generalizations, and 
advancing practical proposi tiona (Contemporary Sociological Theories, 
p. 66). 
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ve may certainly recognize his influence. Since ve are dealing with the 
situation in the United states, where his inf'luenee has been slight, 
there is ample justification tor this . 
The basic contention among O!.tholic sociologists, then, seems 
to be between the synthetic and the sociational schools. The tolloving 
aDSl.ysis v1ll test this hypothesis. 
ii. The relative autonOJiiY ot sociology. --There can be little 
doubt that the Catholic development ot sociology :f'rom the beg1 nni ng 
hinged on the issue of the relative autonca;y of the science. As Williaas 
bas suggested, part ot the problea bas been the relationship of sociology 
to other social sciences.1 Some Catholic sociologists haTe considered 
sociology to be a synthetic science in the sense ot its drawing on the 
data and methodology of other social sciences. In this respect, Catholic 
sociologists are not alone in their concern, tor this bas been a eon-
tinuing problem for sociology in general. . The contemporary situation 
bas by no means become focused, as the trend tovard the integration of 
the social sciences sbovs.2 
This is, however, only indirectly related to the other aspect of 
this synthesis, namely, the relationship of sociology to theology, phil-
osophy 1 ethics, and social action. 1'he issue is symbolized by the terms 
lwilliam Kerby, "Sociology," The Catholic Encyclopedia, XIV, 
115-118. 
2 See Gillin, ed., For a Science ot Social Man, and Kenneth 
:Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor, Mich. : University of Michigan Press, 
1956). 
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"Christian Sociology" and "Catholic Sociology," terms apparently justi-
fied by Quadragesimo Anno.1 The implication is that sociology is not 
scientific in the same sense as biology or physics, for instance, since 
the adjective interjects a particular system of values. (While it may 
incorporate values which support it, e.g., respect for truth, etc. , and 
these values may be consistent with particular value systems in whole 
or in part, science is considered by most scientists to be relatively 
separated from such systems and to cut across them in its attempt to 
be empirical.) 
For the Catholic sociologists to speak of Catholic Sociology 
may mean one of three things, or all: (1) Sociology is not like other 
sciences in its relationship to values, e.g., it is more like philosophy 
than physics. 2 (2) Science as a whole, of which sociology is a branch, 
is so dependent on values of one kind or another that it is necessary 
for Catholics consciously to relate their normative system to it in 
order to maintain their integrity. This operation, it would follow, 
significantly changes the scientific conclusions. (3) Sociology is the 
study of ways in which social reform, based on Catholic social prin-
ciples, can be accomplished. These seem to be implied by Quad,ragesimo 
Anno. Some Catholic sociologists take Pope Pius XI to mean more than 
~ope Pius XI cites Rerum Bovarum as embodying a truly Catholic 
social science . See Husslein, ed., Social Wellsprings, II, 183. It may 
be suggested that Pope Leo XIII vas speaking of social science in the 
applied sense, in which case the term would have more cogency than if 
used in terms of pure science, as many Catholics do. 
2Paul H. Furfey, "A Foreword to Sociology," Nev Scholast., 
9(1935)' 207. 
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this, however. 
Much Catholic criticism of sociology is based on the second 
point of view. Catholics are aware of the problem here. Brother 
Augustine writes, " •• • It seems to leave both the Catholic and the 
non-catholic interpreters out on a nonscientific limb, since the same 
evidence and the same method lead to different conclusions. • • • " 
Because of this he pleads for more research and says tbat scientific 
progress must be "our most important product. nl 
The development of sociology among Catholics shows a movement 
from the first interpretation noted above to the second. WUliams' 
synthetic category is based largely on the evidence for the first point 
of view, whereas the current position as represented by the most recent 
writings of Paul Furfey refiects the second point of view. 
WUliam Kerby, already noted as the founder of sociology among 
Catholics in the United States, held that sociology is not tully scien-
tific. In his article on "Catholic SOciologyn in the Catholic Encyclo-
pedia, published in 1912,2 he laid dovn principles of sociology for 
Catholics which stood for many years as the dominant influence. His 
approach is synthetic both in ascribing a wide role to socioJ.ogy as 
the synthesis of the social sciences, and in assigning to sociology the 
task of incorporating a social philosophy which wi1l give metaphysical 
grounding to its established results. While the method of sociology is 
1 Augustine, "The Scientific Catholic Sociologist," pp. 3-4. 
2see Kerby, "Sociology. 11 
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primarily inductive, it cannot remain free of metaphysics . This is 
illustrated by the implicit agnosticism, materialism, and determinism 
of contemporary sociology. Sociology cannot be descriptive vithout also 
being interpretive. In the Catholic view the metaphysics is prior. For 
instance, Christians do not derive their idea of brotherhood inductively. 
Sociology must never give up its concern for what ought to be, and there 
must be a close relationship between moral guidance and social investi-
gation. For example, it is the business of ethics to teach t he right or 
private property, but it must be villing to learn the sociological 
significance of changes in i ts form and the laws governing these changes . 
This was essentially the position taken by Paul Furfey in his 
earlier works. In 1935 Furrey listed the three fold task of the sociolo-
gist: (1) he must set up an ideal, the human society which is to be 
regarded as the best possible; (2) be must discover ways and means by 
which we lii8\Y approach the ideal; (3) he must work out a philosophy of 
life to guide society in its imperlect form. The essential aim of 
sociology is to solve social problems . As to method, there is no essen-
tial difference between that of science and philosophy. "In either case 
the human mind proceeds by slowly building generalizations from which, 
in turn, nev truths are deduced. nl There is a superfi cial difference 
between philosophy and science in that philosophy deals with facts of a 
transcendent order and science deals with concrete facts; but philosophy 
i s important for science, for it is an aid to ethics and ethics is an 
"essential element of sociology. " Without ethics there cannot be a 
1Furtey, "A Forewcrd," p. 189. 
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"socioJ.ogy of final values. 11 Social science must begin by ''matehing 
philosophical knowledge and factual data. ,J. 
In 194o, Furfey suggested that sociological knovledge is partial 
and incomplete vi thout the aid of philosophy and theology, for "science 
ean tell us nothing about the essential nature of man and the purpose of 
his existence." "The existence of the Mystical Body is a socially sig-
nificant fact, and it is just as actual, real, and concrete as the in:f'ant 
mortality rate of Minnesota i .n 1939. "2 It follows, then, that there is 
a catholic sociology just as there is a behavioristic sociology. 3 
Others in this earlier period are similarly impressed vi th the 
need for a CathoJ.ic soc1Q1Dgy. Joseph Hu.sslein' s preface to A SUrvey of 
SocioJ.ogy by Eva Ross (1932) c&l.ls the vork "a basic and systematic 
treatment of the entire range of 'Chri stian Social Science' as Pope Pius 
XI bas significantly phrased it. . . . 
The first president of the American Catholic Sociological Society, 
Father Ralph Gallagher, laid down the principle that there is a catholic 
SocioJ.ogy. This, he said, was the justification for the existence of 
the Society. Raymond ~ in an early article in the American catholic 
SocioJ.ogical Review admits that he and others started their vork in 
1Furrey, "A Forewcr:d, 11 pp. 189-207 • 
~aul H. Furfey, ''Why a Supernatural Sociology?" Am. cath. Soc. 
!!!!:·, 1 (1940), 167. 
3paul H. Furfey, "Sociology and Its Phil.osophical Aspects," 
Mod. School.., 21 (1944), 161. 
4 Ross, Basic Sociology, p. vii. 
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sociology w1 thout feeling a need for a Catholic sociology any more than 
tor a Catholic mathematics or a Catholic chemistry. He attributed this 
to the Comtean infiuence mediated by .American sociologists who have 
"exalted inductive fact f'i.nding and condemned philosophizing." It vas 
his recognition that Comte was himself a socia.l philosopher that enabled 
him to see that the mixture of' induction and socia.l philosophy was 
inevitable. Sociologists cannot be content to see man aa a "few genera-
lizations arising from a bundle of facts." Sociology cannot remain a 
merely physical science, because the subject matter is special--it is 
1 human. 
Ours is a sociology wedded to a philosophy, to preconceived 
notions. Within the f'ramework or these postulates we will 
follow the best research methods of other sociologists- -
agnostics or pagans- -but will always insist that spiritual 
and etbieal values be interwoven also. 2 
Gradua.lly, however, the empbasis has shifted. The position 
that there is a Catholic sociology did not go uncba.llenged. One of the 
most direct statements is that or Alphonse H. Clemens . He says that 
sociological research is a separate field of inquiry because sociology 
is an independent science, autonomous, and distinct from theology, 
~~, 'tpz.esidential Address," PP• 39-42. 
2 Ibid. , p . 4o . Cf. Raymond w. ~, Introductory Sociology 
(N. Y.: A~n-Century Crotts, 1947), p . 33; Francis Friedel, "Under-
graduate Preparation of the Social Worker, " Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 1 (194o), 
25; A. J . McSWeeney, The Socia.l Role of Truth Accor to St. Thomas: 
A St in Thomistic Social Philos Washington, D.c.: The Catholic 
University or America Press, 1 3 , p . 14o. Here McSWeeney emphasizes 
the place of philosophy above science in the hierarchy of knowledge. 
Philosophy is the protector of at her sciences by virtue of sttpremacy 
in metaphysics. 
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philosophy, psychology, biology, and the like. The distinction lies not 
in subject matter but in methodology. "For our science can searcely lay 
claim to complete independence unless it be thoroughly and exclusively 
inductive. nl It can be expected that the findings of sociology will 
parallel the findings of other sciences, since truth is one. Sociology, 
however, has "exclusive title" to the study of social life from the 
standpoint of association and dissociation. It is mueh narrower than 
philosophy and theology. Theology deals with eternal verities and 
philosophy deals vith "immutable principles of right thinking and acting 
for all men in all places at all times and under all conditions . "2 
In a similar vein, Ross states that certa.in fundamental facts 
from other branches of knowledge must be taken as postulates 1n sociology. 
However, she feels that this does not make it necessary to speak of a 
"supernatural sociology" or a "Christian sociology," for "it seems to 
form the essence of sociological theory itself, whieh should take the 
whole truth into aecount, including Christian social concepts, when 
man 1 s social relations and the processes whereby he has arrived at these 
are the matter of consideration."3 
B.r the very nature ot the foregoing definitions, the question is 
1 A. H. Clemens, •'The Need for Constructive 'l'hillking 1n Sociologi-
cal Research," .Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 1(194o), 74. 
2 Ibid. , p. 75. ct. Paul J . Mundie, "The American Catholic 
Sociologica.r-Review," Am. C!ath. Soc. Rev., 1(194o), 5. 
~ J. Ross, "Christian Social Concepts and the Sociologist," 
Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 2(1941), 94. 
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raised regarding the degree of autonomy Clemens and Ross claim for 
sociology. Clemens goes on to say that the mere accumulation of facts 
is not enough and that the Catholic cannot be content with mere in-
vestigation--he 'nmst deal in preventive and remedial sociology.~ 
Similarly, Eva Ross, in her reply to Hartnett, 2 quoted in Chapter I, 
is attempting to apply a corrective to the synthetic point of view in 
sociology. Yet she gives ample proof that in her estimation sociology 
is circumscribed by postulates given in the theological and philosophi-
cal system. She considers sociology incomplete because some things about 
man cannot be studied scientifically, notably his soul, Vith its pavers 
of mind and will, and the spiritual life of grace. 
The facts or truths established by philosophy or furnished by 
revelation which Catholics postulate vhen setting up hypoth-
eses, or when Judging a theory or the completeness or a 
factual study are these: 
(1) God exists and is the Creator of man and the universe. 
(2) The world had a beginning (vith creation) and will 
have an end. 
(3) The Church vas established by Christ, Vith authority 
to guide men in matters related to their eternal destiny. 
( 4) Man has a soul which is nonmaterial and immortal. 
( 5) Man is subject not only to physical laws of nature 
but also to unchang:lng BOral laws. 
( 6) Man bas a tree will. 
(7) Man is an individual person and has certain rights 
and duties which are common to all members of the human 
race.3 
Thus the most outspoken among Catholic advocates of empiricism in 
sociology recognizes not only the limits of empiricism but the need to 
1 Clemens, "The Need for Constructive Thinking," p. 77. 
2 Ross, Comment on article by Hartnett, pp. 108-no. 
3 Ross, :Basic Sociology, p. 20. 
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take specific norms into consideration. 
Just as the trend in sociology among catholics bas been toward 
autonomy in the relation between sociology and theology and philosophy, 
so also the trend has emphasized the autonomy of sociology in relation 
1 to other social sciences. But it is quite clear that in the case of 
sociology, theology, and philosophy, the autonomy is relative . In the 
final analysis the claim of autonomy is an analytical device, which does 
2 
not remove the fundamental relationship. The effect of this emphasis 
is to say less about it and for the sociologists to avoid the exposition 
of theological and philosophical principles. 
This shift in emphasis bas made it possible for catholic sociolo-
gists to participate more eftecti vely in sociology in general . There 
may be a danger, however, that they will avoid significant attempts at 
sociological theorizing on the basis of empirical research and confine 
themselves to a rather sterile empiricism which avoid generalizations 
in areas where theology and philosophy would also speak. This follows 
from the fact that if catholic sociologists theorize, they would feel 
compelled to make extensive use of their metaphysical frame of reference 
1Furfey, Scope and Method, pp . 5-6: "The precise distinction 
between sociology and the other social sciences needs a great deal of 
f'urther discussion; but even nov at the outset it is clear that a dis-
tinction does exist. " 
2 Joseph Fichter quotes Joachim Wach approvingly to the effect 
that there is no such thing as a Christian or Jewish or Moslem Sociology. 
This, however, does not prevent the stating of social and moral value 
premises. (Social Relations in an Urban Parish [Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, l954] , p . 3·) 
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and run the risk of bei.D.g suspect in the academic community.1 
iii. The proper object of sociology. --Catholics are likely to 
pursue science on the basis of principles l&id down by Thomas Aquinas . 
Two of these are significant in the thinking of Catholic sociologists . 
One is the principle of the hierar~ of the sciences, 2 and the other is 
the distinction betveen the material and the forma.l objects of science. 3 
Henri Renard gives a particularly lucid statement of the meani.Dg 
and relationship of material and formal objects when he writes: 
The material object is the thing itself which is considered • ••• 
The formal object is the manner in which the object presents 
itself. Thus one and the same material object, a tombstone for 
example, will, by reason of dissimilar forma.l objects, be viewed 
quite dif:firently by a stonecutter, by an historian, and by a 
geol.ogist . 
LeaiU ng Catholic sociologists see that the problem ot the 
autonomy of sociology is related to the distinction between the forma.l 
and material object of a science, and, following :from that, the distinc-
tion between the forma.l objects ot various sciences. While Aquinas used 
the word science broadly to include philosophy and theology, 5 the 
1
sister Jeanine, "The Catholic Sociologist, " p. 3. Cf. Paul 
H. Furfey, Fire on the Earth (N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1936), p . 1 9 . 
Joseph Fitzpatrick in 1951 indicated a dilemma, however. To separate 
themselves trom the vorld of modern man also creates a problem: 
" ••• We talk to each other; write articles which are read by each 
other •• • and in the lack of cbal.lenge there is stagnation. " 
('Catholic Responsibility in Sociology. ") 
2 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ed. Anton Pegis (N.Y. : Modem 
Library, 1948), P.I, Q.I, Art . 5· 
3~., Art. 1 · 
4 Henri Renard, The Philosopey of Being (Milwaukee: The Bruce 
Publishing Co. , 1943), p. 12. 
5 Aauinas . on. t!i t _ _ A 'l"i: . 1 • 
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recognition of formal and material object is acceptable to a narrower 
definition of science. In fact, he distinguished between empiricism, 
philosophy, and theology, as illustr ated in De Regillline Principum.1 
Here he set forth three distinct formal objects of the same material 
object: (1) the supernatural. (theology) , (2) the natural (philosophy), 
and (3) the concrete existence (empiricism). By distinguishing among 
these formal objects he was able to avoid confUsion in methodology. 
Theology is concerned vi th the First cause . Philosophy is concerned 
with the Formal Cause . Sociology (not St. Thomas's term) is concerned 
with the Material Cause, as Mueller says, with the "individuation of the 
general principle of life."2 It follows that such considerations as the 
end or purpose (philosophy) ot society cannot be the proper object of 
sociology. This does not say that the "teleological significance" of 
human actions shoul.d be ignored, but it is to be taken as a given and 
its influence on action studied. 11Soc1ology is a science of things as 
they are, not of things as they shoul.d be. n3 
Furthermore, various empirical sciences may study the same 
material object, but they are distinguished from each other by their 
formal object, that is, the various activities that the material object 
may have. Thus, social psychology is interested in the interplay of 
1Thomas Aquinas, De Begimi.ne Principum ad Regem Cypr1, trans . 
G. B. Phelan (Toronto: st. Michael ' s College Philosophy Texts, 1935), 
cited in Mueller, "The Formal Object," p . 55 . 
2 Mueller, "The Formal Object, " p. 57. 
3Ibid., p. 6o. 
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mind on mind, social statistics in the properties of the quantities of 
social phenomena, ecology in the spatial aspect of human social living, 
social economics in the interchange of goods, but sociology in the as-
1 
socia.tion and dissociation ot human interaction. 
This very sophisticated a.nalysis bas two thrusts. One establishes 
the proper distinction betveen empirical science, theology, and philosophy 
on the basis ot their respective formal. objects. The other provides the 
basis for distinguishing sociology from other social sciences in the 
same manner. While the distinction between sociology and other social 
sciences is not of primary importance to the problem of this study, it 
is a. logical corollary of the Thomistic philosophy of science. This 
distinction does leave room for interpretation a.nd disagreement regarding 
the formal object of various sciences . 2 
Of more importance is the establishment of the relationship 
between theology, philosopbl, and empiricism or positive studies. 
Catholics may disagree in their definition of the formal object of 
sociology as c~ed to other social sciences, but there is a growing 
nDan1m1 ty in placing sociology on the level of secondary or material 
cause &long vi th natural science and distinguished from theology and 
philosophy. Human interaction in general may be the material object of 
theology, philosophy, and science . Hovever, ea.ch will have a. different 
~ueller, "The Formal Object," p. 59· 
~ey, in defining sociology in his Scope and Method, makes 
use of these categories and shows the contusion in definition vhen they 
a.re not applied (pp. 129ft'.). 
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purpose in studying it. Theology vill be concerned with its super-
natural. aspects and investigate the Firat Cause. Philosophy will be 
concerned with its metaphysical aspects and investigate the Formal 
Cause. Science will be concerned with its concrete aspects and investi-
gate the Secondary or Material Cause. These different purposes are the 
formal objects of each discipline. However, since the concrete aspects 
of human interaction are so manifold they may be broken dovn into 
specialties, i.e. , particular sciences. Each social science, in turn, 
may then be assigned a formal object. 
Williams' analysis, as well as that of :ma.ny catholics, has suf-
fered t'rom a lack of clarity in disti.Dguishing between the problem of 
identi:tying the respective formal objects of theology, philosophy, and 
social science and the problem of identitying the respective formal 
objects of the various social. sciences . These two problems, as has been 
indicated at several points in this chapter thus tar, are distinct, and 
it is the former that is pertinent t o this stuc:ly. Franz Mueller in an 
article vri tten in 1949 indicated his awareness of this very lack of 
clarity: 
Some zealous Catholic scholars tend to neglect the secondary 
causes, referring all be cODling directly to the uncreated First 
Cause, 1 . e . , to the special intervention of God. • • • Sociology 
does not endeavor, nor is it equipped to determine whatness, 
but it is interested, in the first place, in observable facts 
or events appearing or tak1 ng place regularly and normaJ.ly 
under certain conditions . In o:tbe! words, its object is the 
typical rather than the essential. 
~er, 11Some Remarks," p. 4. 
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He goes on to give an example of the various approaches to a 
single material object, the family. The social philosopher "determines 
vhat is a family or what distinguishes the family as such from the state 
as such. " The sociologist ascertains '~hat accounts for certain typical 
traits of the .Americ:an family. nl 
Celestine J . lluesse, in a volume on the sociology of the parish, 
also finds it necessary to make clear the formal object ot sociology. 
He writes: 
Like other social sciences it is built upon observation and 
confined to the realm of proximate causes; it discloses, as it 
were, the ~rather than the ought or the ultilllate !& of human 
behavior. Specifieally the f~rmal object of sociological re-
search is social interaction. 
Paul Furfey, however, makes a signific:ant point when he SS¥S 
that despite the distinction among formal objects and appropriate metho-
dologies, sciences nevertheless borrow each other 1 s findings, and 
sociology needs to depend on knowledge supplied by philosophy, theology, 
and ethics, since each say something about man. 3 
Catholic sociologists have spent a great deal of time attempting 
to define the proper object of sociology in relation to other social 
sciences and, in light of the theological-philosophical system to vhieh 
they are cODDDitted, this is an important enterprise. It does seem, 
~eller, "Some Remarks . " 
2 Celestine J. Hue sse and Thomas J. Harte, eds., The Sociology 
of the Parish (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publisb.i.ng Co., 1951), p. 8. 
3 ~., P• 4. 
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however, that haTing made the analytical distinction does not solve the 
problem of sociology tor Catholics. 'rhe norms must still be taken into 
eonaideration, and the system of knowledge is still a. hierarchical one 
in vhich theology and philosophy have more veight and authority than 
scienee.1 
iv. The role of empiricism in sociolO§l.--Many Catholic sociolo-
gists look to Frederick LePlay as the master ot the sociologieal. method. 
He is the example, they say, of a purely inductive sociologist vho took 
Comte seriously. 2 There are those vho vould consider the ideal of pure 
induction valid. Ross admits this is dittieul.t, but it is a laudable 
objective. However, even if Catholics devote themael Tes to purely in-
ductive sociology the problem of "sociology and the Catholic" Will remain. 
There v1ll still be the tact that Jll8l1 cannot be vholly known through the 
empirical method. Man bas an i.Dner life that is not always expressed in 
action. "Indeed, this inner lite 1111y differ quite completely f"rom its 
so-called externa.l 'manifestations. t n3 Some catholics should confine 
themselves to a narrow inductive approach, but not all should be so 
confined. Some should "carry sociology into a wider scope than the 
~. K Francis, ''History and the Social Sciences: Some Ret'lec-
tions on the Re-integration of Soci&l Science," Rev. of PoL, 13(1951), 
358-
2 Ross, "Sociology and the cathol.ic, II p. 7. Cf. Ross, Basic 
Sociology, pp. 9-10. 
3Ibid. Cf. D. R. G. Owen( Scientism, Man, and Religion 
(Phila.: Westminster Press, 1952}, pp. 173-174; and James J. Burns, 
"Catholic Social Theory," Social Theorists, ed. Mihanovich, p. 338. 
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sterile observation ot f'aets." Catholics who do purely inductive work 
should do it well, so that it will stand up under impartial criticism. 
But catholic sociologists who give a place to social philosophy will be 
doing vital work in shoving the necessary relation between a priori 
judgments and induction.1 Fur:fey says, "There exists a science of' 
empirical sociology, sociology in the narrow sense, which does not 
include value-judgments among its premises . "2 But writing a deeade 
later he admits that even narrowly inductive sociology involves value-
ju.dglllents o:f a metasociological nature. 3 'fhere is ~lied here a basic 
dilemma that these alternating opinions retlect. On the one band, to 
remove the lines that aark ott the various disciplines that deal w1 th 
man and society creates methodological con1"usion. 'l'his is the condition 
ot pre-sociology that most sociologists are glad is past. On the other 
hand, to make a sharp distinction between these approaches, especi ally 
between deduct! ve and induct! ve methods, creates the risk o:f ignoring 
the important relationship that does exist. Sister Jeanine sees this 
quite clearly in her 1956 Presidential Address to the .American Catholic 
1Ross, "Sociology and the Catb.o1ic," p. 9. She :felt in 194-2 
that Catholics have "rarely maintained the pure inductive method which 
they advocate, and have :frequently drawn unwarranted conclusions based 
on belief and prejudice rather than on the :facts which they have 
gathered and presented, or based on an incomplete view o:f the :facts . " 
(EYa J . Ross, Comment on article by Friedel, All. Cath. Soc. Rey., 3 (194-2], 
141). 
~:fey, 'tvalue-judgaents in Sociology, " p . 89. 
3See Fur:fey, Scope and Method. 
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Sociological Society. 
According to Friedel., the empirical vork of Catholics Yill have 
special significance. This is not because the Catholic Yill reject the 
techniques of non-Catholics, but because he will use them better. This 
is the case because the Catholic vill have an "untal tering devotion to 
Truth. Truth is one, and no service is rendered by a corruption ot 
data. ,,1 This devotion to Truth Yill also make the Catholic aware of 
the importance of valid presuppositions. Thus, it is quite possible 
that the statistics gathered by Catholics Y1ll tell a different story 
2 
:trom the statistics gathered by non-catholics. The cballenge to 
Catholics, as Eva Ross also states, is to be better scientists than those 
vho claim to be the best. 
According to Franz Mueller, "There should be no doubt that 
recognition of the rel.ative significance of facts and the discovery of 
meaning is the primary object of sociological research."3 The error 
that liUSt be avoided in pursuing empirical studies is "the notion that 
sociological eategories can ever untold the significance of supernatural 
truth. "4 
Sister Jeanine sees another problem in pursuing empirical re-
search. This is that in an "unspoken deference to this positivist spirit, 
the most vital aspect of the interpretation of Catholic social relations 
1Francis J. Friedel., "Catholic Sociological Research," .Am. Oath. 
Soc. Rev., 3(1942), 132. 
2 Ibid.' p. 136. 
~eller, "Some Remarks," p. 7. 4 ~., P• 3· 
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is, too often, relegated to a footnote, vith the explanation of' the be-
havior 1n question and its bearing on social behavior, and with at least 
an implicit acknowledgement that this 1n:f'luence is beyond the scope of 
sociological inquiry.1 
There are several legitimate functions of empirical sociology. 
Ross, tor instance, sees its importance for building up a body of theory 
and the establishment of statistical laws which will make prediction 
possible. However, she would not want to overestimate the possibility 
of prediction in social life or run the risk of assuming an implicit 
determiniD.2 
Franz Mueller, in discussing the relationship between slq)er-
natural or "theological sociology" and empirical sociology, suggests 
that "theological sociology" vill be able to give answers to problems 
1n e~rpirical sociology, while empirical sociology will "otten serve as 
a theodicy in substantiating the supernatural truths of theological 
sociology. "3 
Some Catholics attempt to solve the problem of' relating sociol-
ogy to norms by thinking in terms of' two kinds or sociology: empirical 
and supernatural. Supernatural sociology is the study of' human rela-
tionships in their ideal form based on theological premises and of 
the approximation of this ideal as determined by the degree of Christian 
1 Sister Jeanine, "The Catholie Sociologist," p. 3 . 
~oss, Basic Sociology, p. 5. 
3Franz Mueller, "The Possibility and Scope of a Supernatural 
Sociology," Am. Cath. Soc. ReT., 1 (1940), 146. 
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motivation vhich enters into these relationships. The Christian sig-
nifieance ot hUIII&!l intercourse is ot central concern. B.Y an&logy, it 
is the dif'terence between charity and philanthropy, 1 or the dif'terenoe 
between the speech of Aristotle and the barking ot dogs. 2 The dif-
terence between the actions ot a Christian and of an atheist can be 
knovn only by faith.3 Christian charity is a supernatural git't of God. 
"The meritorious acts performed by e. Catholic in a state of grace do not 
belong on eyen the highest plane ot created being. "4 The doctrine of 
the Mystical Body is "sociologiea.lly essential" to Christian living. 
According to "Mueller, the tor.aal object ot supernatural sociology ~ould 
be limited to the study of supernatural entities and forces which in-
tl.uence the relations of men With each other, affecting the integration 
and disintegration of social structures. ,.p 
It may be noted tbat it is common tor Catholic sociologists to 
look to their science tor the illustration of Truth or the justifieation 
of it. There is no room for the possibility tbat sociology could ever 
correct the Truth known by faith. This attitude also carries over to 
religious practices long established by tradition. That this is a prob-
lem is suggested by recent articles in parish sociology. Fichter, tor 
instance, questions whether the traditional parish structure is any 
longer adequate in the Un1 ted states. The sociology ot religion in gen-
eral is movi.ng very slowly among catholics probably because of this 
1Furtey, Fire on the Earth~ p. 37. 2Ibid., pp. 26-27 . 
3 ~ 4 5 ~., P• c:Q. Ibid. , P• 25. Ibid., p. 53· 
6 Mueller, "The Possibility and Scope," p . 146. 
1 issue. 
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Wolf&, in analyzing the sociological work of American Catholics 
in 1943, recognized that the distinction between inductive and deductive 
studies is dittieult to maintain by the very nature ot the Catholic 
point of view. Furthermore 1 the spectacle of non-Catholic soeio.logists 
indiscriminately and subtly inJecting a philosophy into their work 
causes many Catholic sociologists to oeeupy their time refuting the 
consequent errors rather than to do their own sociological work. Most 
students 1 he felt, believe that a eontl.iet exists between sociology and 
religion. His answer vas to place sociology in the moral frame of refer-
ence and thus have sociologist s do their work frankly on the basis of a 
relationship to ethics and philosophy. 2 
In pleading for more rigor in sociological met hod Furtey gives 
three characteristics of scientific social thought: (1) aeeurate delinea-
tion of the problem and definition of terms; (2) facts must be gathered 
and demonstrated by known and valid methods; (3) generalizations may be 
no broader than the facts warrant. He indicates that these eharacteris-
ties do not desaribe many non- catholic sociologists, especially positiv-
ists . They are frequently guilty ot folk thi nking and twist their facts 
to fit their theories. catholics m.ust not be guilty of such folk th1 nldng. 
l.rhe problem of the relationship between the Mm1 ni strative 
level of church organization and research technicians is discussed on 
pp. 170-171. 
~. Wolte, "American Catholics and SOciology," Franciscan Studies, 
24(1943), 105-110. Cf. William H. Conley 1 "Soci al Aspects of Recent 
Labor Legislation, '' Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 1 (1940), 67. Conley speaks of 
a twilight zone between social science and philosophy where they overlap 
and can co-operate in forming social policy. 
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The remedy for it is the constant habit of clear, fearless, objective 
thinking. God does not need lies to have His Truth triumph. "Secure 
in our possession of Catholic Truth we fear no fact, so long as it is a 
fact demonstrated by the canons of logical reasoning and objective 
evidence. '~ 
Furfey, in a recent wor k, gives a strong defense of the scien-
tific nature of sociology. In it he is carefUl not to contuse science 
with mere quantification. Knowledge is judged to be scientific on the 
basis of three criteria: (1) certitude, {2) causality, {3) generality. 
Sociology qualifies on all three counts, although it needs more perfect 
certitude, causality, and generalization in order to fUlfill the defini-
tion of science.2 
v . Presuppositions in sociology. - -Raymond Murray has already 
been introduced as one sociologist who does not think the autonomy of 
sociology can be carried very far. 
In fact it is difficult to see how there can be any complete 
sociology without its being impregnated with some underlying 
vievpoint or philosophy. For this reason we believe it is 
important that sociology be t ied up frankly vi th a Christian 
1Paul H. Furfey, "The Sociologist and Scientific Objectivity," 
Am. Cath. Soc . Rev., 4(1945), 9. Fitzpatrick concurs when he writes: 
"Of all people in the world Catholics should have the calm conviction 
that genuine knowledge need never be feared. It would not be an in-
dication of strong faith but of weak faith to think that the advance 
of science may displace the province of God, or our own determination 
of our lives . " ("Catholic Responsibility," p . 394. ) Cf. Ross, 
"Christian Social Concepts," p. 94. 
2 Furfey, Scope and Method, p . 86 . 
philosophy of life, at least for those who profess to be 
Christians .l 
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Catholics have gone to great pains to make their presuppositions 
plain . These are given by the Church in its tradition and official 
pronouncements which from time to time clarify the Church's stand on 
contemporary i s sues . The role these play in sociological investiga-
tion is made clear by Eva Ross, who writes: 
Since we believe that it belongs to the divine maJesty of the 
Church to pronounce whatever conduct or program is wanting 
(sic) in justice and brot her l y love, the Catholic sociologist 
must follow these principles if he is to be certain that his 
ideas for social amelioration are based on true philosophy 
and religion, and that he is working for man ' s greatest tem-
poral good. Fbr example, if the sociologist advocates the 
abolition of parish schools in :favor of an entirely public 
education from which religion is excluded, he precludes to 
that extent man ' s right to know his God and to learn to love 
and serve Him; if he advocates birth control, he is defeating 
the end for which God instituted marriage; if he recommends 
the sterilization of the unfit and the habitual criminal, 
he denies man his right to full and complete existence .2 
Miss Ross has in recent years been incli.ned to separate sociology 
and social action,3 and so would no longer apply these r estrictions to 
the sociologist since it is not in his province to advocate anything. 
Nevertheless, the catholic sociologist must be certain that he knows 
"sound principles of morality and rel igion" so that he can guard against 
"neglecting man's u1 timate end, of for getting the true meaning of life, 
~urray, Introductory Sociology, p . 33. 
2 Eva J . Ross, A Survey of Sociology (MD. waukee: The Bruce Pub-
lishing eo . , 1932), p . 8. 
3 Ross, "The Sociologist's Contribution to Postwar Reconstruc-
tion, " p . 3· 
or of overlooking man's rights and duties in relation to his fellow 
men. ,.1 
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This is the basic issue between catholic and secular sociologists, 
according to Murray: " • • • whether or not a necessary conflict exists 
between sociology based upon supernatural foundations, and a sociology 
based upon science."2 There can be no question vhere the catholic 
stands. Fundamental principles of theology and philosophy must be taken 
into consideration, and any sociology which ignores the teachings of 
Christianity will have different objectives from the catbolic.3 
Albert Muntsch in dealing with anthropology refers to the need 
for approaching the study "in harmony with catholic exegesis . " The 
Church has issued norms for our guidance, he says. Fbr example, there 
are the opening chapters of Genesis, the historicity of vhich has been 
affirmed by the Biblical Commission. Here is a body of truth not neces-
sarily open to scientific appraisal, but it is part of the Revelation 
which bas shown man "to be made in the image and likeness ot God. "4 
These statements drawn largely from the early days of the 
American Catholic Sociological Society reflect the basic concern of 
Catholic sociologists, i .e., that their sociology shall be in harmony 
with Catholic presuppositions. This remains a foundation stone for them. 
~oss, Stn"Vey of Sociology, p. 10. 
2 
Murray, Introductory Sociology, p. 36. 3 ~., P• 32. 
4 Albert Muntsch, "A Catholic Approach to Anthropology, " Am. 
Soc. Rev., 2(1941), 165 . 
----
Cath. 
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However, in dealing vi th presuppositions, it is necessary to 
distinguish this concern for postulates about man and society given in 
the theological -philosophical synthesis from tvo other kinds of pre-
suppositions . Pr esuppositions may also be the object of sociological 
study in the sense of investigating their influence, or they may be 
1 prior to research as methodological norms . Catholics have done little 
in studying their traditional normative stand in its social forms . The 
obvious immediate response to such a challenge is that the immutable 
principles of religion are not subject to such study. Indeed, Catholics 
have been sensiti ve at this point because some sociologists have in the 
name of sociology studied the norms of religion and concluded that they 
are superstition or rationalization not based on fact .2 As a result, 
Catholics have been wary of the sociology of religion in particular. 
Recently, however, some Catholics have ventured forth in this direction. 
This work has come to be aimed primarily at the parish. Not all parish 
studies have been strictly sociological . For instance, Neusse and Harte, 
The Sociology of the Parish, is considered by some Catholic sociologists 
to be more canonica.l., theological, and philosophical than sociologicaJ...3 
other studies have concentrated on aspects of religion that are 
1 Furfey, Scope and Method, p . 15. 
2 See such critiques as Furfey, "The Sociologist and Scientific 
Objectivity," pp. 3-12; and Remelt, Final Moral Values . 
~chter, Social Relations, p . 195. 
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somewhat removed f':rom the study of norms and values directly, such a.s 
studies of "leakage" 1n catholic parishes, 1 statistical studies of 
changes in population in parishes, 2 or studies of parish organization of 
a descriptive na.ture.3 The kind of study that involves the analysis of 
norms has been attempted only by a few Catholics. The most notable of 
these is Joseph Fichter, vho makes a fUnctional analysis vhich involves 
a knovledge and use of norms. 4 But there are problems: 
For exam:ple, the religionists accuse the secularists of depart-
mentalizing the lives of people in our society and particularly 
of interpreting religion as a part-time, peripheral, and indif-
ferently useful activity. If the social scientist analyzes 
religion as he finds it--and if he finds it this vay--he can 
hardly be '~lamed" for this interpretation. 5 
The criticisms of sociologists vho study religion "stem f':rom an 
estimable desire to keep holy places holy." But the intelligent Christian 
'Vill disagree Vi th • • • the piously sentimental claim that science v1ll 
cheapen religion . ~ 
The sociological. study of religion, according to Fichter, results 
in ''merely an inconclusive list of social items of no sociological 
significance if they (are) not related to, and evaluated by their respec-
tive norms." To understand a social institution one must understand the 
D.C.: 
1Gerald J. Schnepp, Leakage f':rom a Catholic Parish (Washington, 
The catholic University of America Press, 1942). 
2 Joseph Fichter, "Urban Mobility and Religious Observance," 
Am. Cath. Soa. Rev., 9(1950), 130-139· 
3John D. Donovan, "A Sociologist Looks at the Parish," Am.. Cath. 
Soc. Rev., 9(1950)~ pp. 66-73 · 
4 
Fichter, Social Relations, p. 215. 
5 6 Ibid., P• 3. Ibid. , p. 5. 
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norms which guide it. This is not "a value judgment in the moralistic 
sense; " it is a matter of accepting the normative pattern and compariDg 
"what is and what is intended. nl 
In a more general approach to stuccying values, Yves Simon2 sug-
gests that social science bas from its beginning bad an unwarranted 
relationship to the physical sciences, the model of which is mathematics. 
Since in mathematics there are no final causes, it was assumed tacitly 
that this is true in society as well . The error lay in the fact that 
social science deals with a different kind of reality trom mathematics. 
Early social science of the Greeks, Augustine, and the Schoolmen vas 
practical in that it was concerned with man as a human agent. Modern 
social science, however, claims freedom from ethical concerns . The 
postulate of freedom from value- judgments, however, must be understood 
to ensure objectivity, not to pass judgment on the ontological status of 
values. Ethical values, for instance, belong to a pattern that is normal 
in all respects. "Theoretical knowledge, metaphysics, philosophy of 
nature, medicine, logic overflow with value-judgments concerniDg the 
greater or lesser degree of a quality that should be there. "3 Mechani~ 
confronted with consciousness, concludes that man makes meanings and that 
these meanings are mere value-judgments, sharply contrasted with judgments 
of reality. 
1 Fichter, Social Relations, p . 215. 
2 
Yves Simon, "From the Science of Nature to the Science of 
Society," Bev Scholast. , 27(1953), 28o-304. 
3Ibid.' p . 292n. 
133 
Social science needs to reconsider knowledge itself from the 
standpoint of the nature of value- judgments. These may actually be 
necessary for an understanding of social facts. ''What we need is a 
criterion for the recognition of those contexts in which the intelligi-
bility of facts includes a reference to human values. nl If man is free, 
and freedom is a mode of causality, then values play a vital role. The 
significance of ethical neutrality is merely pedagogical rather than 
epistemological. Facts cannot be separated from interpretations: it 
is a part of their meaning. "Facts pertaining to the life of human soci-
ety seem to be of such a character that a philosophy of human life and 
society is necessarily at work in the reading of their intelligibility. "2 
The third approach which involves norms Paul Fur:f'ey calls meta-
sociological . He has contributed a thor ough presentation of this aspect 
of sociological method in his work, The Scope and Method of Sociology. 
In this case the norms (he calls them value-judgments) are methodologi-
cally prior to investigation. They are the principles of "the construc-
tion and criticism of a valid sociology. "3 
He distinguishes between sociology and metasociology. By virtue 
of assigning to each a distinct formal object he avoids the contusion of 
applying philosophical method to sociology or assigning sociological 
subject matter to philosophy. Sociology refers to the scientific study 
1 Simon, "From the Science of Nature, " p. 296. 
2 Ibid.' p. 304. 
3Furfey, Scope and Method, p. 8. 
of ita object (however that may be defined), whereas the object of 
metasociology is sociology itself.1 
Metasociology is "an auxiliary science whose fUnction is to 
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determine for sociology criteria of scientific quality and criteria for 
relevance, together With their practical applications.'~ It furnishes 
the ~thodological presuppositions necessary for carrying out socio-
logical research, constructing sociological systems and criticizing such 
research and such systems a:f'ter they have been completed. u3 Sociology 
itself is the subject matter. 
The task of m.etasociology is threefo ld: (1) developing criter:ia 
for distinguishing scientific knowledge from non-scientific in the field 
in which sociology operates; (2) furnishing criteria for distinguishing 
what the field of sociology is; (3) providing practical procedural rules 
for sociological research. This task involves both logic and axiology. 
Logic supplies "principles of orderly and correct thought n; axiology 
supplies 11principles when questions of value are at stake. 11 Thus, tor 
instance, the ethics of sociology is a metasociological consideration.5 
In the latter ease the value-judgments which are made in deciding mat-
ters of usefulness, practicality and convenience are to be distinguished 
f'rom other types of value- judgments tbat do not properly belong to the 
sphere of metasociology: values as objects and value-judgments as 
1 Furfey, Scope and Method, p. 9. 
~id., p. 8. 3~., p. 8. 4Ibid., p . 15. 
5Ib1d.' pp. 96-100. 
' 
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postulates of sociology •1 
Metasociological value-judgments are subject to validation to 
some degree, but there are conflicting claims. (It can be assumed that 
Catholics will draw on religious beliefs as the criteria for validating 
metasociological value-jud8Jnents. ) At t~ present time, too little has 
been done in the field to expect metasociology to be highly developed. 
In many respects Furfey' s approach is a pioneering effort. 2 
vi. The Catholic criticism of sociology. --The Catholic point of 
view regarding norms in sociology is conditioned by a critical attitude 
toward the sociological work of many non-Catholics. Murray says of 
Catholic sociologists: 
. . • The ef'for1B of Catholic writers have been confined pretty 
largely to the defense of Christian teaching against the 
assault of irreligious sociologists.3 
The aim of this section will be to review the Catholic criticisms 
of sociology as a turther source of illumination of' the problems which 
exist for CathoJiea in developing a sociological point of view. 
The earliest Catholic sociologists were strongly critical of 
sociology a.s pursued by non-Catholics. William Kerby, writing in 1912, 
recognized that sociology is not tree of metaphysics and shows a marked 
tendency toward AgnosticiSDl, Materialism, and Determinism. 
Even when the science has been confined to the humbler role 
of observation and interpretation of particular social facts 
1 Furfey, Scope and Method, p. 17. 
2~., p. 17. 
~, Introductory Sociology:, p. 36. 
and processes, its devotees bave been unable to ref'rain from 
as~tions which are offensive to the Christian outlook on 
life. 
Some examples of these assumptions are proposals of limited 
family size and divorce as the means to human progress, the assignment 
of an active role to the state in regulating :family lite, and judgments 
about the origin and validity of r eligion.2 
This theme is reiterated throughout much Catholic literature, 
and severa.l authors spell out such eri ticism in detail . This conscious-
ness of fallacies in sociological work bas spurred Catholics on to clarity 
their own position and to ~ special attention to methodology and defini-
tion. A by-product, already noted, has been the tendency to level ott at 
this negative stage without doing significant independent sociological 
vork. Recently this trend bas been shifted somewhat. Notable in this 
movement are the most recent works of Paul Furf'ey, 3 Nicholas Timasheff, 4 
and Sister Frances Woods . 5 
Probably one of the most incisive criticisms of sociology ever 
6 produced by a Catholic is Final Mora.l Ys.lues in Sociology by 'fheodore 
lxerby, Sociology, p. ll6. 
2 ~., P • ll7. 
3Furtey, Scope and Method. 
4 Timasheff, Sociological Theorz. 
5sister Frances Jerome Woods, CUltural Values of American 
Ethnic Groups (N.Y.: Harper and Bros . , 1956). 
6 Remelt, FinaJ. Moral Values. ct. Paul Glenn, Sociology: A 
Class Manual in the Philosophy of Human Society (St. Louis: B. Herder 
Book Co . , 1935). 
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Hemelt. Written in 1929, the concern of this study as "to demonstrate 
that sociology as set forth in the works of non-Catholic writers places 
f'1naJ. moral values upon man's action. ,,1 This is a naturalistic point of 
view which "offers a substitute for the theological interpretation of 
morality •• • • ,(2. Hemelt's study is, in short, a. "critique of sociology 
in the light of Catholic theology. • . • "3 His assumption is that the 
subject matter of moral studies is conduct or behavior. A thorough 
explanation of man's conscious activities depends upon basic pbilosopbi-
cal assu:m:ptions. Since sociology studies conduct it is a moral science. 4 
Yet it is cbaracteristic of sociologists to exclude "interpretations of 
phenomena that do not immediately subject themselves to an experimental 
basis for verification ••• • "5 
The early date of the work helps to explain the contusion intro-
duced by failing to distinguish between the formal objects ot sociology 
and moral theology. Much of Hemelt' s work is irrelevant in light of 
more recent Catholic thinking about the scope of sociology. The criti-
cism is instructive not for any light it sheds on the work of contemporary 
Catholic sociologists, but because it shows the kind of problem which 
Catholics saw in sociology and one way in which it vas approached. 
Not only does Hemelt criticize sociology for its presumptions in 
handling moral issues, but he questions the validity of sociology in 
1 Hemelt, Final Moral Values, p. ix. 
2 3 4 5 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p . x . Ibid., p. xi . 
general as an approach to the study of man. The empirica.l study of man 
is inadequate and ineompl.ete because it repudiates knowledge supplied by 
revealed religion.1 For instance: "Subscribing to naturalism, sociology, 
indeed by its experimental. criterion for truth, devitalizes a moral. act 
and makes it but a resul. tant of social forces. "2 
Repeatedly Remelt speaks of sociology without qual.ifying adjec-
tives. This helps to support the contention that be does not represent 
the contemporary Catholic criticism of sociology. catholics have accepted 
sociology, even though certain kinds of sociological work are questioned 
because of the biases they have . 
Hemel t recognizes that frequently the practical results of the 
behavioristic and Catholic concepts of personality v1ll be the same, 
e .g., recommendation to build playgrounds for children, but the social 
philosophy of behaviorism is "pernicious. "3 This perniciousness is in 
the pretense it makes to a final answer to the "questions of life . " 
The Catholic criticism of sociology bas moved from the identifi-
cation of sociology with certain points of view which are open to ques-
tion to the criticism of biases in the work of certain sociologists. 
How completely this transition bas been made w1ll be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
More recent crit~ are less critical of sociology than they 
are of sociologists. According to catholics most sociologists are not 
1 Remelt, Final Moral Values, p. U6. 
2 ~., p. 196. 3Ibid.' p . 15. 
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really scientific in their work. If they weze they would not make the 
unwarranted assumptions they do about the objects of their study. 
Of great concern i a the fact that non-Catholic sociologists tend 
to min1mi ze the nature of man . This may be partly because of the socio-
logical situation in which collectivized units in the contemporary era 
have tended to absorb individuals and thus ignore the true character of 
lmman personality. The sociologist f'requently assumes that such a si tua-
tion somehow indicates that man's true nature is something less than 
personal.1 
Then, too, the writings of men like Smal.l, Cooley, Ross, Reuter, 
Ward, Sumner, and Giddings imply that man is an anima] who acquires his 
humanity through interaction, human nature not being an original en.dov-
2 
ment . Sociologists like Lundberg and Dodd make unproven assumptions 
about man when they treat him a s nothing but a responder to stimuli and 
when they treat his actions as quan.."ti t i e a to be measured. 
As Roberta Snell writes : 
(They) treat man statistically and attribute to him little 
mor e spiritual substance than that of quantitative measure 
itself. Rational faculties of intellect and v1ll are dis-
carded. .Man's actions are like other phenomena. .Man 
achieves his perfection by means of eugenics and population 
control . • • • The Natural l aw is rejected. The supernatural 
~obert P. Moban, A Thomistic Philosophy of Civilization and 
Culture (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1948), p. 51. 
2Paul J . Mundie, Review of Reuter, Handbook of Sociology, Am.. 
Cath. Soc. Rev. , 3 (1942), 53 . Sister Mary Liguori, 11Tbe Concept of 
'Social Process' in American Sociology, II Am.. cath. Soc. Rev., 3(1942), 
169. 
1 is repudiated entirely. 
She concludes: 
In the teaching of most of the sociologists studied in this 
work, may be found ideas contributing to the destruction of 
the dignity and rights of the human person, and hence, to 
the ruin of society. 2 
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According to Catholics the concept of man is inevitably tied to 
the concept of society, and the fact that society is hypostatized by so 
many sociologists has its result in an inadequate concept of man. Sociolo· 
gists from Durkheim3 to Parsons4 are criticized for this. 
Criticism by sociologists writing more recently are less specific 
and tend to accuse non-Catholic sociologists of disregarding the nature 
of man or vacillating between severa.l interpretations . Thus, Rudolph 
Morris sa.ys of Arnold Rose 1 s recent introductory text5 that there is 
nothing in it to contradict Catholic doctrine, but there is nothing 
positive either.6 Likewise, Sister Marie Agnes of Rome criticizes Arnold 
1sister Roberta Snell, The Nature of Man in St. Thomas 
With the Nature of Man in American Sociolo Washington, D. C. : 
Catholic University of America Press, 19 2 , p. 166. Cf. Burns, 
"Catholic Social Theory," and Healey, Society and Social Change. 
2 Snell, The Nature of Man, p. 167. 
ared 
The 
~ohan, A Thomistic Philosophy, p . 51 . 
4 Thomas O' Dea, "The Sociology of Religion," Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 
15(1954), 73-103. 
5Arnold Rose, Sociology: The Study of Human Relations (N.Y.: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1956) . 
6Rudolph Morris, Review of Rose, Sociol<?&J Am. Cat h. Soc . Rev., 
18(1957), 79-8o . 
141 
Green1 for vacillating betveen acceptance and denial of tree will, social 
2 instinct, moral law, and the like. 
Such criticism leads to the inference that some Catholic sociolo-
gists are not ready to accept the legitimaey of theorizing, for the 
vacillation being criticized can be interpreted as evidence of conceptual 
growth through the continual testing of hypotheses. If sociologists have 
anything to say about the nature of man, they have tvo choices: either 
the tentative, experimental approach, or the dogmati c (the dogmatism may 
be their own or that which is incorporated from other sources) • To 
accuse a scientist of uncertainty is either to misunderstand the nature 
of science or to be insincere. 
catholic sociologists are not unaware that despi te the despirit-
ualizing of man which they see in the work of some sociologists, there 
is a humanizing which constantly goes on and which serves as a substitute 
for the real dignity of man. Paul Furfey as well as Sister Snell point 
this out. The humanitarian philosophy stresses the dignity and worth 
of man; it is tolerant, kindly, permissive, and secularist, rooted in 
the eighteenth century enlighte:maent. It extolls man's human! ty, not his 
spiritual destiny. 
This may appear to have the same results as the view of man which 
Catholics advocate. It has been the basis of much social reform, for 
1 Arnold Green, Sociology (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Book Co., [1952] 1956). 
2 Sister Marie Agnes of Rome, Review of Green, Sociology, Am. 
Soc. Rev., 18(1957), 81. cath. 
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instance. But it is 1mrealistic and clouds the scientific judpent of 
the scientist who espouses it . It causes him to explain away man's base 
conduct by attributing his action to a detenrl..nism. It causes him to 
be sentimental about minorities and criminals. oa the other hand, 
Catholics with a true view of man need not excuse the crim1naJ to love 
1 him, or patronize the minority in order to demand justice for him. 
According to Catholic critics, non-Catholic sociologists have 
been notoriously gull ty of failing to grasp the meaning and importance 
of religion in society. The basic error is in making religion merely 
humanistic and naturalistic, explainable on the basis of psychological 
need and social function . 2 Divine origins and supernatural elements are 
ignored. 
This leads to the Catholic criticism of certain attitudes toward 
values . The relativistic treatment of human actions and the denial of 
supernatural norms is a repudiation not only of the Divine Law but of 
the natural law as well. Man's values are interpreted by many non-
Catholic sociologists as merely irrational, socially conditioned habits 
which change with circumstances and which can be manipulated by changing 
the environment . 
One of the most recent criticisms by a Catholic sociologist is 
of the work of law professor 1 Morton Grod.zins, The Loyal and the Disloyal} 
1Paul H. Furfey, "The Humanitarian Philosophy and the Acceptance 
of Sociological Generalization," Am. Oath. Soc. Rev., 16 (1955), 122. 
2 
lluesse and Harte, eds . , The Sociology of the Parish, p . ix. 
3 Morton Grodzins, The Loyal and the Disloyal. 
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Here is a clear example, SS\YS John F. Kenney, of the results of the 
denial of natural lav. When Grodzins says, "The effective definitions 
of loyalty are, therefore, under most circumstances, unofficial social 
norms, and groups compete to establish these definitions as they compete 
in other spheres of life, " he elim.:inates 8.flY basis for the Judgment of 
conduct to be right or vrong. He has no norm which is verifiable by 
reason. No real basis for loyalty is forthcoming from such an analysis .1 
The failure to have a basis for Judging values not only influences 
the sociologist to accept a relativism, but it creates contusion vhen in 
looking for an explanation of human values he finds them to be irration-
ally based and socially conditioned. 2 Mores replace morals, and ulti-
mately tree vUl is denied. 3 
Worse than this aspect of relativism and naturalism is the denial 
of ultimate, unchangeable goals in life . For such sociologists there is 
no Eternal Law. Such a position leads to all kinds of erroneous con-
elusions about human activity. For instance, ms.ny writers advocate 
birth control, state control of persons, and euthanasia because they 
have erroneous concepts of the true nature of values in human life. 
'l'he kinds of criticism which Catholic sociologists make about 
sociology have not changed through the years. The change has been, 
1 John F . Kenney, Review of Grodzins, The Loyal and the Disloyal, 
Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 17(1956), 261 . 
2aoss, "Christian Social Concepts," pp. 90-96. 
3
eavana.ugh, "Modern Sociology," pp. 156-158. 
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instead, the direction of the criticism. Whereas for.merly Catholics 
criticized sociology, they now criticize sociologists. Modern Catholic 
scholars for the most part accept sociology as a disciplined study of 
social structure and function, because they have solved certain methodo-
logical problems in its relationship to other approaches to man and 
society. It is especially instructive in this connection to note that 
whereas a writer like Remelt criticized sociology for being too empiri-
cal, modern Catholic sociologists are more likely to critize their non-
Catholic colleagues tor not being empirical enough. 
In light of the advance made by Catholics in delimiting the scope 
or sociological study, it is rather surprising to tind a modern Catholic 
sociologist basing criticisms of non- Catholic sociology on assumptions 
silllilar to those of Theodore Remelt. Thomas O'Dea's criticism of Talcott 
1 Parsons' sociology of religion is a case in point . 
O'Dea is, first or all, critical of Parsons' conceptual system 
because it seems to leave out man' s spiritual nature and destiny. 
In making an object or man, it succeeds only in making objects 
of successive aspects of man. The living person is a whole--
a unity in his interior self .••• To fit the human person 
and his religious interests into a closed conceptual construct, 
concerned especially W'ith social structure and function, is to 
commit on the grandest possible scale the old logical error of 
including the whole in the part. Both the person and the object 
of his religious concern transcend conceptualization. Both 
transcend social structure and its functional uniformities.2 
1
o'Dea, "The Sociology of Religion." 
2 
Ibid. ' P.P. 89-90. 
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Be lists his main critieisas of Parsons as follows: 
(1) Reliance on a narrow positivistic definition or cognition. 
(2) The positivistic concept of liBn and its derivatives. 
(3) The eypostatization of society or social. system. 
( 4) The "residual" conception of religion. 
(5) The "psyohologizing" or religious content. 
( 6) Isolation t:r011 history and philosophy, including theology •1 
There are tvo i.llportant points to consider regard.ing this cri ti-
que. One is that there is a question as to its validity. The other is 
that in this critique there is a clue to the contemporary direction of 
sociological thought among catholics. 
Concerning the validity or O'Dea's criticism, it is necessary 
to ask whether he is actually criticizing Parsons' work or reading into 
it a point of view and attacking that. '!'he question is raised because 
Parsons consistently and consciously attempts to avoid the position for 
which he is being criticized. Disclaimers do not, or course, take 
precedence over the evidence, but one is obliged to accept such qualif.Ying 
statements unless the scientific conclusions presented directly contra-
diet them. Mere absence or philosophy and theology in the content of 
the social scientist's vork is not proof that he is ignoring them. One 
is obliged to take Parsons seriously vhen he says, tor instance: 
There is no illplieation that the value of any one such element, 
or even all or those included in one logically coherent system, 
is completely descriptive of any particular concrete thing 
1
o'Dea, "The Sociology of Religion," p. 91. 
1 
or event. 
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To accuse him of doing the opposite requires rather clear demonstration. 
There is no doubt tbat out of the context of Parsons' self-
imposed restriction his vork may at lJl8JlY places seem to ignore the 
"noetic"2 quality of man and religion. Eut O'Dea seems to be assuming 
a concept of functionalism not intended by Parsons. In the sense in 
vhich Parsons and others, such as Robert Merton, use the term, no meta-
physical questions are necessarily begged. 
Prentiss Pemberton argues the same point from an epistemological 
analysis when he says: 
This may be put another~: our very act of "looking" affects 
the data we observe. But when we learn to allow for this in-
evitable distortion, tor this subjective element, we gain not 
perfect, but at least partial knowledge that can be confirmed 
when tested in nature. Such knowledge comprises both dependable 
"laws" and unfathomable surprises. It leads neither to a noetic 
identification of concept vith standard aspects of concrete 
data, nor to a total Kantian gulf betveen concept and Ding an 
Sich. Concepts cannot correspond to concrete phenomena; they 
can-correspond to "elements in" the phenomena which are ana-
lytically separable f'r~ other elements, as Parsons sums up in 
his analytical realism. 
Parsons explicitly states his desire to attack the misconception 
that "either the aim or the actual result of scientific investigation in 
1 Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, p . 730. 
~ul H. Furfey detines "noesis" as: "The act by which the 
intellect perceives a truth immediately, tb&t is, vithout reasoning 
trom previously known facts; also the mind's ability to perform this 
act." (Three Theories of Society [ B.Y.: The Macmillan eo., 1937] , 
p. 243.) 
3Prentiss Pemberton, "An Examination of Some Criticisms of 
Talcott Parsons' Sociology ot Religion," Jr. of Relig. , 36(1956), 247. 
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any field can be to attain a complete picture of the ontological reality 
of phenomena. ,.1 
Parsons seems to be doing what many Catholics think sociologists 
should do, i.e., make a distinction between formal objects in studying 
man and confine sociology to its proper object. That fact, that he is 
then criticized for doing so, is added evidence for the conclusion, 
previously stated, that the very nature of the Catholic intellectual 
synthesis does not allow for an autonomous sociology. The only other 
conclusion is hardly tenable, i.e., that modern Catholic sociologists 
are battling a straw man lef't over f'rom an earlier era. 2 
3· Summary 
It may be tentatively concluded f'rom this analysis of Catholic 
attitudes toward sociology that regardless of the formal differentiation 
that may be made between sociology and philosophical disciplines, values 
pley an important role. These, moreover, are cast as norms which :f'unc-
tion in a variety of ways: (1) as the presuppositions regarding the 
objects of sociological investigation (e.g., what is man?) given in the 
theological-philosophical synthesis of Catholic thought; (2) as pre-
suppositions about the nature or values which require. that human values 
~cott Parsons, Essa s in Sociolo ical Theo Pure and A ied 
(Glencoe, D.l.: Free Press, 19 9 , p. 73, quoted in Pemberton, 
Examination of Some Criticisms," p. 248. 
2 This latter alternative is substantially the conclusion of 
Pemberton in his analysis of O'Dea's criticism. In light of the evidence 
of this dissertation, Pemberton's conclusion is incomplete. 
be normatively judged; (3) as the standards which guide the pursuit of 
sociological study--axiological propositions of a metasociological nature. 
In these respects Catholics have a rather well-developed point 
of view which may serve as a tentative ansver to questions posed in 
Chapter II of this study. It vill be the task of the next chapter to 
examine the work of Catholics in specific sociological problems vith a 
view to examining the wa:y in which this normative structure operates and 
to the confirmation of the hypothesis presented here. 
CHAP!'ER IV 
CATHOLIC APPROACHES ro SOCIOLOGY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF VALIDATING NORMS 
1. The Problem Restated 
The development of sociology among Catholics in the United 
States bas been a process of finding a satisfactory adjustment between 
a scientific approach to man in society and the philosophical-thecQogical 
approach. 
The point of' arrival is characterized by a coming to terms with 
the norms of philosophy and theology. This is not a superficial domina-
tion of' Catholic norms, but, rather, a well thought out relationship in 
which a relative autonomy is accorded sociology, a purpose all its own. 
Within this purpose and range of' autonomy sociology pursues scientific 
study of' a highly respectable nature. It finds a scientifically defens-
ible position regarding its presuppositions in the generally accepted 
requirement to state biases clearly so that they can be account ed for. 
The Catholic sociologist feels that he has an equal right with all other 
sociologists to hold to presuppositions for which he finds support in 
other discipli.nes . The Catholic sociologist wants to make his socio-
logical contribution without j eopa.rdizing his presuppositions . Yves 
Simon says, "In Catholicism the maintenance of the true dogma and morals 
is always the most urgent of all tasks." 
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Melvin J. Williams has suggested a clear- cut approach ~or 
1 Catholics in his summary. The position he suggests is based on what 
Catholics want to accomplish and what they can do within the framework 
of their presuppositions . The basic principles of his suggested ap-
proach are: (1) Make a distinction between speculative and empirical 
studies . (2) Recognize that human values have both a material and a 
metaphysical aspect. (3) Make a distinction between formal objects in 
terms of these aspects. ( 4) Make the presuppositions plain. ( 5) Allow 
a free competition o~ biases among scientists. Williams' summary also 
involves making a distinction between sociology and other social sciences, 
which is not of direct concern here.2 
A word may be said about (5) above, since the issue of the dis-
sertation seems to hang on its implications . While Williams feels that 
this is a possible position ~or Catholic sociologists to hold, the 
evidence presented here suggests limits. It does appear that the Catholic 
approach supplies a limited functionalism, but ultimately the ends are 
latent, and the level on which the competition of ideas takes place lies 
very close to the surface of practical policies. 
It is, of course, true to say that Catholic sociologists are not 
in :f'ul.l agreement regarding the nature and task of sociology. In speak:ll:lg 
collectively o~ Catholic sociologists, we must always be aware of the 
fact that while they have a common problem, they do not necessarily have 
\Juliams, Catholic Social Thought, pp. 423-434. 
2~. , p . 428. 
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a common mind on the solution. The common problem is to find a legiti-
mate place for sociology in the larger system of thought. The fact 
that sociology has meant many different things to many people through 
the years has caused Catholics to be wary. Certain points of view have 
been quite repugnant to them because they have struck at the roots of 
Catholic belief. 
Thus the probable direction of sociological thinking on the part 
of Catholics is more clearly indicated by reference to the fundamental 
unity of Catholic sociologists in the problems they face and the religious 
context of their role. But Furfey is quite correct in pointing out that 
in studying the work of catholic sociologists one must be aware of the 
many levels of competence.1 
Judging from the many statements about sociology presented in 
the previous chapter it may be suggested that the Catholic position is 
one in vhich norms established by the Church through its interpretation 
of revelat ion, combined vith reason, supersede sociological investiga-
tion. Catholic sociologists have not asked vhat the just society is, 
but how can the ju.st society as it is interpreted by official religious 
pronouncements be achieved, or to what extent does it actually exist?2 
1 Jean-Marie Jammes and Henry Mendras, "Religious Sociology in 
the United states, 11 Lumen Vitae, 6(1951), 135. 
2John F. Cronin, Catholic Social Principles {Milwaukee: The 
Bruce Publishing Co. , [195QJ 1952) , pp. 124, 200-252. Cronin ' s work is a 
typica.l example of the common approach vhich moves from the papal pro-
grams to suggested implementation. As a combination of sociology, 
economics, and social philosophy, his vork is admirable. Hovever, there 
does not seem to be any suggestion that some other kind of economic order 
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They do not ask what family arrangements are best sui ted to achieve 
personal fulfillment, but rather what forces militate against a particu-
1 lar family form, and how can that form be preserved. 
The task of this chapter will be to explore more tully the 
problem of norms in terms of this study' s concern with validation. In 
order to do this, it may be well to suggest the implications of Chapter 
II for this problem. 
There the thesis was developed that there is a relationship 
between norms and the circumstances of the particular epochs in which 
they bave arisen. Norms, as ideas, are never fully divorced from their 
social context. Nevertheless, many of the underlying assumptions of 
diverse epochs and cultures seem to require the postulate of universal-
ity.2 In fact, the use of reason and science makes such a universal 
appeal . It becomes necessary 1 then, somehow to reconcile what seem to 
be opposing tendencies 1 i.e. , ideas have both an appeal for universal 
acceptance and at the same time are existentially based. A coherent 
concept of value recognizes both of these elements . It also recognizes 
that in actual experience value bas both a subjective and objective 
than that suggested by the popes ~ also embody the ideals of social 
justice. On the other hand, Paul Montavon, writing from the standpoint 
of social ethics 1 does feel that sociology has something to say about 
the forms which justice ma.y take. He suggests that it may turn out 
that long accepted applications of Catholic principles are no longer 
feasible . ( 11Etbics and Social Sciences," Soc. Ord. , 8(1958] , p. 31.) 
1 John L. Thomas, The American Catholi c Family (Englewood Clift's, 
N. J . : Prentice-Ball, 1956), pp. 33-95 . 
2 See Deats, Thematic Values. 
dimension. The subjectivity or value emphasizes its culture-bound 
quality; the objectivity or value emphasizes its universal quality. 
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Any approach vhich recognizes the one aspect or value to exclu-
sion of the other is involved in the reductio~ fallacies either or 
"nothing but" or or "something more. ,,l The solutions to the problems of 
world order seem to hinge on a. reconciliation of these polar concepts. 
A concept or norms e.s instrumental in the achieving of ideals, set in a. 
context of a coherent and corrective approach to truth, is a way of 
accomplishing such a reconciliation. 
Sociology, among other social sciences, has a part to play in 
this dialectic between vhat is and what may be. At least it illuminates 
the norms and values that do guide individuals and groups. Also, it 
cannot avoid the universalistic assumptions it makes, and insofar as the 
sociologist makes choices as a. sociologist he appeals to norms which are 
not completely relative. It is suggested, therefore, that both as 
responsible scientist and responsible citizen, the sociologist contribute 
to the progressive validation of norms. 
The logic of the sociologist's position, however, seems to be 
that he cannot accept an absolutist position regarding norms. When he 
accepts uncritically norms which are the product of other forms of in-
quiry, he jeopardizes his science. To state these biases clearly does 
not mitigate the problem. 
It is here maintained, then, that the present situation regarding 
biases in the social sciences is inadequate if it goes no fUrther than to 
~idney, Theoretical Anthropology, pp. 47, ll5-ll6. 
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maintain that the only responsibility which the scientist has is to make 
his biases plain so that others can account for them in judging his work. 
Without presuming on the sociologist's scope of competence it 
may be suggested that he can make a contribution to the validation of 
norms when he brings to bear his findings on his knowledge of norms in a 
critical fashion. There is no thought that this in any way is the final 
test tor the validity of nor.ms . It does suggest that sociology has 
something to say in company with other disciplines equally concerned with 
discovering the truth. The particular methodology ot sociology that 
seems use:f'ul in this pursuit is a f'unctional approach that assesses norms 
in terms of their relationship to the patterns and processes of society 
and culture . Sociologists may well ask, for instance, whether certain 
time- honored norms in the context of new si tua.tions are any longer ade-
quate expressions. 
The question then becomes, do Catholic sociologists generally 
accept these implications in their work? 
Two issues have had a very important influence on the Catholic 
position regarding norms in sociology. One is the reaction against un-
warranted assumptions in non- Catholic sociological work. The other is 
the drive toward empirical competence as a means of achieving sociologi-
cal respectability. :Both ot these inf'luences presumably have made 
Catholic sociologists extremely cautious regarding the scope of work 
whieh they outline tor themselves . 
In her review of Williams, Catholic Social Though;t, Eva J. Ross 
states that a "changed outlook in thought" in the work of Catholic 
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sociologists is marked by the founding of the American Catholic Sociologi-
cal Society, and the first publication of its journal in 194o.1 Miss 
Ross does not indicate precisely what this change has been. Certainly, 
it bas not been an abrupt one . In a sense, the founding of the Society 
was the concrete expression of changes in thinking that had been taking 
place during many years preceding it. Nevertheless, the changes which 
became evident have served to clarify Catholic sociological thought, 
given it a unifying motif, and, a s a result, set many earlier writers off 
as social philosophers rather than sociologists . For this latter reason 
it is necessary to concentrate on recent Catholic sociologists in order 
to do justice to the Catholic point of view regarding the questions of 
this dissertation . 
While the founding of the American Catholic Sociological Society 
was partly thought of by Catholics as a response to unacceptable socio-
logical points of view, the intention was not to withdraw into a world 
of its own. Rather, its intent was to provide a forum in which the 
problems of sociology especially important to Catholics could be discus-
sed. 2 That such a procedure has had its desired results is reflected in 
recent writings . 
The remainder of the chapter will follow the general outline of 
Chapter II: 
(1) The way in which presuppositions are handled by Catholic 
1Ross, Review of Williams, pp. 206- 207 . 
2Jammes and Mendras, "Religious Sociology, n p . 134. Cf. Kane, 
"Are Catholic Sociologists a Minor ity Group?" pp. 2-12, and Fitzpatrick, 
"Cat holics and the Scientific Knowledge of Society," pp. 2-8 . 
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sociologists will be examined. 
(2) The Catholic sociologists' approach to the study of values 
and norms will be analyzed . 
( 3) The Catholic sociologists' point of view toward the rela-
tionship between sociology and ethics v1ll be examined. 
The aim throughout v1ll be to discuss those aspects of the above 
purposes that are pertinent to the problem of a sooiologic:al contribution 
to the validation of norms . 
2 . Presuppositions 
One of the most noticeable character istics of recent Catholic 
sociological work bas been the attention paid to empirical work on many 
1 
topics . Catholics have always done some of this, but the "relatively 
late introduction of Sociology as a maJor field of study in American 
Catholic Colleges, the traditional preference for deductive rather than 
empirically inductive disciplines, and the relative absence of admini-
2 
strati ve and financial encouragement" have been limiting factors. 
1For example, see Russell Barta and Charles T. O'Reilly, "Some 
Dating Patterns and Attitudes Toward Marriage of 174 Catholic College 
Students," Am. Cath. Soc. Rev. , 13(1952), 24o-248; Bernard G. Mulvaney, 
"Post- Depression Fertility in the Un1 ted States, " Am.. Cath. Soc . Rev. , 
14(1953), 84-93; John M. Martin, 11Seientifie Parole Prediction," Am. 
Cath. Soc. Rev., 14(1953), 162-166; John J . Kane, "The Social Structure 
of American Catholics," Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 16(1955), 23-30; Sister M. 
Dominie, "Religion and the Juvenile Delinquent," Am. Cath. Soc. Rev. , 
15(1954), 256-264; Sister Bridget Creighton, "Socio-economic Status of 
the Nursing Candidate," Am. Cath. Soc . Rev. , 15(1954), 19-29; Francis A. 
Cizon, "Interethnic and Interreligious Marriage Patterns in Parish X, " 
Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 15(1954), 244-255· 
~novan, 11Ameriean Catholic Sociologists," p . 104. 
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The movement toward empiricism was beset by many dif'f'icul ties 
which required clarification of the Catholic approach to sociology. 
Probably the most significant developments in this process of clarifi-
cation vere the distinction between formal objects and the discovery, 
through the critical analysis of non-Catholic works, of the role of 
biases. When Catholics were able to separate sociology f'rom the pa.r-
ticula.r vork of sociologists, they had achieved a basis for self-confidenoe 
in empirical study. Until that time empiricism itself vas suspect be-
cause of the unwarranted assumptions vhich empiricists often made. 
As recently a.s 1954, John J. Kane expressed this point of view 
when he wrote: 
When Catholics attack sociology as it is known in the United 
States, they are attacking philosophy as taught and understood 
in the Ull:i ted states. It is secular philosophy, not sociology, 
which must be feared.l 
Kane follovs this with the stricture that Catholics are long on 
philosophy and theology but short on empirical facts. This may be taken 
as an expression of the common attitude which Catholic sociologists have 
toward the state of their vork. 
It should be noted that the representative thinking in the process 
of developing an empirical approach is to be attributed to Franz Mueller, 2 
1J. J. Kane, "Christian Sociology and Urgent Need in Our Day," 
Soc . Ord., 4(1954), 449. 
~ Mueller gave one of the earliest statements on the formal 
object of sociology in his "The Formal Object," pp. 55-61. Another major 
contribution to clarification of the nature of sociology came in his 
"Some Remarks," pp. 2-13. 
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Eva J . Ross, 1 Francis Friedel, 2 and Paul Furfey.3 Mueller and Ross have 
seen this as a formal separation of sociology and the philosophical 
disciplines. Friedel and Furfey have been inclined to see it as in-
volving the articulation of premises . All four accept the need to 
make premises clear, but the former see this as part of the process of 
separation while the latter see it as a process of synthesis. In actual 
practice, however, the end results are similar . The separation of formal 
objects, as bas already been noted, is never complete, while the synthesis 
is always hierarchical . It may be interesting to note that Mueller and 
Ross are lay sociologists, while Friedel and Furtey are members of the 
clergy. 4 
Quite a few Catholic sociological works avoid specific reference 
to presuppositions. These are empirical studies which are descriptive 
and which lead to limited empirical generalizations. The use:f'tllness of 
~ comments on articles by others contain a good statement of 
Miss Ross's position: Ross, Comment o~ article by Friedel, pp. 140-141; 
and Comment on article by Hartnett, pp. 108-110. Cf. Ross, Basic 
Sociology, Appendix II. 
~iedel, "Catholic Sociological Research," pp. 129-143; and 
"Formal Object of the Social Sciences," Am. Cath. Soc . Rev., 4(1943), 
16-24. 
3Paul H. Furfey bas been one of the most prolific of Catholic 
sociologists. Most of his formal thinking about sociology as a science 
is summed up in his Scope and Method. 
4The choice of these sociologists as representative is an effort 
to indicate the importance of the methodological thinking that seems 
basic to actual sociological study. By excluding sociologists pri-
marily known for their empirical work there is no intention to overlook 
the contributions they make to methodological clarification by their 
work. 
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such studies may be indicated by the authors, but the work is presented 
in disinterested form. Presupposi tiona must be inferred. Such works 
are least likely to be influenced by biases. 
Normative statements are more explicit when Catholics write 
about their own problems in socioloif or when they wri te text books 
intended for Catholic use . Earlier text books written as sociology were 
more likely to be of a philosophical and ethical nature, sociology being 
2 little more than an illuminating sidelight. More recently Catholic 
sociology texts have been descriptive and follov the outline of topics 
and the content of non-Catholic works . 3 Most of these, however, at 
least begin Yith a statement of philosophy and may even indicate at 
significant junctures the position which catholics should take on cer-
tain matters . At other times sociological findings are taken as examples 
of what happens when the norms are not adhered to. 
1For example, see John A. Ryan, "The Bishops ' Program for Social 
Reconstruction," Am. Cath. Soc . Rev. , 5(1944), 25-33; John E. Coogan, 
"Religion and the criminologist, 11 Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 6(1945), 154-159; 
Joseph L . Kerins, "The Catholic Sociologist and the Sociology of Industry," 
Am. Cath. Soc. Rev. , 8(1947), 12-23; Franz Mueller, "The Social Question 
of the Shop, 11 Am. Cath. Soc . Rev., 9(1948), 84-97; Daniel M. Cantwell, 
''Race Relations as Seen By a catholic," Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 7(1946), 
242-258; Leo J . Robinson, "Toward a Juridicial Order, " A:IA. Cath. Soc. Rev. , 
9(1948), 3-8; George G. Higgins, "American Contributions to the Implemen-
tation of the Industry Council Plan," .Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 13(1952), 
10-24. 
2
see, for example, Paul J . Glenn, Sociology: A CJ.ass Manual in 
the Philosophy of Haman Society. 
3see Ross, Basic Sociologz, and Clement s . Mibanovioh and Joseph 
B. Schuyler, Current Social Problems (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing 
eo. , 1950). 
One of the better examples of a text book in sociology for 
Catholics is Sociology and Social Problems by Eva Ross •1 Chapter Two 
of this book deals With "The Purpose of Man, and of Social IJ.fe." In 
16o 
summary her statement says that man is created by God w:t th a spiri tua.l 
soul that is immortal. Therefore, man ' s life on earth must be organized 
with man • s eternal destiny in mind. The Church is the divinely estab-
lished authority to guide men in relating their temporal life to their 
supernatural destiny. Man is subject to both physical laws and moral 
laws, but he has free will to r eject either. Nevertheless, these laws, 
summed up in the natural law, and available to man's knowledge through 
reason, are God-given. To help man carry out the natural law God bas 
given His Divine Law through revelation. The moral aspect of the natural 
law includes rights and duties , and social relationships consist in a 
g1 ve and take between these rights and duties. Man • s chief rights are to 
life, liberty, justice, truth, property, and the performance of his 
duties to God. SUbsidiary rights follow from these, such as the right 
to a living wage, to rest and recreat ion, and to marry or remain single. 
There are corresponding duties to God, to man himself, and to other men. 
To God man owes worship, the acceptance of His will, and the f'ulfil.lment 
of religious obligations . To himself man owes the preservation of his 
own life and health, the right use of spiri tua.l and material powers and 
possessions, and the maintainence of his dignity as a creature of God. 
To others man owes justice and cbarity. 2 
1 Eva J . Ross, Sociology and Social Problems (Milwaukee: The 
Bruce Publishing Co. , 1947) . 
2~~3 ~~ -~ 
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The text which follows this statement is an explanation of what 
these norms mean in concrete experience and hov they can be achieved. 
Alternative responses to these norms, or the results of failure to 
adhere to them, or the ~s in which they have been achieved, are also 
indicated. 
Mihanovich and Schuyler in a social problems text illustrate hov 
the adherence to these norms is given particular content which has the 
same authority as the basic presuppositions. Thus they s~: 
A sociologist who denies the existence or validity of 
any of the above presuppositions is easily led to error •••• 
The result? Disaster. The sociologist can preach (as 
many of them do t~) birth control, mercy killing, sterili-
zation, and divorce. 
Another example of the w~ in which Catholic sociologists have 
wrestled with the problem of presuppositions is Donald Thorman's 
criticism of certain non- Catholic treatments of religious origins. He 
begins by expressing disappointment that the vaunted objectivity of 
many sociologists is really missing at important points. He notes: 
The seeming unwillingness of these writers to admit the pos-
sibility that a religion really be of divine origin or have 
supernatural elements in it leads them to state their own 
theological and philosophical beliefs as accepted socio-
logical facts . 2 
While such criticism is no doubt warranted at a number of 
places, the important point is not a consideration of the justifia-
bility of it. Rather, what are the implications of Thorman's position? 
~hanovich and Schuyler, Current Social Problems, p . 5 . 
2nonald J . Thorman, "The Sociological Concept of Religion," 
Am. Cath. Soc . Rev. , 12(1951) 1 149. 
We may veil agree vi th Thorman that it is important to state biases, but 
his basis tor saying that his particular bias makes the understanding or 
religion more scientific begs some important questions . How can anyone ' s 
presuppositions be so judged unless in some vay they are subjected to 
critica.l analysis? In the long run, Thorman's biases may be proved to 
be closer to the truth than anyone else ' s , but in the meantime it seems 
that the validation of such biases must be considered an important task. 
One of the most obvious points which Catholic sociologists 
defend is the ethics or population cont rol . Typically, the Catholic 
sociologist uses his studies to support the Catholic ethica.l position 
regarding birth control . A very recent example which appears to be a 
scientific approach to the val.idi ty or the Catholic position is an 
article by Anthony Zimmerman ent itled, "The Alleged Danger of Imminent 
World Overpopulation. ,,1 His conclusions are : 
(1) It the present pace of human expansion continues indefi-
nitely, then, so tar as the human mind can conjecture, the 
race will eventually become too large tor its earthly babi tat . 
Even if the process requires centuries and milleniums, the 
space of the earth is limited and cannot forever accommodate 
a race which continually expands . Therefore, according to 
our present knowled8e, we cannot understand how God intends 
to maintain the state of equilibrium indefinitely •••• 
(2) At the present juncture of history, the race is not yet 
too large for resources, since the world economy responds 
readily to added efforts. • • • 
(3) A point of unavoidable disequilibrium cannot be located 
in the foreseeable future •••• 
( 4) When length of lite is extended to maximum deaths catch 
up to births ••• • 
(5) Industrial development makes larger populations possible. 
• • • 
1 
Anthony L. Zimmerman, "The Alleged Danger of Imminent World 
OVerpopulation," Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 18(1957), 10-32. 
(6) It is irrational to take measures for population re-
striction at the present time in order to avoid a catastrophe 
in the unforeseeable future which is only a matter of con-
jecture. Such measures have little scientiffc backing and 
betray a lack of faith in Divine Providence. 
At several places such an argument is open to question from a 
sociological perspective . In the first place, it is difficult to under-
stand how a Catholic can attempt to prove this position scientifically, 
since its validity is already established in other ways and since the 
very meaning of proof must logically involve the possibility of disproof. 
In addition, the conclusions are based on evidence which com-
pletely ignore the actual facts of geography, not to mention culture. 
His assumptions that the whole earth offers potential space and re-
sources for increased population and that the conditions of the "un-
foreseeable future" do not already exist in some places seems to ignore 
some concrete sociological facts. 
The point here is not to question the Catholic position on birth 
control. Rather, it is to point to the difficulties involved when a 
synthesis is attempted between science and an absolute ethic. The 
Catholic sociologist is on extremely dangerous ground when he attempts 
to offer sociological proof for ethical presuppositions. The more astute 
Catholic sociologists have been aware of this dilemma for some time, as 
the previous chapter shows. 
To what extent Catholic sociologists are better empiricists be-
cause they take their presuppositions seriously cannot be competently 
1
zimm.erman, "The Alleged Danger," pp. 27-32. 
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judged here. M.any Catholic works are quite acceptable to the non-
Catholic scientific community. There appears to be an enlarging area 
in which Catholics are operating with scientific soundness. This is 
partly due to the reassessment of the role of presuppositions in 
sociological work. 
For instance, there is a growing willingness to look sympa-
thetically at the work of non-Catholics. To some extent this is due 
to a new awareness of the role of biases and a consequent humility on 
the part of non- Catholic sociologists . 
The work of sociologists like Talcott Parsons1 and Pitirim 
Sorokin, 2 however, are more acceptable than work by earlier writers 
like Ward, Sumner, and Cooley6 or contemporaries like George Lundberg.3 
Even some sociologists who formerly were strongly criticized are now 
of'ten cited for support . Joseph Fichter at one place draws on the 
conclusions of G. H. Mead, although he is careful to repudiate what he 
considers Mead's philosophical and psychological assumptions about the 
emergence of the self. 4 
lwote the appe.al to Parsons and others in support of a fUnctional 
approach to religion that avoids metapbysica.l and ethica.l issues in Gordon 
George, "The Sociology of Ritual," Am.. Cath. Soc. Rev. , 17(1956), 111-130. 
2 Catholic sociologists generally are congenial to Sorokin' s work 
because of his attention to values and his particular typology of cul-
tures. With Catholics, he tends to idealize the culture of the Middle 
Ages . See Pitirim Sorokin, The Crisis of OUr Age (N.Y.: E. P. Dutton 
and Co., 1941) . 
3see the discussions between Paul Furfey and George Lundberg in 
correspondence in the Am.. Cath. Soc. Rev., 7(1946), 203-205, and 8(1947), 
47- 48. 
4Joseph Fichter, "Religious Values and the Social Personality, " 
Am. Cath. Soc. Rev .• 17(1956). 109-116. 
A similar justification of formerly unacceptable theories of 
personality is found in John Thomas's recent text, The American Catholic 
Family. In discussing the ideology underlying his work he deals with 
human nature in the catholic philosophical sense as meaning the ''prin-
ciple of action" in the being of man, that which enables him to perform 
"human acts . " He distinguishes this from usages which are employed in a 
descriptive manner to signify personality. He says: 
In this latter usage it is possible to speak of "mutability" 
and "beginning" of human nature and to assume that man is not 
born "human, " but becomes so in the process of developing 
personality.1 
This is indeed a significant change f'rom the point of view 
reflected in the work of Theodore Remelt . 
Such illustrations as these show how it becomes possible for 
some catholic sociologists to operate in the field with little overt 
reference to their role as catholics or the Catholic norms . Both Paul 
2 Furf'ey and Joseph Fichter are recent examples. These men have produced 
mature studies which make significant contributions to their field, 
Furfey in the field of method and Fichter in the general field of in-
troductory sociology. 
In the matter of presuppositions, the need for apologetic has 
had an important influence . The statement of them bas been not only a 
matter of solving the problem of biases, but of serving a more positive 
1Thomas, The American Catholic Family, p. 35. 
~fey, Scope and Method; Fichter, Sociology. 
166 
function. There are two senses in which Catholic sociologists have 
considered it important to defend their position as Catholics . First, 
within their own circles Catholic sociologists have felt it necessary to 
work out explicitly the role of norms as a way of justifying the socio-
logical approach. Most of the articles on methodology and scope bave 
been aimed at a Catholic audience . Such articles are appearing with less 
1 frequency as sociology moves toward acceptance. 
The other kind of apologetic bas been in the form of a defense 
of the use o~ Catholic presuppositions in sociology. The defensive 
elements are still occasionally apparent in articles. While this sort 
of writing is not frequent as it formerly was, at important points it is 
still emphasized. These points are the ethical issues involved in cer-
tain kinds of studies. The sociology of the family is probably the out-
standing example of this. Few works are written Vi thout explicit, if not 
detailed, re~erence to the Church's position regarding the family, 
especially the role of sex and issue of birth control. No other subject 
seems to require as extensive apologetic as this. The reason most often 
cited for making this kind of an approach in a sociological work is the 
felt need to oppose advocates of birth control and of other questionable 
tenets set forth in the name of sociology and science. 2 
1 These are cited throughout Chapter In. One of the most 
eloquent defenses of sociology is Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, "Catholic 
Responsibility, " pp. 384-396. 
2 
In addition to Catholic text books on the family, the average 
review of a non-Catholic text in the American Catholic Sociological 
Review makes this same criticism. 
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The evidence at the present time indicates that Catholic 
sociologists have not moved beyond the maxim that pr esuppositions be 
made plain. While a deeper understanding of the role of biases has 
enabled them to participate more tully in the general sociological tradi-
tion, they have not as yet approached the problem of the validity of 
Catholic norms as it bears on the basic intent of sociology as a science. 
3. Values and Norms as Data 
Catholics have always taken values seriously in sociological 
study. In fact, the problem of values has been the focal point of much 
of the dissat isfaction t hat Catholics have voiced regarding non-Catholic 
works . Man, tor the Catholic sociologist s , must be recognized as a 
valuing creature . What is more, values are more than actions or mere 
subjective feelings. The Catholic approach to values recognizes its 
many- sided aspects . Especially do they recognize the ontological status 
1 
of values . 
This broad approach to values has had both positive and negative 
implications for the Catholic sociologist. On the one hand it bas made 
him aware of the importance of a verstehen approach to the study of 
human action. On the other band it has had to face the fact that values 
cannot be completely known by sociology. In fact, it is a question how 
much of real importance Catholics feel can be said about values . 
Most Catholic work avoids the problems involved in the situation 
described above by st~ close to the descriptive level where values 
1
see the discussion of this i .n Chapter II, pp. n-74. 
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are concerned. However, certain never developments are posing inter-
esting issues . One ot these developments is in the sociology ot 
1 
religion. 
Same Catholics today question whether the statement ot purpose 
in the founding ot the American Catholic Sociological Society actually 
lett room tor the sociology of r eligion. That statement in part reads: 
To stimulate concerted study and research among Catholics 
working in the field ot sociology, to create a sense of soli-
darity among Catholic sociologists, and to unearth and dis-
seminate2the social implication of the Catholic thought-
pattern. 
Joseph Fichter declared in 1950 that as yet nothing had been done in 
Catholic sociology, i.e., the sociology ot Catholics . 3 But this state-
ment needs qualification. Fichter apparently meant that no work in the 
sociology of religion had been done which aimed at the basic problems 
ot the function ot religion in society. 4 
Early studies by Catholics on topics involving religion were 
confined pretty largely to description and statistics, basing definitions 
on canon law rather than operational criteria. Such studies were aimed 
1 For a concise survey ot Catholic work in the sociology ot 
religion see Lumen Vitae, 6(1951) , Nos. 1 and 2. This survey also 
includes the wor k ot Protestants . Its major weakness is brevity, but 
this is quite understandable, since its scope is world-wide . 
2 Quoted in Jammes and Mendras, "Religious Sociology," p. 134. 
3Ibid., p . 135. 
4Jammes and Mendras use Wach' s definition as a criter ion here : 
"The investigation and analysis ot the relationships between religion(s) 
and society in their reciprocal conditionality. " Quoted in Jammes and 
Mend.ras, "Religious Sociology," p . 135. See Joachim Wach, Sociology 
ot Religion (Chic88o: University ot Chicago Press, 1944), p . 410. 
at various aspects of Catholic life, such as, marriage patterns, ethnic 
characteristics, population movement, assimilation into the general 
eu1 ture, relationships of persons to the parish, and parish structure 
itself.1 
The recent work of Fiehter2 goes deeper than these studies in 
that it lays the groundwork for a sociological conceptualization of the 
parish and parisbiODers. He moves beyond the traditional and superficial 
definitions of parish membership based on baptism and residence.3 He 
also recognizes that there are various levels on which the parish can be 
studied: legal, communal, family, statistical, institutional, and as-
4 
sociational. To be aware of these is to make a more complete descrip-
tion possible and also to open the way for a f'u.ller understanding of the 
functional aspects of religion. 
In suggesting major issues in the sociology of the parish, 
Fichter meets head on same of the knotty problems that Catholics must 
face. What understanding can the sociologist achieve regarding the 
Church as a power structure in the larger society? Is the Church in 
1J. T. Gillard, Colored Catholics in the United States 
(BaltUiore : 1941); G. A. Kelly, Catholics and the Practice ot the l'&ith 
{Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of Alleriea, 1946); A. Me 
Caffrey, Youth in a Catholic Parish {Washington, D. C.: The catholic 
University ot America, 1941); Ger&l.d Schnepp, Leakage t'rom a Catholic 
Parish (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1§42); 
John Barbreeht, The Lay Apostolate (st. Louis: B. Herder Book Co . , 
1929); Ger&l.d Shaughnessy, Has the Illlligrant Ke~t His Faith7 {Washington, 
D. C.: The Catholic university of America, 1929, cited in Jammes and 
Mendras, op. cit. 
~chter, Social Relations. 
3 4 Ibid. , p. 10. Ibid. , p . 182. 
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fact undemocratic? In what ways are democratic procedures at work in 
American parishes? Is social integration achieved through tree relig-
ious choice? Are non- sacred values more integrative than sacred, as 
might well be indicated by unity which the cOliiiiWlity o:ften achieves 
1 
across religious lines? 
These questions are not answered, but the very raising of them 
indicates that Catholic sociologists are following the logic of their 
science into new and challenging areas. 
Gordon George in a recent article, discussi.ng the sociology of 
ritual, raises questions regarding the non-religious aspects of religious 
behavior. His is a functional analysis which draws support from the 
ideas ot Malinowski, Durkheill, and Parsons. 2 
Thus the sociology of religion raises in probably the most 
crucial way the role of nor.ms in the Catholic sociological approach. 
The question moves f'rcn the problem ot presuppos itions to an attitude 
toward the norms themselves. The following statement by Fichter has a 
subtle significance not usually found in similar points of view. 
Speaking of the scientist's need to make biases clear he says: 
Re goes scientifically astray, however, not by stating his 
''bias" but by trying to conceal it, or by forcing his dis-
covered social facts to coincide with his bias. This is, of 
eourse, the scientifically unforgivable sin.3 (Italics supplied.) 
1 Fichter, Social Relations, pp. 200-209 . 
2 George, "The Sociology of Ritual," pp. 117-130. 
3Fiohter, Social Relations, p. 205 . 
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Fichter is quite in line vi th other Catholic sociologists, how-
ever, in recognizing that the sociological is only one aspect of human 
existence •1 The same position vas articulated by Franz Mueller in 1941 
when he said that sociology cannot explain the whole and essential 
reasons for religious phenomena. It is ninadequate to set forth the 
essential issues of religious life. Sociology should not attempt to 
2 take the place of theology. " 
It appears that as Catholic sociologists are drawn more and more 
into the general universe of discourse of sociology they find it neces-
sary to accept techniques of study and interpretation which require a 
much more objective handling of Catholic norms and associated behavior. 
There is no evidence presently available to suggest what this implies 
for the fUture . 
Another problem that becomes increasingly important in this 
movement is the role of the Catholic sociologist as Catholic. That the 
sociology of religion as it is developing among Catholics is creating 
problems for the Church is indicated by the controversy which vas stimu-
lated by Fichter's first volume in a projected series on the Southern 
Parish. Some Catholics have lamented that fUture volumes were usup-
pressed," while others have raised the issue of the responsibility of 
the Catholic sociologist in his reporting. This seems clearly to be a 
1 Fichter, Social Relations, p. 3· 
2 Franz Mueller, ''What Constitutes a Sociology of Religion?n 
Am. Cath. Soc. Rev., 2(1941),152. 
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conflict between the "staff" and the "line. nl Fichter's lengthy com-
ments on ethics and the social sciences in his work, Social Relations 
in an Urban Parish, is a response to this problem. On the one band he 
laments the hostility of religionists to the work of sociologists of 
2 
religion; but on the other hand he indicates that in reporting, at 
least, the sociologist has an ethical responsibility to his subjects, 
those who sponsor studies, and those who are responsible for the on-
going work in parishes under study.3 
Few Catholics have ventured to explore the implications of certain 
sociological thinking for the validity of the presuppositions which they 
advance. Fichter's work is little more than a hint of what may come. 
The great difficul. ty in dealing with the bearing of empirical work on 
the validity of values under consideration is that there are elements 
in human reasoning which unconsciously influence even the interpreta-
tion of empirical evidence. Vilfredo Pareto, the Italian sociologist, 
did basic work on the problem of the combination of logic and sentiment 
in human thought and motivation, showing the ~s in which this problem 
comes about . 4 
~. P. Fogarty, "catholic Contributions to the Sociology of 
Religion," Blackfriars, 37(1956), 476- 478. 
2 Fichter, Social Relations, pp. 1 -6. 
3Ibid. , pp. 218-232. In editorial correspondence on an article 
by Nicholas Von Hoffman, "The Church: Subject of Social Research," Soc. 
Ord., 6(1956), 319-327, The Very Reverend Francis J. Nally of 13oston-
emphasizes the need to keep research from being made public, (6 [1956], 454). 
4 For a rather extensive treatment of Pareto's work see Parsons, 
The Structure of Social Action, pp. 178-300. 
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It is interesting to note that one of the few explorations of 
this deeper problem has been done by a Catholic sociologist, Thomas 
O'Dea, on the work of Pareto himself. The analysis appears in an 
article entitled, "The 'Residues' of Pareto: An Operational Definition 
of Natural Lav. " Here 0 'Dea opens up what he considers to be an area of 
d . 1 l fruitful collaboration between philosophy an soc~o ogy. 
O'Dea begins by recognizing the two basic categories of action 
which Pareto sets forth: logical action and non-logical (not illogical) 
action. Logical action is that which is baaed on a direct relationship 
between means and ends. Pareto, and O' Dea, are more interested, how-
ever, in non- logical action, and the paper concentrates on this aspect. 
Non-logical action expresses states of mind in which action is explained, 
but in which the explanations are not directly related to the end of 
action. Rather, the explanations appear to be derived from a substratum 
of psychic experience. Going beneath the explanations for action that 
the actor gives, Pareto finds a combination of residues {or sentiments) 
and derivations (or reasons) . Thus, non-logical action gains support 
from attitudes which are derived from many sources other than the direct 
context of action. 
Taking this theory as his starting point, O'Dea suggests that 
Pareto ' s derivatives (made up of residues and derivations) are very 
much like logico-experimenta.l theories in science . Residues may be 
l Thomas O'Dea, "The ' Residues' of Pareto: An Operational 
Definition of the Natural Law," Am. Cath. Soc. Rev. , 16(1955), 170-182. 
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likened to experimental inferences, and derivations may be likened to 
logical inferences . His point in ma.ki ng this analogy is to suggest 
that while Pareto did not recognize it, derivatives actually do involve 
elements of' cognition and logic; they are not merely subjective atti-
tudes f'or which the subject himself' cannot account . Residues, or 
sentiments, are especially t o be considered in this light. While Pareto 
saw them as mere sentimen1B, although socially use:f'ul, 0 ' Dea would say 
that they are sentiments, but they may also contain genuine noetic con-
tent, i.e. , immediate cognition of basic truth. 
Pareto himself says that there are certain principles of non-
logical conduct f'rom which human beings deduce their laws . The prin-
ciples are deduced f'rom a substratum which exists by itself' and is 
fairly constant . Pareto considers this to be natural law. However, he 
understands it to be merely a matter of human will and appetite. This 
is because he has eliminated the element of cognition in the process. 
0 ' Dea suggests that in this form the only conclusion possible is that 
instinct i s t he basis of non-logical action. This is, of course, socio-
logically not an explanation at all . 
Unfortunately, Pareto stops because he has reached the limits 
of observation. What actually takes place on this substratum in the 
deduction of principles i s beyond the scope of sociological analysis. 
O' Dea suggest s that Pareto has supplied a "sociology of lmowledge in 
which knowing does not take place. " 
O'Dea ' s crucial point is that Pareto has moved to a position 
where the only alternative is to deduce the ontological existence of a 
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level of principle which fits quite well into a Thomistic definition of 
natural. law. Pareto has not actually described natural law. In a 
negative fa.shion he has provided an operational. definition. It is what 
is lef't over a:f'ter everything else has been eliminated in the explanation 
of action. This does not leave a pure, unadulterated natural law, but, 
rather, natural law plus unknown elements. It is O'Dea ' s suggestion, 
however, that a content analysis of residues behind law might well reveal. 
natural law in the Thomistic sense. 
The implications of O' Dea ' s analysis are that natural law has 
ontological. status and that natural. law can be partly known by socio-
logical. analysis . What is ultimately involved in Paretan residues 
behind law seems to be "the common good," the regularity of which may 
well mark it as a fUnctional. prerequisite to society. 
It remains to be told how such an analysis coincides with the 
fact that in the catholic synthesis the natural. law is known by reason 
and interpreted by the Church. It may well be asked whether the "con-
tent analysis" of residues could conceivably uncover elements which 
would be at variance vi th natural. law pr inciples as they are presently 
interpreted. 
This approach of 0 ' Dea may be compared to the point of view of 
William Kolb, who suggests that the assumption in fUnctional analysis 
in religion of the usefulness and need for values leads inevitably to 
the postulate of the ontological. status of values.1 
lwllliam L. Kolb, ''VaJ.ues, Positivism, and the Functional. Theory 
of Religion: The Growth of a Dilemma.," Soc . Forces, 31(1953), 305-311 · 
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The sociological study of values seems to raise inevitably the 
problems of this dissertation. Sociology is continually treading on 
the border of the problem of validating norms. 
4. Sociology and Ethics 
i. Metasociology. --The study so far has been primarily con-
cerned with the ethical implications of sociology as a scientific study 
of man and society. It has been shown how ethical issues enter into 
sociology at important points. In this sense, the concern has been 
with the material relationship ot sociology and ethics. This section 
turns to the formal relationship of the two . 
It vas noted in Chapter III that Catholic sociologists discuss 
the formal relationship of sociology and ethics in terms of tvo related 
principles . These are the relative autonomy of each and a distinction 
between their formal objects. The essential point of Catholic sociology 
and ethics is that they are distinct disciplines . At the same time, 
without infringing on its own autonomy, sociology makes use of pre-
suppositions vhich are supplied by ethics as well as by theology and 
philosophy in general. 
catholic sociologists have done little to work out the formal 
relationship between sociology and ethics beyond this point . The 
recognition of presuppositions for the most part lacks a definite in-
dication of the ways in which these two disciplines are formally inter-
dependent. Nothing is said as to how these presuppositions are to be 
used. Neither is there any indication as to how sociological materie.l.s 
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may be used by ethics. 
It is because of this failure to specity these relationships 
that Catholic sociologists have been uncertain as to status and scope 
of their work. Even though the development of the two related prin-
ciples noted above, relative autonODcy" and separation of :formal objects, 
made the modern development of Catholic sociological work possible, 
there are evidences of continued uncertainty. 
There is at least a partial exception to the above statement. 
This is in the recent considerations by Catholics of the ethical judg-
ments of sociologists as sociologists. Paul Furfey treats this aspect 
vi thin the scope of his "metasociological" treatise, The Scope and 
Method of Sociology. Joseph Fichter considers the same problems in the 
context of practical procedures in his Social Relations in an Urban 
Parish. 
Fur:fey' s metasociological approach otters a formal :framework 
for the relationship between sociology and ethics. It v1ll be remembered 
from the discussion in the previous chapter that Furfey's definition of 
"metasociology" is: a study of the principles necessary :for "the con-
1 
struction and criticism of a valid sociology. " The threefold task 
of ''metasociology" is to develop criteria for distinguishing scientific 
knowledge from non-scientific knowledge in sociology, to :furnish criter-
ia for distinguishing what the :field of sociology is, and to provide 
practical procedural rules for sociological research. 
1 Furfey, Scope and Method, p. 8. 
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"Metasociology" is a combination of logic and axiology. It is 
in the consideration of the latter element that et hics is introduced 
directly. Metasociological value- judgments are a matter of deciding 
the usefUlness, practicality, and convenience of sociological work. 
" . • • They may assign value either to sociology as a whole or to sane 
particular conception of sociology or to some part or aspect of 
sociology or to some sociological method or procedure . '~ 
The first essential value- judgment of sociology is that it is 
itself valuable . This is affirmed by the fact that people devote them-
selves to sociological study. This value, further, incorporates two 
additional values: the value of sociology as knowledge and the value of 
sociology as "an aid in social reform and planning. " The choice of 
which of these tvo derivative values should have priority is a meta-
sociological value- judgment. Furfey chooses on rational grounds to 
place knowledge before utility. This choice he considers endemic to 
sociology as a science. 2 
The utility value of sociology dictates the necessity to choose 
among a whole series of usetul values : the practical limits of the 
field of sociology, the choice of research problems, and the choice of 
research procedures . 3 
In addition to these considerations, sociology is also part of 
the subject matter of ethics . That is, to some extent it is subject to 
1Furfey, Scope and Method, p. 91. 
2Ibid. , pp. 92- 94. 3Ibid. , p . 96. 
the laws of ethics . Therefore, met asociological. value- judgments must 
be made which vill "affirm or deny the ethical values of sociological 
procedures . ,,1 
The ethical postulates which should undergird sociology are 
as follows : 
(1) The sociologist should not participate in immorality in 
order to study it. 
(2) He should not obtain mat erial by fraud or deceit . 
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(3) He should not misrepresent t he opinion of those with whom he 
disagrees. 
(4) He should not distort his research to suit his personal 
preferences . 
(5) He should respect the subjects of his research. They should 
not be imposed upon or "exposed to moral danger." 
( 6) He should undertake wor k he is capable of doing so as to 
avoid producing material t bat is unsound or inferior. 2 
To what extent such value- judgments can be validated is con-
sidered next. Like all value- judgments, some can be asserted with 
certainty and some with probability. The probability enters in at the 
point of the application of the above principles, which, as they stand, 
are certain. But ''metasociology" must aim at more certainty at lower 
levels. Certainty is achieved through experience . Furfey does not, 
1 Furfey, Scope and Method, p . 97 . 
2 ~., pp. 97-100. 
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however, discuss what kind of a process is involved at this point.1 
In practice, metasociological value-judgments should be stated 
clearly as assumptions rather than facts . Often a particular approach 
is offered in such a way as to appear to be the only scientifically 
valid one. 
Joseph Fichter in his "Ethical Limitations of Sociological 
Reporting, "2 amplifies Furfey's general ethical principles. He notes 
especially the importance of making a distinction between public and 
private facts. The sociologist must consider the needs and wishes of 
his subjects, sponsors, or co-operators . "Sometimes truth is social 
dynami. te, and its revelation may be either inopportune or actually 
damaging to the public good . .. 3 
Fichter lists four variables that must be related to each other 
if the sociologist is to arrive at moral decisions: 
The sociologist's definition of the nature of science •• 
Determination of the extent to which persons or groups 
will be injured by the publication of data concerning their 
behavior •••• 
The degree to which people or groups are actually mem-
bers of a moral community in which the scientist is also a 
member •••• 
The degree to which the larger society, the loctt com-
munity or the group needs the data of the research. 
. . 
This point of view developed by Furfey and Fichter, while rather 
completely covering one aspect of the forma.l relationship between 
1 Furtey, Scope and Method, pp. 101-103. 
~ichter, Social Relations, pp. 218- 232. 
3~., p. 225 . 4~., pp. 226- 230. 
sociology and ethics, does not deal vith another, and for the purpose 
of this study, the most important, that is, the way in which the fiildlngs 
of sociology are used by ethics . Catholic sociologists approach the 
problem of the relationship between sociology and ethics but narrow 
their focus to what is really professional ethics. 
ii. Natural lav.--It becomes necessary, then, to find a basis 
for establishing inferences regarding the relationship between these 
tvo disciplines in Catholic thought. This basis seems to be in the 
Catholic concept of the natural law. I:t there i s any meeting place 
between sociology and ethics it is in this concept. The question is, 
is the concept of natural law construed in such a way in Catholic 
thought so as to provide a place for sociological investigation? 
There is no pretense here at complete analysis of a concept 
which has been the subject of much extensive debate, indeed, one which 
supplies a point of continuing debate in Catholic eircles.1 It v1ll be 
assumed at the outset that the central :fact ot the natural law as under-
stood by Catholics is its relationship to the theological-philosophical 
synthesis and the sociological conditions of the middle ages,2 at which 
point it had its classic expression in the thought of Thomas Aqui.nas. 
Ernst Troeltsch, who makes such an analysis, vill be the interpreter 
1The University of Notre Dame in Indiana has established a 
Natural Law Institute and since 1955 has been publishing a periodical 
entitled The Christian Lawyer. The natural law is a continuing topic 
for discussion in this journal . 
2 This is recognized by Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 164. 
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followed here.1 
It may be noted that mucll Catholic debate on the subject, while 
it presses for the Thomistic understanding of the natural law, fre-
quently makes little or no reference to the sociological system in 
which it belongs . Thus, even Catholics themselves seem to beg ques-
tion ot the sociological and the intellectual basis of the Thomistic 
natural law. 2 
Nevertheless, the analysis must be judged in terms of the 
validity of Troeltsch' s thesis and its interpretation here. 
The central theme of Troel tsch ' s interpretation is that the 
structure of Medieval Catholicism took shape out of the rather coinci-
dental development of social, economic, and political conditions which 
were tboughtf'u.l..ly examined, reconciled, and from which were deduced 
ideal rules . These ideals became the foundation of the "ecclesiastical 
unity of civilization" of the age and "the permanent foundation of 
Catholic social doctrine . "3 It was the conditions of the Middle Ages 
''which silently, and surely, determined the doctrine of St. Thomas, and 
indeed made it possible. "4 
• • • The interpenetration of the sacred and the secular 1 which 
was possible in the Middle Ages , cannot be explained as the 
trans. 
Cath. 
lrroeltsch, op. cit. , I, 256. 
4 
Ibid. ' p . 203. 
Christian Churc 
' I. 
Kenealy, "Whose Natural Law? " 
result of intellectual dialectic impulses of development, 
but out of the actual pressure of events; for no dialectic 
exists, which, from the standpoint of Christian thought, 
would itself have been in a position to ley- down a programme 
of this kind; here we have to do with the effect of the pos-
sibilities and necessities, which the actual course of affairs 
in the development of social life outride the Church brought 
into the ecclesiastical organization. 
The groundwork for this ecclesiastical unity was laid in the 
actual sociological conditions of the age which fUsed the secular and 
the sacred in a "graded system of estates and corporations" and in the 
interpenetration of the Church and State. It took its theological and 
philosophical form in an ethic that "strove to reconcile natural and 
supernatural morality, the Natural and Divine Law, the natural pavers 
2 
of tree-will and the supernatural povers of grace. " The relatively 
undeveloped doctrines of politics and economics remained "under the 
domain of ethics" primarily because the possibility of their independent 
development was not conceived. 
The Church turned naturally to the already developed idea of the 
natural law in the synthesis of the natural law of the Stoics and the 
Mosaic- Christian Law of Revelation, already current in the Early Church. 
But the Middle Ages not only tolerated the lav of nature, as did the 
Early Church; it incorporated it into an ethical system. 3 
By considering the natural lav to be the original Divine and 
Natural Law of Reason, which governs the cosmos and within vhich all 
spheres of reality find their purpose, it became possible to regard 
1 Troeltsch, Social Teachings, I, 206. 
2Ibid., p. 257 - 3Ibid. , p . 259· 
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natural social institutions as divinecy ordained. Of course, the :fall ot 
man has limited the perception of this law, and it is, consequently, 
not a perfect guide unless illuminated by Divine Law. The Decalogue 
is the maJor source of such illumination, indeed the principal content 
of the natural law. Thus, society in general is subordinated to the 
Christian standard of life, reason and revelation become complementary, 
and the natural and the Divine Law are reconciled. l 
But it is obvious that natural existence and morality do not 
achieve the levels of virtue that the New Testament exhibits and ca.lls 
:for. Thus, the decisive element in Thomistic ethics is the concept ot 
the supernatural as that which raises the natural above its own li.mi ta-
tions to a "participation in the Divine nature . " This is the Vision of 
God given through grace.2 
The natural law, deduced from the Scripture, is introductory in-
to specifically Christian ethics . The real Christian ethics is only 
possible by virtue of sacramental grace . Thus the morality o:f nature 
is limited and depends on man's ability to achieve it . The aim of the 
Church is not to restore the absolute natural law, but to raise the 
creature to the sublime relationship to God. Natural law is always 
''bound to material reality, to the senses, and to that which is natural 
and finite . n3 The value of the world is recognized in natural law, but 
so also are its limits. 4 
1Troeltsch, Social Teachings, I, 259-262. 
2 ~., p . 263 . 4 Ibid., pp. 263-267 . 
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The apparent contradiction between nature and grace, already 
partly surmounted in this development, is overcame by a system of 
degrees lead.ing :from nature to grace. Various orders ot human exis-
tence are progressively higher in a hierarchy that moves toward super-
nature. The rea.l.m of nature is a preparatory stage for the rea.l.m of 
supernature, but the transition is achieved by the miracle of grace. 
The existing social order with its class structure is "rationalized and 
Christianized." It is interpreted as a means to or a presupposition of 
a higher state. This higher state encompasses the true e.nd of ethics 
1 
and it is interpreted by the Church through its theology. 
Thus, the Christianizing of life amoWlted to an incorporation 
of existing social life with its natural law into a hierarchical syn-
thesis. It is left with its own logic, illuminated by the Decalogue 
and the Old Testament. Christian thought sets its stamp on the social 
order. In such a vay a firm grip is held on the radical ethic of 
Christianity as a goal, and at the same time the ethical values of the 
secular order are drawn into it as a preparatory stage. Th:fs relation-
ship makes the Christian unity of civilization possible.2 
This is not an evolutionary idea, as it first appears to be. 
It is not a "whole, working itself out continuously trom an inward 
sense of necessity. " It is, rather, "an architectonic classified 
system of ends, in which every time a nev phase begins the process is 
1 Troeltsch, Social Teachings, I, 269. 
2 Ibid. , Pl· 270-271. 
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initiated by a special Divine act of creation . '~ Each phase advances 
as far as possible to the next, but requires a miracle of grace to 
make the transition. 
The Thomistic ethic incorporated in it the graded system of 
the secular order , gave it a Christian teleology and a means of achieving 
the Absolute , i.e., grace. The idea of reason is really superaeded by 
authority located in the "teaching and pastoral office of the Church. "2 
The Church directs the organism, and t he inequalities of life are over-
come by subordinating them to its purpose and authority. 3 
Until the present day, therefore, the f'undamental basis of 
the catholic ethic still remains formally, alongside of the 
ecclesiastical theocracy, the principle of the scriptura.lly 
acknowledged rational Natural Law, whose content is a con-
ception of the Natural Law which is in harmony with the 
patriarchalism of the Old Testament and the conservatism of 
Aristotle; it thus regards the social reality of the Midfe 
Ages, in its main features, a s the expression of reason. 
The relativism of the Thomistic ethic makes room for differ-
ences, but the absolute end is always latent. The Church must con-
stantly be involved in interpretations which verbally reconcile the 
natural law and the authority of the Church. 5 
The conclusion which Troeltsch draws from his analysis is that 
to maintain the Christian ideal in society some kind of reconciliation 
with natural forms of life must be effected. Christianity will have to 
incorporate in some wa:y the "ethical ideals of this life • .,6 This is 
1Troeltsoh, Social Teachings , I , 273. 
2 Ibid. , p . 300 . 3 Ibid . , p . 301. 4 Ibid., p . 270. 
5Ibid., PP· m -212 . 6 Ibid. , p . 
exactly what Thomism did for its age . However, to return to Thomism 
requires a return to its sociological basis .1 
Troeltsch fUrther concludes that insofar as modern Catholic 
social reform adheres to Thomistic principles it involves a return to 
medieval principles of the fusion of the natural law with the dominion 
of the Church and is "opposed to the idea that new conditions require 
a new theoretical structure of social ideas . "2 
It is difficult to assess the degree to which Catholics accept 
the sociological necessities of the Thomistic ethic as Troeltsch out-
lines them. There can be no doubt that the Thomistic synthesis is 
generally regarded as dominant in Catholic thought . Reading the work 
of Catholic sociologists one is impressed by their frequent references 
to his work. 
~oeltsch, Social Teachings, I, 279. 
2Ibid. , p . 304. It is interesting to note that Jacques Marita:i.n, 
the neo- Th-amist philosopher, seems to agree with Troeltsch and to accept 
the challenge of this conclusion. In his work, True Humanism, he, too, 
indicates in brief that the Thomistic ethic as it is known today bas 
definite sociological roots. Maritain, however, feels that there is 
an essential truth about Thomism which can be revived and made ap-
plicable to the modern ~. The Middle Ages was characterized by the 
"concrete fact that temporal civilization was in some way itself a 
function of consecrated activity and thus imperatively demanded a 
religious unity." If this is true, then the modern task is to interpret 
the "consecrational" conception of the temporal for the day. This 
Maritain does by describing an ideal order based on the facts of modern 
social life . Such an order would be pluralistic and inclusive, but in-
fused with Christian influence through those Christians who would take 
their vocation seriously in politics alongside the popular elites . It 
would tolerate error and would recognize the infravalent ends of the 
temporal order, rather than consider the temporal order as means only. 
(Jacques Maritain, True Humanism [London: Geoffrey Bles, (1938) 1950] 1 
pp. 156-204. ) It is a question worthy of study to examine Maritain ' s 
ideal nCO-Thomistic order in light of Troel tsch • s thesis. 
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If 1 however 1 Troel tsch' s thesis is correct 1 then certain in-
ferences are possible regarding the relationship between sociology and 
ethics in Catholic thought. 
(1) The ethical task of the interpreters of the natural law is 
not a search for norms, but rather a search for the ways in which the 
norms known partly by reason, and predicated on the absolute ends known 
by the Church through revelation, can be realized. 
(2) Sociology can illuminate the ways in which this natural law 
operates, but it does not in any sense discover it. 
(3) Because of the dua.l.ism of nature and supernature and the 
primacy of the latter, sociology, even in the above task, contributes 
little to ethical judgment in any ultimate sense of the validity of 
1 
norms . 
( 4) While there does not seem to be any reason why Catholic 
sociologists cannot pursue a genuine functional analysis of norms in 
the strictly sociological sense, in the larger sense, i . e., functiona-
lism in terms of normative validation, is limited because the ends are 
already known. As Troel tsch says, the Catholic ethic is not a whole 
working itself out, but an absolute end supplying a unifying motif . 2 
10ne Catholic sociologist put it this way to the author: 
sociology does not even illustrate natural law. 
2Note the sim:i..lar concerns of Williams in What Present-Day 
Theologians Are Thinking, pp . 74-75 . 
SUMMARY A1ID COlfCLUSIOBS 
!he a1JI of this study has been to investigate a particular 
sociological approach to see whether or not it fulfills the conditions 
that seem to be required tor a contribution to the validation of ethical 
nol'JIS. The need for and possibility of the validation of nol'JIS has been 
assUDI.ed. Further, it has been assumed that this process of validation 
llUSt soaehow include the knowledge about man and society that is avail-
able through the social sciences. 
!l'he study has also presupposed a philosophical point of viev on 
the basis of which it has defined its terms. !l'his point of viev is 
personal idealism. This particular point of viev commends itself because 
it does not attempt to reduce the subject matter of the social sciences 
to soaething less than rational mind and interpersonal experience. In 
fact, its coherent approach to experience is quite in harmony with the 
world task of discovering unity. 
It is readily conceded that the task of validating norms is 
primarily within the scope of ethies.1 This does not mean, however, 
1 Professor Brightman writes: .. The :autual. interdependence of 
the descriptive and norza.tive, however, does not destroy the difference 
between them •••• A normative science, while it presupposes the know-
ledge furnished by the descriptive sciences, goes beyond a mere descrip-
tion of :facts." (Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 2:7.) 
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that the ethical task cannot be aided by the social seiences.1 They 
at least provide the data tor ethics. The essential ethical assumption 
ot the study has been that there is a JLOral order that can be known. 
This order needs to be discovered by a process of analyzing and critieiz±Qg 
experienee.2 
'fhe urgency of t his task of validating ethical norms is pressed 
upon us by events threatening destruction tor mankind. In a more posi-
tive sense, it seems to be the pr erequisite tor bringing human beings 
together eo-operatively in a world in which many factors are forcing 
people of different baokgrounds and points of view into contact. While 
the assumptions of this study may not be acceptable to all, the task seems 
to be a legitimate one tor men of good will everywhere. 
Sociology, among other sciencea of human behavior, can no longer 
avoid the cla:ia of mankind upon it to make its knowledge relevant to 
this ethical need. This suggests the possibility that sociology move 
into the more difficult realm of norms in partnership with ethicists, 
philosophers, and theologiana. 3 
The particular group of sociologists chosen as a case study in 
the problems related to this task are Catholic sociologists in the Unit ed 
1
"0n the other hand, a normative science, like ethics, must 
build its laws on a knowledge of the actual and necessary taets and 
conditions of human life." (Brightman, Moral Laws, p . zr.) 
2 
See ~. , PP• 45-79. 
3 Professor Muelder sees this as already in progress to some 
extent. See his "Norms and Valuations," pp. 123-124. ct. Casserley, 
Morals and Man, p. 223. 
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States . These are, by definition, those who are committed both to 
sociology as a science and to Roman Catholicism as a religion. Because 
these sociologists take their sociology and their religion seriously, 
it is suggested that in their approach may be found certain implications 
for the more general problem.posed. 
The tirst requirement of this study bas been tbat ot under-
standing the ways in which sociology and values are related. It bas 
been found, on the one hand, that sociology has tended to be relativistic 
and skeptical about universal ethical principles. This has grown out of 
its secular roots as well as out of its descriptive findings . At first 
glance, it appears that sociology proves quite the opposite of that 
which this study assumes. Professor Brightman has pointed out that 
, 
L. Levy-Bruhl has given the classic statement of sociology's refutation 
1 / 
of ethics. t.evy-Bruhl said that theoretica.l ethics is impossible be-
cause sociology has destroyed its presuppositions. These presuppositions, 
he said, are that human nature is always identica.l with itself in every 
time 8.11d place and that the content of moral consciousness forms a bar-
monious whole. 
However, if we analyze these alleged presuppositions, we find 
that ethics does not assume that moral law is "universal in the sense of 
being binding on human beings at every stage of evolution and develop-
ment •• •• It is universal for moral beings such as we know ourselves 
to be. " Nor do we find that identity is necessary to moral law, for 
1Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 49. 
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moral law can be formulated so as to recognize differences . The basic 
error is in contusing the content of moral experience before it is 
criticized with the "same experience a:tter it has been rationally 
interpreted. ,J. 
Many sociological points of view of more recent date carry 
implicitly the conclusions of Levy-Bruhl as their assumptions. Thus, 
we find that in the way sociologists define values they frequently beg 
the question of universality. The dilemma for such sociologists is 
that they must presuppose universal acceptance of certain basic norms 
in order to be scientific. What is more, in other roles they take upon 
themselves the moral responsibility of the ''ought . " Values cannot be 
avoided in sociology, and beyond that they stand implicitly as candidates 
for noms. 
Throughout this study, three perspectives have been promi.ne.nt: 
Value- judgments have been considered as attitudes toward the subject 
matter of sociology, i . e . , what value is placed on man, society, social 
institutions, etc. Value-judgments have been considered as part of the 
data which sociologists describe and analyze . Value-judgments have been 
considered in terms of the ethical eODIIDitment of sociologists, i.e., the 
ethics of sociology, the relationship of description to evaluation, etc. 
Before entering into an analysis of Catholic sociological develop-
ment, it has been necessary to look at sociology in general from the 
standpoint of these perspectives in order to see the peculiar problems 
1 Brightman, Moral Laws, pp. 49-50· 
193 
ot each and the direction in which the resolution of these problems 
Sociology is at a crucial point in its position in the modern 
world. On the one hand, there is the drive to be objective and value 
free, and, on the other hand, there is the ever increasing demand tbat 
sociologica.l. knowledge be put to use. Present eondi tiona do not seem to 
be congenial to the previously held dictum that sociology will prescribe 
the means if the ends are set forth from some other quarter. Sociology 
faces crucial questions: Wbat can man hope tor in a world of' confiict? 
What should man hope for? What do the sciences ot man tell him about 
himself? 
We are not here suggesting that the social sciences take over 
the ethica.l. task, but what is suggested is that they be more closely 
related to the universal task of Talidating norms. 
It the social sciences are to be more than spokesmen for par-
ticular cultures, or more than describers of' "curious entities" ca.l.led 
1 
values, they must go beyond a mere recognition that values exist. 
Neither the positivist who equates values with action, 2 nor the "verstemn" 
sociologist who does not go beyond a recognition that values are something 
more than action are fully prepared to enter into a solution to the pres-
sing problems of world order. Max Weber gave the charter to social 
science which freed it from provincialism and dogmatism.3 The positive 
1Muelder, ''Norms and Valuations," p. 98. 
2 Adler, "The Value Concept," pp. ZT6-ZT9· 
3weber, Methodology, p. 11. 
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results of this freedom for the social sciences have tor the most part 
been realized. But there is a nev and cb&llenging problem facing the 
social sciences--how they can be used in the service of human values. 
The spectacle of science in the service of destruction has quickened a 
sense ot responsibility on the part of social scientists. Once again 
values enter into the picture. But the question now is not how can they 
be avoided, but how can they be served? 
What is the place or the social scientist with respect to this 
new claim? It bas been assumed here that a starting point must be a 
willingness to co-operate with other disciplines which seek similar ends. 
Thus, the social sciences must to some degree become partners with phil-
osopby1 ethics, and religion. Each must be willing to expand its borders 
of concern. They must at some place be able to discuss the same pro-
1 blems. What is more, they must learn from each other. As in the case 
ot Catholic sociological thinking, the social sciences JNSt exam1 ne the 
implications of their findings and assumptions in terms or other points 
of view. Especially is this true of metaphysical and ethical assumptions. 
Likewise, ethics and philosophy li\1St be more aware ot how men act and of 
the complexities of social situations, cultures, and personality. 
But more precisely, it has been suggested that the co-operative 
task of the disciplines mentioned DlUSt be phrased in terms of progres-
sive understanding and agreement on norms, especi&lly those which guide 
1 See the volumes in the series, Conference of Science, Philosophy, 
and Religion, published by Harper and Brothers, beginning with 1940. 
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moral action. Sociology has many legitimate interests quite removed 
from the central. task of ethics. But there are points vhere its findings 
can be use:f'ul to ethics and vhere a more inclusive and dynamic under-
standing ot ethical norms lll8\Y make much of its own material 110re i .ntel-
ligible. 
It has seemed quite natural in this study, then, to turn to a 
situation in vhich there appeared to be a close co-operation between 
sociology and ethics. This vas the case of the sociological work ot 
Roman Catholics in the United States. 
The problem was twofold. . One task vas to discover the way in 
vhich sociology and ethics vere interrelated in the vork of Catholic 
sociologists. The other was to look especially for evidences ot a 
functional approach to norms on the part of these sociologists. 
Because of the traditional con:t'lict between sociology and ethics, 
Catholics have been reluctant to enter into sociological vork. The 
biases in early non-Catholic sociological writing vere identified vith 
sociology itself by many Catholics. However 1 the scientific frame of 
llind prevailed, energized by the drive to solve the socia.l problems ot 
a minority, immigrant people. 
Sociology was at first accepted vith many reservations and re-
strictions. catholics vere anxious to tie it firmly to ethics and 
philosophy in order to aToid the implications of much non-catholic 
sociology. Sociology first appeared among American Catholics as an 
ethical and philosophical. discipline. Such a relationship, however, 
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eventually hampered sociological work by limiting its scope of interest 
and its methodology. 
Among Catholics, sociology vas east loose !'rom ethics academieal..-
ly with the basic problem of ethics and values in sociology unsolved. 
Catholic sociologists then entered into a process ot analysis and elari-
fieation that is still going on. But during this time the basic issues 
were uncovered and discussed. 
The first task of Catholic sociologists was to justify its 
existence as a separate discipline. This effort was somewhat confused 
by the dual nature of its purpose. It was an effort both to separate 
sociology !'rom other social sciences and to separate it from the philo-
sophical and theologieal.. disciplines. The results were 1 nevertheless, 
satisfactory 1 at least in the direction most important for this dis-
sertation. :Basic to the identity ot sociology was the distinction between 
formal obj eets in science. Accepting the fact that the material object 
ot JD8JlY disciplines is the same, the purpose, or formal object, of each 
may vary, thua justifying separate approaches. 
The next step was the justitiest ion of empirieal.. study. This 
followed from the definition of the formal object. Having taken away 
the ethical fUnction of sociology the descriptive function became valid. 
In addition, by making a distinction between empiricism and positivistic 
biases Catholic sociologists were able to accept an empirical approach 
to the study of man. This acceptance involved the substitution of 
Catholic presuppositions. 
l<JT 
The third step was the analysis of the place of presuppositions 
in sociology. The discovery that sociology was not necessarily tied to 
any particular presuppositions made it possible for Catholics to sub-
stitute their own value-judgments for those or which they were critical. 
The point of arrival, then, tor Catholic sociologists, was an 
entrance into sociology with the maJor assumption that value-judgments 
must always be made clear and must be taken into consideration in 
evaluating any sociological work, Catholic or non-Catholic. 
The role of norms in Catholic sociological vork is not fUlly 
explored, however, in the description of vbat place they have in the 
sociological writing. The problem ot this study vas framed in terms ot 
the sociological contribution to the va.lid.ation of norms. The initial 
suggestion vas that this must be understood not only in terms ot what 
fUnction norms fulfill in sociology, but also in terms of the tunctional 
treatment ot norms, i.e., the treatment ot norms in terms ot their 
results in action. The f\mctional role of norms in sociology is con-
ceived of in this study as an analysis ot the results of the acceptance 
ot and adherence to certain norms by the human agents whom the sociolo-
gists study. In the context of validation this is done with the purpose 
of contributing to the process of validation. 
A study ot Catholic sociological literature shovs that Catholic 
sociologists assume that ethics, as a discipline separated !rom sociology, 
alone has the authority to speak in the realm or morals. The task of 
sociology is not to test ethical norms, but rather to show the conditions 
under which they can be made effective, or to describe social situations 
which illustrate either the fUlfillment or failure to fulfill the require-
ment of the norm. Attitudes toward the materials 'for sociological study 
are predetermined by the Catholic philosophical and theological concep-
tions. Values are taken seriously, but their candidacy for validation 
is in terms of predetermined norms . Thus, for instance, family as well 
as religious norms, are statically conceived and defended. Ethical 
injunctions are derived f'rom philosophy and theology. They are acknov-
ledged biases. The task of the Catholic sociologist in relationship to 
ethics is to illuminate the circumstances under which they must operate. 
Catholic sociology has al~s been interested in supplying the 
data needed for the application of Catholic ethical principles. In 'fact, 
f'rom time to tillle, they have suggested needed changes in tradi tion.al. 
points of view and institutional structures. While the line of distinc-
tion may be tine, these suggestions appear to be aimed at facilitating 
the ful:f1llment of pre-EGtablished nol"'IS, rather than at contributing to 
the co-operative search for norms. No question is being raised regarding 
the freedom which Catholic sociologists have to be critical of catholic 
norms, although in actual practice same Catholic sociologists have been 
1 limited by ecclesiastical authority. 
The question that may be raised is whether the Catholic sociolo-
gist, by virtue of the intellectual synthesis of which he is a part, is 
in a position to criticize norms . 
1For a discussion of the ecclesiastical-political aspects of this 
problem, see James H. Nichols, Democracy and the Churches (Phila. : The 
Westllinster Press, 1951). 
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Catholic sociologists, for instance, know that the aspects of 
man which they study are incomplete. There is more to man than his 
accidental properties. Man also bas a form or essence, which it is the 
task of the philosopher to interpret. There is a natural reluctance to 
presume on a study that embodies a fuller apprehension of reality, inas-
much as it takes into account and supersedes less inclusive approaches. 
The Catholic sociologist is, then, satisfied with the limited scope of 
his work. Even the broader approach, sometimes advocated by those who 
would have a synthesis of the social sciences and the more inclusive 
disciplines, is interpreted in terms of a more vigorous attention to the 
norms of philosophy and theology, rather than a di.~otical relationship. 
At first it would appear that the concept of Natural Law would 
be most congenial to the use of social science in its understanding and 
application. When it is understood, however, that Natural Law is 
conceived of primarily in a logical and deductive sense, it is immediately 
apparent that this has little to do with empirical studies. The Natural 
Law is man 1 s reason about ethical behavior on the basis of certain 
postulates about God and creation. While an appeal may be made to 
experience i .n terms of conscience, this law is fundamentally deducti vely 
formulated. Thus, the tendency is to give an uncriticized cultural con-
tent to the Natural Law. 
At the same time the ethical Natural Law merges vi th the descrip-
tive by a process of reading into the descri ptive Natural Law the ethical 
assumptions. This merging, which appears to take empirical facts seriously, 
1 
actually is a one-sided relationship. 
200 
It may be well to recall the definition of norms with which this 
study began. All norms are instrumental. in that they are the standards 
by which values are judged. Unless, however, one is absolutely certain 
that the norms he applies are beyond criticism and revision, this :f'unc-
tion of evaluation must have a feed- back2 effect in vbich the norms 
themselves are criticized by the total effect of their application. 
Therefore, to speak of the role of norms implies not only the obvious 
instrumental relationship to values, but also the critical appraisal of 
the results of norms in operation. It is this latter aspect that has 
been the main concern ot this study. 
Furthermore, the appeal. throughout has been to reason in its 
synoptic and coherent as well as its logical character. For support of 
this appeal reference must be made to the assumption that reason is the 
basis ot human thought and communication. All argument begins vith such 
a premise. Synoptically, it seems most reasonable to infer trom exper-
ience that all real.i ty is ultimately reasonable. Since reason is an 
attribute of persons, it has been interred that just as reason is the 
norm of thought, personality is the norm of experience. The fulfillment 
of personality is the goal of life. 
'Wbi.le the ideals (or norms) of respect for truth and for 
1 Joseph Fletcher, Morals and Medicine (Phila., Pa.: The West-
minster Press, 1951) . 
2 Cf. Boulding, The Image. 
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personality are the rationally deduced ultimates, empirical evidence is 
l 
mounting in the social sciences for their validity. Norms are required 
which will achieve these ends in practice . Such norms would be instru-
mental on many levels and would, by virtue of the cultural and historical 
context of human choice, be relative to tDne and place. 
The agreement on ultimate ends is in itself a difficult objec-
tive. Of equa.l importance is agreement on proximate norms which facili-
tate the realization of ultimate ends . The question of the place of 
social science in the process of ultimate validation is here not raised, 
although this is an important consideration. Of concern here is the 
2 task of translating ultimate norms into valid instrumental goals. 
The assumption is that such norms, in order to be relevant, must 
be relative to time and place. This in itself requires a constant 
process of relating norms to the facts of experience. At the same time, 
the problem of agreement about such norms is a necessary concomitant . 
A survey of the dominant approach of Catholic sociologists in 
the United States reveals that they have not as yet accepted this more 
vigorous interaction vith ethics, even though their religious connection 
is very important in other ways . 
It seems clear that the religious connection may ta.ke many forms . 
The historical relationship between sociology and ethics among Catholics 
has been one of the chief limiting factors. Farthermore, the dominant 
1 See Deats, Thematic Values . 
2 As Casserley says, the good deed is both absolute and relative. 
(Morals and Man, p. 6. ) 
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metaphysics of Catholicism tends to keep fact and value separated. 
Values are the province ot philosophy and theology. Sociology ma;y 
describe them, but the task of relating ethics to lite is one primarily 
of the multiplication of principles governing special situations . As 
long as Catholics are so closely tied to this position the possibility 
of a Catholic contribution to the problem is not to be expected. 
It is r eadily admitted that in a sense this is a begged question 
because Catholics themselves do not raise this problem ot validation in 
these terms . However, on at least two counts the present analysis has 
validity: one is the possibility that because of the religious inter-
est of Catholic sociologists some enlightenment might come from their 
position; another is the :fact that cultural practi ces are increasingly 
at variance with certain basic ethical stands that the Church takes. 
This study began with the assumption that a functional approach 
to nol"'lS vas a use:f'ul. one :for sociology when dealing with values and 
norms. A functional approach was understood to avoid begging questions 
of val.idi ty, and allowing freedom to the sociologists to examine the 
manifold aspects of norms in operation in society. 
The study in no way proves that a functional approach to norms 
is the best for the purposes outlined. This has been assumed and to 
some degree supported. On the other hand, it has been shown that up 
until this time Catholic sociologists have not seen their role to be 
related to the problem o:f validating norms, nor have they approached 
Catholic norms in a functional vay to any great extent. 
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It seems 1n order, however, to conclude by suggesting some 
reasons for hope and some prospects in the sociological contribution 
to the validation of norms . 
We may begin by reaffirming that no position is either logically 
or empirically satisfactory which equates what is with what ought to 
be. If this is the acceptable alternative, then there is no problem of 
validation. To equate "is" and "ought" creates a hopeless contusion in 
which nought" is no longer a meaningt'ul. concept •1 Such a position is 
belied by human experience. Man, universally, has a sense of oughtness. 
This sense of oughtness has many dimensions. We are here concerned only 
with the sociological, vhich, at the least, sees the experience of "ought" 
as being directed toward the realization of values about vhich judgments 
of vorth have been made vi thin a social context. The norms of human 
experience are largely derived from group interaction. Even vhere norms 
appear to be isolated or prophetic, they aim at acceptance on the part 
of society. Such normative judgments are established precisely for the 
purpose of evaluating existing behavior. A study of human interaction 
in relationahip to norms indicates that, as a matter of fact, norm.s for 
behavior are frequently at variance vi th behavior itself. It should be 
mentioned that even the empirical approach to lav or "legal realism" has 
an implicit te1eology. 2 And the suggestion that "ought" can be derived 
1 Bender, Prolegomena, p. 99. 
2F. S. C. Northrop, The Taming of the Nations (N. Y. : The 
Macmillan Co., 1954), p. 326. 
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from "is," as in the case of Northrop, is not a simple identification.1 
To press for the identification of "ought" with "is," is not 
only at variance with experience, but it leads to the logically unten-
able position of relativism.2 Such an identification, practically, 
excludes universality in ethics . 
However, we cannot avoid the fact that even the content of the 
"ought" is related to the requirements of particular social structures.3 
The sociology of knowledge, though it exists in several forms, is united 
in its suggestion that values and norms, as well as other "ideas," are 
existentially based. Cultural relativism in anthropology, in its own 
way, shows how values and norms are integral parts of cul t ura.l patterns 
and that these patterns vary to a great extent, and vi th them their norms. 
Neither of these approaches 1n the social sciences are to be 
taken, though, as proof that universal norms are a fiction. Criticism 
is most telling at the level of the presuppositions which these approaches 
make. The basic assumption is that their theories are true and somehow 
transcend the societies and cultures they describe. To this extent a 
universal appeal has been made. In fact, all science makes this assu:mp-
tion. To the extent that science makes its appeal to respect for truth 
~orthrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, 
pp . 328f'f. 
2 
Casserley rightly says that relativism must not be made a 
dogma. (Morals and Man, pp. 96-97.) 
3For the intimate relationship between "is" and "ought" see 
Cohen and Nagel, Introduction to Logic, p . 367; and :Bender, Prolegomena, 
P• 101. 
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and respect ~or persons it is operating within the framework of what 
seems to be a universally valid ethic. 
How, then, are we to interpret the findings of the sociology o~ 
knowledge and its anthropological counterpart, cultural relativism? 
Karl Mannheim gives the key in the suggestion that in the recognition 
of the ideological nature of ideas there is a basis of criticism and 
1 
transcendence. Grace deLagun.a, speaking about anthropology, says, "In 
achieving science our culture has found a means of transcending its own 
limitations, of embracing ideally all cultures within itself. "2 
Even though the sociology of knowledge and cultural relativism 
need not point to a hopeless situation regarding norms, they do provide 
a needed corrective to the naive assumptions that world community is only 
a matter of sitting down and talking things over.3 Unless the Ollght is 
both intelligible in terms of particular cultures and possible of rea-
4 lization, it ceases to have meaning. 
Thus, agreement on norms must be seen in terms of a rather com-
plex process of understanding social structures, cultures, combined with 
the interpenetration of values from different cultures, the insights of 
religion, and rational thought. 
~eim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 42-43. 
2 
Grace A. deLaguna, "CUltural Relativism and Science," Phil . Rev. 
51(1942), 149. Ct. Edgar S. Brightman, "Unity in Difference," Perspec-
tives in a Troubled Decade, ed.s. Lyman Bryson, et al, p. 437. 
3see L. Harold DeWolf, Comment on Dr. Brightman, "Unity in Dif-
ference, " pp. 448-449. 
4See Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 115. 
More particularly, sociology, as well as other social sciences, 
can investigate the consequences and relationships of norms in action. 
To some extent, at least, values as candidates for norms :au.st be under-
stood in terms of their results . If the social sciences can show how 
values operate under certain circum.stances, they will make a contribution 
to the ethical task. 
Criticism of various functional approaches in the social sciences 
is made primarily in terms of the theories that are derived rather than 
the techniques of study. Thus David Bidney criticizes Malinowski for 
making functionalism a principle of interpretation by assuming that 
"each culture is a complete, self- sufficient entity" in which every item 
has a necessary function . "He assumes a priori that al1 institutions 
and customs are equally satisfactory and does not recognize the possibil-
ity of dyafunctional, reactionary tendencies Within the context of a 
given culture. "1 Radcliffe- Brown, following Durkheim, "assumes social 
integration as a fact, as well as an ideal," and regards society as the 
"ultimate functional unity. " These men all seem to liB.ke functionalism 
2 
a dogma. 
On the other hand, sociologists like Robert Merton and J. Mil ton 
Yinger have shown that such implications need not necessarily follow 
from a functional approach. As evidence for this denial Merton indicates 
that there is a difference between manifest and latent functions, that 
~idney, Theoretical AnthroPo;togy, p . 369. 
2 Ibid. , p. 370. 
207 
there are functional alternatives, and that there are dysfunctions and 
1 
tunctionall.y irrelevant patterns of behavior. 
Wil.l.iam Kol.b raises a question of a different sort, however, 
when he suggests that functionalism has implications for the ontological 
status of values . His argument is that functionalism not only shows 
that most peopl.e in society share values, but also that most peopl.e be-
lieve these values to be related to a realm of values that has "ontic" 
status. This creates a real dil.emma tor those positivists who tradition-
a.ll.y have suggested that values are fictions . If it can be shown by 
functionalism that values are necessary, then to suggest that values 
are necessary fictions is to undercut the truth. " •• • Men c:annot know 
to be false what they must believe to be true. "2 
One need not go quite as far as Kolb in suggesting that a func-
tional theory of values impl.ies that values have "ontic" status in order 
to see the truth of his general position that values llUSt be taken ser-
iously. As Yinger sa.ys, "The virtue ot tunctional analysis is that it 
avoids the metaphysical debate • • • and states instead: Religious 
beliefs and practices do exist; they have consequences for human be-
havior. 3 How are they used 1" 
~erton, Social Theory, pp. 50-82. 
2 Kolb, 'tvalues, Positivism, and the Functional Theory of 
Religion," pp. 305-311· 
3 J . Mil ton Yinger, Religion, Society and the Individual (N.Y. : 
The Macmillan Co . , 1957), p. 56. 
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It seems that 1\mctional.ism in this sense, carried on w1 th vigor, 
offers a sociological approach to values and norms which will supply 
fru1 tful data to ethics. This does require that sociologists take values 
seriously. 
The more inclusive approach to validating norms, in which sociol-
ogy can be a participant, requires particular circumstances. Fundamental-
ly, freedom, respect for truth, and respect for persons must prevail. 
Beyond this there is the more specific cultural framework which provides 
a "dynamic balance of polar interests and values," and which :Sidney caJJ.s 
"cultural democracy. ,.J,. The achievement of this "is a never ending task 
requiring an idealistic faith in the villingness and ability of rational 
men to seek the general good and to promote social freedom and justice. "2 
Thus we need not necessarily choose between a "fixed absolutism which 
does not allow for cultural adjustment to the •.• needs of individuals 
and an anarchic opportunistic relativism which recognizes no fixed prin-
ciples. n3 A normative culture bas no "effective existence unless it is 
practical and influences social behavior. n4 And the actual behavior of 
persons cannot be understood "apart from the postulates and ideals which 
men have conceived for themselves. "5 The alternation between theory and 
practice must constantly take place. 
p. 436. 
1:Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology, p. 396. 
2 Ibid. , p. 399. 
3Ibid., PP• 378-379. Cf. :Brightman, "Unity In Difference, " 
4 Ibid., p. 311· 
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In a sim1lar vein Mukerjee calls for the evolution of principles 
and norms on the basis of existing social facts and emerging social ends 
and values. This comes about as sociology and social philosophy co-
l 
operate. C&sser~, too, calls for theology and the social sciences to 
came to terms in this common task. 2 
Thus, the question of norms must always be to some extent open, 
cumulative, and dialectical. 3 Norms are in the process of discovery and 
"it is the quest not the result • •• tbat defines his [man•s] destiny, 
for certainty is not given to man to possess. n4 Professor Brightman 
says of ethics as a science: "A science cannot be a set of fixed and 
unchangeable conclusions; it IIU.St bave a method which renders t'urther 
investigation, t'urther discovery possible. "5 
Karl Mannheim has stated the problem of norms in the modern world 
in these words: 
Sociological ana.l.ysis reveals that what we call "the moral 
crisis" or the crisis in valuations does not simply arise 
tram wickedness in modern man but to a considerable extent is 
due to the failure of the Great Society to re-establish on a 
large scale the methods ot vaJ.ue adJustment, vaJ.ue assimila-
tion, value reconciliation and value standardization which 
were always active in sma1.J. communities, and which, owing to 
the limited size of these communities, could do their work 
1 R. Mukerjee, "Sociology of Values," Soc. and Soc. Rev. , 
31(1946), 109. 
2
casserley, Morals and Man, p . 2 . 
3 Ibid. , p. 177. 
4 
El.iseo Vivas, The Moral Life and the Ethical Life (Chicago: 
The university of Chicago Press, 1950), p . 250. 
5 Brightman, Moral Laws, p . 31 . 
1 
spontaneously. 
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If Christian thinkers are to blend their thought with sociologi-
ca.l knowledge, as casserley and others have called for, then they must 
recognize at least a limited scope for experimentalism in valuat ions . 
They must be willing to subject their values to analysis, rather than 
arbitrarily begging the question by knowing that Christianity bas the 
answers. 
2 
The intent of this study is not to make of sociology an all-
inclusive approach to truth. But certa.i.nly, it must be logica.lly 
related to such an approach. This means that its facts and theory must 
be more closely related to the task ot validating norms. Part of this 
process is a dialectic between norms and empirical study. Such a 
dialectic places neither the empirical facts nor 1;he norms in a position 
of authority. Rather, they are f'unctionally interrelated and mutually 
corrective in the progressive achievement of truth. 3 
~eim, Diagnosis of Our Time, p . 104-. 
2compare Kolb, who says that Christian norms should be able to 
be tested empirically and that Christianity must enter into the competi-
tion of ideas and research. At the empirical level the Christian cannot 
ask for more. As to the non- empirical aspects of the faith, he must 
expect "to know God as other Christians do, through revelation appre-
hended through the faith of the historical community of believers." 
William L. Kolb, "Religion and Values in Sociological Theory," Chr. Schol., 
39(1956)' 208. 
3Northrop, f'rom his own perspective, has indicated the need for 
a closer relationship between philosophy and the social sciences: '~t 
is needed--and there will not be any eure for our present troubles until 
it is provided--is a philosophical articulation of the concept of man 
and the universe which contemporary empirical knowledge of man and nature 
entails, and the creation of a new humanism in terms of the new idea of 
the good which this more adequate scientifically grounded philosophy 
defines." (The Meeting of East and West. (N.Y. : The Macmillan Co. , 1946] , 
p . 258.) 
2ll 
In some respects this is merely a statement about the vay man 
thinks. And, in tact, some norms seem already to have emerged from such 
a process. Casserle;y suggests that social science up to this time has 
confirmed many of the basic norms of Christian humanism. There are those 
who feel that social science has confirmed the primacy of personality and 
1 personal fulfillment. 
The major hindrance to this process of validation is the tendency 
to absolutize the cultural content of norms. The truth about relativism, 
which should perhaps be called relationism, is that cultural expressions 
vary endlessly. The term relationism suggests that values are related 
to history even though metaphysically they .a:y transcend it. 
Whether or not the Catholic intellectual synthesis precludes the 
possibility of participation in the task of normative validation is a 
matter for further s~dy.2 
1 
casserJJ:tr1 Morals and Man, p . 223. 
2 
Northrop ' s interesting chapter entitled, 11Roma.n catholic Culture 
and Greek Science," in The Meeting of East and West, pp. 254-290, might 
well be a starting point of such a study. 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(This bibliography does not cover the tull range of Catholic sociol.ogi-
cal writing. Selection bas been made with the special problem of the 
dissertation in mind.) 
Abell, Aaron I., "Origins ot Catholic Social Reform in the United 
states: Ideol.ogical Aspects," Review of Pol.itics, 11(1949), 
294--309. 
Adler, Franz, "The Range of Sociology ot Knowledge, " Becker and 
Boskotf (eds . ), Modern Sociologieal. Theory in Continuity and 
Cha.Dge 1 pp. 396-423. 
, "The Value Concept in Sociol.ogy," American Journal of 
--s=-o-c-=-iol.og;y, 62 (1956), 272-279. 
Agar, William, Catholicism and the Progress of Science. New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1946. 
American Catholic Sociol.ogical Society, Report of the First Annual 
Convention. December 26-28, 1938. 
Augustine, Brother D., "The Scientific Catholic Sociologist," American 
Catholic Sociological Review, 18(1957), 2-9. 
Aqui.nas, Thomas, Summa 1'heologica (ed. Anton Pegis). New York: The 
Modern Library, 1948. 
Bai.n, Read, "Natural Science and Value-policy," Philosoph;y of Science, 
16(194.9), 182-192. 
-~~~' ''The Scientist and His Values," Social Forces, 31(1952), 
106-109. 
"Sociology as a Natural Science," American Journal of 
Sociol?gJJ 53(1947)1 9-16. 
Baldwin, James M. ( ed. ) , Dictionary ot Philosophy and Psychology, 
2 vola. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925. 
Barnes, Harry E., and Becker, Howard, Social Thought from Lore to 
Science, 2 vols. Washington, D. c.: Harren Press, 1952. 
Barnett, H. G., "On Science and Human Rights," American Anthropologist, 
50(1948), 352-355· 
Barta, Russell, and O'Reilly, Charles T., "Some Dating Patterns and 
Attitudes Toward Marriage of 174 Catholic Col.lege students, " 
American Catholic Sociological Review, 13(1952), 240-248. 
213 
Becker, Howard, "CUrrent Sacred-Secular Theory and Its Development, " 
Becker and 13oskoff ( eds . ) , Modern Sociological Theory in Contin-
uity and Change, pp . 133-185. 
---:::---:--·' Through Values to Social Interpretation. Durham, N. c. : 
Duke University Press, 1950. 
Becker, Howard, and Boskoff, Alvin (eds . ), Modern Sociological Theory 
in Continuity and Change . New York: The Dryden Press, 1957 . 
Bender, Richard N. , "Prolegomena to the Derivation of Moral Laws from 
Psychological Data" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Boston 
University, 1954) . 
Benedict, Ruth, Patterns of Culture. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1934. 
Benne, Kenneth D., and Swanson, G. E. (eds . ), "Values and the Social 
Scientist," Journal of Social Issues, 6(1950). 
Bernard, Jessie, Social Problems at Mid- century. New York: The 
Dryden Press, 1957. 
Bernard, Luther L., The Fields and Methods of Sociology. New York: 
Farrar and Rinehart, 1934. 
Bernard, Luther L. , and Jessie, Origins of American Sociology. New 
York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. , 1943. 
Bidney, David, Theoretical Anthropology. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1953. 
Bishops' Program of Social Reconstruction : A General Review of the 
Problems and Survey of Remedies . 20th American Ed. Washington, 
D. C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1939. 
Boran, Behice, "Sociology in Retrospect," American Journal of 
Sociology, 52(1947), 312- 320. 
Boulding, Kenneth, The Image . Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of 
l-lichigan Press, 1956. 
Bowman, Claude C., "Must the Social Sciences Foster Moral Scepticism?" 
American Sociological Review, 10(1945) , 709-715 . 
Brauer, Theodore (ed. ), Thomistic Principles in a Catholic School . 
St . Louis : B. Herder Book Co., 1943. 
Bridgman, P. W., "Operational Analysis , " Philosophy of Science, 5(1938), 
114-131 . 
Brightman, Edgar s., An Introduction to Philosophy. New York : Henry 
Holt and Co ., (1925)1951. 
Moral Laws. New Yor k: The Abingdon Press, 1933. 
Nature and Values. New York : Abingdon- Cokesbury Press, 
, Persons and Values . Boston: Boston University Press, 1952. 
--- -· 
----' A Philosophy of Religion. New York : Prentice- Hall, 194o. 
, "The Presuppositions of Experiment, " The Personalist, 19(1938), -.....,1::""':3':7'6~-14 3. 
, "The Problem of an Objective Basis for Value-judgments," 
---=Bry:---son, Finkelstein, and Maciver (eds. ), Science, Philosophy and 
Religion: Thir d Symposium, pp . 1-11. 
1 "Unity in Difference, " Bryson, Finkelstein, and Maciver -~(-e~d~s . ) , Perspectives in a Troubled Decade, pp. 435-452. 
Bryson, Lyman, Finkelstein, Louis, and Maciver, Robert M. (eds . ) , 
Perspectives in a Troubled Decade : Science Philo sop and 
Religion, 1939-19 9. New York : Harper and Bros . , 1950. 
Science, Philosophy and Religion: Third Symposium. New 
York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, 1943. 
Burns, James J ., "Catholic Social Theor y," Mihanovich (ed. ), Social 
Theorists, pp. 3o8-342. 
Butterfield, Herbert, The Origins of Moder n Science . New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1951. 
Cairns, Huntington, "Sociology and the Social Sciences," Gurvitch and 
Moore (eds . ), Twentieth Century Sociology, pp. 3-19. 
Campion, Donald, "The Sociology of Catholics in America, " Mihanovich 
(ed. ) , Social Theorists, pp . 342-368. 
1 "Survey of American Social Catholicism" (Unpublished Ph. D. 
----,d:-:i-s-se. rtation, st . Louis University, 1949) . 
Cantwell, Daniel M., "Race Relations as Seen by a Catholic," American 
Catholic Sociological Review, 7(1946) , 242-258. 
Case, Clarence M. , "A Definition of Social Problems," Lee and Lee ( eds . ), 
Social Problems in America, pp. 7-8. 
Casserley, J . V. Langmead, Morals and Man in the Social Sciences . 
London: Longman's, Green and Co . , 1951. 
Catholic Encyclopedia, New York: The Encyclopedia Press, 1912 . 
"Catholic Institutions as Sources of Doctorates in Sociology," 
American Catholic Sociological Review, 18(1957), 58-59· 
215 
"Catholic Social Science," Catholic Charities Review, 34(1950), 245 . 
Cavanaugh, F., "Modern Sociology, " Commonweal, 18(1933) , 156-158. 
Chase, Stuart, The Proper Study of Mankind. New York: Harper and 
Bros ., 1948. 
Child, Arthur, "The Existential Determination of Thought," Ethics, 
52(1942), 153-185. 
"The Problem of Imputation in the Sociology of Knowledge, 11 
Ethics, 51(1941), 200-219. 
, "The Theoretical Possibility of the Sociology of Knowledge, 11 
--,Et=""""'hi~c·s, 51 (1941), 392-418 . 
Chisholm, Mary c. , Ideological Implications of Current Definitions of 
a Social Problem. vlashi.Dgton, D. c.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1948. 
Cizon, Francis A. , "Interethnic and Interreligious Marriage Patterns 
in Parish X," American Catholic Sociological Review, 15(1954), 
244-255 . 
Clark, William, Review of Hirning and Hirning, Marria~e A~ustment, 
American Catholic Sociological Review, 18(1957),5-6~ 
Clemens, A. H., "The Catholic Sociologist Faces a New Social Order, " 
American Catholic Sociological Review, 4(1943) , 158-164. 
, "The Need for Constructive Thinking in Sociological Research,u 
---:Am- e-rican Catholic Sociological Review, 1 (194o) , 74-81. 
, "Shall We Have an Atomic or Organic Age?" American Catholic 
-~,...--=-Sociological Review, 7(1946), 234-241 . 
Cohen, Morris , "Method, Scientific, 11 Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, X, 389-396. 
"Reason in Social Science, " Feigl and Brodbeck ( eds . ) , 
Readings in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 663-676. 
216 
Cohen, Morris, and Nagel, Ernest, An Introduction to Logic and Scien-
tific Method. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1934. 
Confrey, Burton, "Achieving a Catholic Sense in Sociology," Catholic 
Education Review, 27(1929), 406-407. 
Conley, William B. , "Social Aspects of Recent Labor Legislation," 
American Catholic Sociological Review, 1(1940), 62-67. 
Coogan, John E., "Religion and the Criminologist," American Catholic 
Sociological Review, 6(1945), 154-159. 
Creighton, Bridget, "Socio-economic Status of the Nursing Candidate," 
American Catholic Sociological Review, 15(1954), 19-29. 
Cronin, John F. , Catholic Social Principles . Milwaukee : The Bruce 
Publishing Co . , (1950)1952. 
Curtin, Joseph A., "Analysis of Family Theory as Found in Some Standard 
Textbooks Commonly Used in the Basic Courses in Sociology in Col-
leges and Universities" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, The Catholic 
University of America, 1952) . 
Davis, Kingsley, Human Society. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949. 
Dawson, Christopher, "Sociology as a Science," Cross Currents, 4(1954) , 
124-137· 
Deats, Paul K. , "Thematic Values and Universal Norms" (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Boston University, 1954) . 
DeFerrari, R. J., "Sociology in the Program of the Catholic General 
College, " American Catholic Sociological Review 1 13 (1952), 89-102. 
DeGre, Gerard, "The Sociology of Knowledge and the Problem of Truth, " 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 2(1941), U0-115. 
DePloige, Simon, The Conflict Between Ethics and Sociology (tr . c. c. 
Miltner) • St . Louis: B. Herder Book Co. , 1938. 
DeRuggiero, Guigo, "Positivism," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 
XII, 26o-265. 
Dewey, John, "Norm and Normative," Baldwin (ed. ), Dictionary of 
Philosophy and Psychology, II, 182. 
Devlolf, L. Harold, Comment on Brightman, "Unity in Difference, " Bryson, 
Finkelstein, and Maciver (eds. ), Perspectives in a Troubled Decade, 
pp . 448-452 . 
217 
Divine, Thomas, "The Nature of Economic Science and its Relation to 
Social Philosophy, " American Catholic Sociological Review, 1 (194o) , 
129-140. 
Dominic, Sister D. , "Religion and the Juvenile Delinquent, " American 
Catholic Sociological Review, 15(1954), 256-264. 
Donovan, John, "American Catholic Sociologists and the Sociology of 
Religion, " American Catholic Sociological Review, 15(1954), 104-114. 
, "The Social Structure of the Parish, " Nuesse and Harte ( eds) , 
---=:::---The Sociology of the Parish, pp . 75-99 . 
, "A Sociologist Looks at the Parish, " Amer ican Catholic 
---=-so-c~iological Review, 11(1950), 66-73 · 
Dougherty, George v., The Mor al Basis of Social Order Accor ding to St. 
Thomas . Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1941 . 
Dowling, Austin, "The National Catholic \-lar Conference, " American 
Ecclesiastical Review, 79(1928), 37-54. 
Durkheim, Emile, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life ( tr. J. W. 
Swain) . London: George Allen and Unwin, 1915. 
, The Rules of the Sociological Method (tr. S. A. Solovay 
--a-n'""'d- J . H. Mueller ) . Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1950. 
Sociology and Philosophy (tr. J . G. Peristiany) . Glencoe, 
Ill . : The Free Press, 1953. 
Eby, Louise Saxe, The Quest f or Moral Law. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1944. 
Edel, Abraham, "Concept of Values in Contemporary Philosophical Value 
Theory," Philosophy of Science, 20(1953), 198-207 . 
Einstein, Albert, "The Laws of Sci ence and the Laws of Ethics," Feigl 
and Brodbeck ( eds . ) , Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 
pp. 779-78o. 
Ellis, J . T., American Catholicism. Chicago : University of Chicago 
Press, 195 • 
----=~-=-' American Catholics and t he Intellectual Life . Chicago: 
Heritage Foundation, 1956. 
Ellwood, Charles A . , "Roman Catholic Sociology, " Sociology and Social 
Research, 26(1941), 114-120. 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Edwin R. A. Seligman ( ed . ) • 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934. 
Fairchild, Henry P . (ed. ), Dictionary of Sociology. New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1944. 
"Feature X: Value- free Methodology in Social Sciences," America, 
92(1954) , 125-127. 
Feigl, Herbert, "The Scientific Outlook: Naturalism and Humanism," 
Feigl and Brodbeck ( eds . ) , Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 
pp. 8-18. 
Feigl, Herbert, and Brodbeck, Mary (eds . ), Readings in the Philosophy 
of Science . New York : Appleton-Century Crofts, 1953. 
Fichter, Joseph H., "Contemporary Catholic Writing: Social studies," 
Books, 12(1954), 235-231 . 
, "Religious Values and t re Social Personality," American 
---,.ca...,.t-=-holic Sociological Review, 17(1956), 109-116. 
----·' Roots of Cha.nge . New York: The Appleton-century Co ., 1939· 
, Social Relations in an Urban Parish. Chicago : University 
--o-=f:--:.Chicago Press, 1954. 
Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. 
Southern Parish. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1951. 
"Urban Mobility and Religious Observance, " American Catholic 
Sociological Review, 9(1950) , 130-139. 
Fitzpatrick, Joseph P. , "catholic Responsibility in Sociology," Thought, 
26(1951), 384-396. 
----,,.--,-..-·' "catholics and the Scientific Knowled8e of Society, " American 
Catholic Sociological Review, 15(1954), 2-8. 
Fletcher, Joseph F. , Morals and Medicine. Princeton, N. J. : Princeton 
University Press, 1947. 
Fogarty, M. P., "Catholic Contributions to the Sociology of Religion," 
Blackfriars, 37(1956), 474-478. 
Francis, E. K. , "History and the Social Sci ences: Some Reflections 
on the Re- integration of Social Science," Review of Politics, 
13(1951), 354-374. 
Francis, E. K. , "Sociological Concepts and the International Order," 
Review of Politics, 16(1954), 475-484 . 
Francis, E. K., and Labbans, Jean, "Suggestions to American Sociologists 
for a Scheme of Research," Lumen Vitae, 6(1951) , 16o-165 . 
Friedel, Francis J ., "Are We Accepting the Challenge?" American Catholic 
Sociological Review, 3(1942), 3-10. 
, "Catholic Sociological Research," American Catholic 
---,.So_c...,..iological Review, 3(1942), 129-143. 
, "Formal Object of the Social Sciences," American Catholic 
---=-so_c...,..iological Review, 4(1943) , 16-24. 
, "Undergraduate Preparation of the Social Worker, " American 
--~C~a~t~holic Sociological Review, 1(1940), 21-28 . 
Furfey, Paul H., Fire on the Earth. New York: The Macmillan Co . , 1936. 
, "A Fore\iOrd to Sociology," New Scholasticism, 9(1935), 
---=-"u~37-208 . 
A Hi story of Social Thought. New York: The Macmillan Co . , 
-----:--, "The Humanitarian Philosophy and the Acceptance of Sociologi-cal Generalizations," American Catholic Sociological Review, 
16(1955) , 117-122. 
, "On Defining Sociology, 11 American Catholic Sociological 
---,.Re_v...,..iew, 9(1948), 19-25 . 
-.....,,.---
, The Scope and Method of Sociology. New York : Harper and 
Bros., 1953 . 
, "The Sociologist and Scientific Objectivity," American 
--~C~a~t~holic Sociological Review, 6(1945), 3-12. 
, "Sociology and Its Philosophical Aspects," Modern Schoolma.n, 
-~21,...(""""1944)' 153-161. 
' --1:-:9=3=-7. 
Three Theories of Society. New York: The Macmillan Co. , 
, "Value- judgments in Sociology," American Catholic Sociologi -
--cal~Review, 7(1946), 83-95 . 
, ''Why a Supernatural Sociology?'' American Catholic Sociologi-
--cal-=--Review, 1 ( 1940), 167-171. 
Gearty, Patrick W., The Economic Thought of Monsignor John A. Ryan. 
Washington, D. c.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1953. 
George, Gordon, "The Sociology of Ritual , " American Catholic Sociologi-
cal Review, 17(1956), 117-130. 
----
, "Some Sociologists Out of Bounds," America, 92(1955), 397-398. 
Gillin, John (ed.), For a Science of Social Man. New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1954. 
Gilson, Etienne H. , The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
New York: Random House, 1956. 
Glenn, Paul J . , Sociology: A Class Manual in the Philosophy of Human 
Society. st . Louis : B. Herder Book Co . , 1935 . 
Golightly, Cornelius L. , "Social Science and Normative Ethics," Journal 
of Philosophy, 44(1948), 505-516. 
Goode, William J . , and Hatt, Paul K. , Methods in Social Research. New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. , 1953. 
Gordon, R. , "Impact of the Social Sciences on Ethics," Sociological 
Review, 2(1954), 57-75 . 
Gouldner, Alvin, "Explorations in Applied Social Science," Social 
Problems, 3(1956), 169-181. 
"Graduate Dissertations in Sociology, " American Catholic Sociological 
Review, 8(1947), 289-293· 
Graham, E. s. , "Value-free Methodology: A Sectarian Weapon," America, 
92(1954) , 37-39· 
Gurvitch, Georges, and Moore, W. E. (eds . ), Twentieth Century Sociology, 
New York: Philosophical Library, 1946. 
Haas , Francis J., Man and Society . New York: Appleton- Century Crofts, 
(1930 )1952. 
Harbrecht, John, The Lay Apostolate . St . Louis: B. Herder Book Co . , 
1929. 
Harte, Thomas J., "Catholics as Sociologists," American Catholic 
Sociological Review, 13(1952), 2-9. 
, "Editor's Preface to Issue on Sociology of Religion," 
---,,...--American Catholic Sociological Review, 15(1954), 70-72 . 
221 
Hartnett, Robert c., "A Postwar Reconstruction Program for the American 
Catholic Sociological Society," American Catholic Sociological 
Review, 4(1943), 102-110. 
Healey, Mary E. , '~ePlay's Contribution to Sociology: His Method," 
American Catholic Sociological Review, 8(1947), 97-110 . 
, Society and Social Change in the Writings of St. Thomas, 
---=-=--~ Ward, Sumner, and Cooley. Washington, D.C. : The Catholic Uni-
versity of America Press, 1948. 
Hemelt, Theodore M., Final Moral Values in Sociology. Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1929. 
Hertzler, J. 0., "Some Basic Sociological Postulates Underlying World 
Organization and Peace," Social Forces, 22(1943), 125-130. 
Higgins, George G., "American Contributions to the Implementation of 
the Industry Council Plan," American Catholic Sociological Review, 
13(1952), 10-24 . 
Hiltner, Seward, Sex Ethics and the Kinsey Report. New York: Associa-
tion Press, 19?3· 
Hinkle, Roscoe C. and Gisela J., The Development of Modern Sociology. 
Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1954. 
Hinshaw, J. 0., "Epistemological Relativism and the Sociology of 
Knowledge," Philosophy of Science, 15(1948), 4-10. 
House, Floyd N., The Development of Sociology. New York: McGraw- Hill 
Book Co . , 193 • 
Hughes, Philip, The Popes' New Order. Nev York: The Macmillan Co., 
1944. 
Husslein, Joseph c., The Christian Social Manifesto . Milwaukee: The 
Bruce Publishing Co., 1931. 
(ed. ), Social Hellsprings. 2 vols. t.lilwaukee: The Bruce 
Publishing Co., 1942. 
Irving, J. A., Science and Values. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1952. 
Jammes, Jean-Marie, and Mendras, Henry, "Religious Sociology in the 
United States," Lumen Vitae, 6(1951), 133-146. 
Jeanine, Sister M., "The Catholic Sociologist and the Catholic Mind," 
American Catholic Sociological Review, 17(1956), 2-9. 
222 
Jensen, H. E., "Sociology and Fundamental Values," American Catholic 
Sociological Review, 3(1942), 11-21. 
Kading, Daniel, "The Role of the Social Scientist," Southwestern 
Social Science Quarterly, 32(1952), 271-276. 
Kane, John J., "Are Catholic Sociologists a Minority Group?" American 
Catholic Sociological Review, 14(1953), 2-12. 
, "Christian Sociology: An Urgent Need in Our Day," Social 
---:::-or"'""d:--er, 4(1954), 447-450. 
, "The Social Structure of American Catholics," American 
--~C~a~t~holic Sociological Review, 16(1955), 23-30. 
Kenealy, William J ., ''Whose Natural Law?" Catholic Lawyer, 1 (1955), 
259-266. 
Kenney, John F., Review of Grodzins, The Loyal and the Disloyal, 
American Catholic Sociological Review, 17(1956), 261. 
Kerby, William J ., "Sociology," Catholic Encyclopedia, Dl, 115-118. 
, Introduction to Social Living. Washington, D. C. : The 
---,C~a~t~holic University of America Press, 1948. 
Kerins, Joseph, L., "The Catholic Sociologist and the Sociology of 
Industry," American Catholic Sociological Review, 8(1947), 12-23 . 
Kinsey, Alfred, Pomeroy, Wardell, and Martin, Claude, Sexual Behavior 
in the Human Male. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1948. 
IG.uckhohn, Clyde, Mirror for Man. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949. 
, "Values and Value-orientatiom in the Theory of Action," 
--~P~a-r-sons and Shils. (eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action, 
pp. 388-433· 
IG.uckhohn, Clyde, and Murray, Henry (eds . ), Personality in Nature, 
Society, and CUlture . New York: Alfred A. Knopf, (1948)1953· 
IG.uckhohn, Florence R., "Dominant and Variant Value-orientations," 
IG.uckhohn and Murray (eds. ), Personality in Nature, Society, and 
Culture, pp. 342-357· 
Kohler, Wolfgang, The Place of Velue in a World of Fact. New York: 
Liveright Publishing Co., 1938. 
223 
Kolb, William L. , "The Changing Prominence of Values in Modern 
Sociological Theory," Becker and Boskoff ( eds . ), Modern Sociologi-
cal Theory in Continuity and Change, pp. 93-132 . 
, "Religion and Values in Sociological Theory, 11 The Christian 
---,..Sc ..... h~olar, 39(1956), 204-208. 
, ''Values, Positivism, and the Functional Theory of Religion: 
---=Th=--e-Growth of a Moral Dilemma, 11 Social Forces, 31(1953), 305-311. 
Laguna, Grace A. de, "CUltural Relativism and Science," Philosophical 
Review, 51(1942), 141-166. 
Land, P . s., "Bishop Haas and Mon s ignor Ryan," America, 89(1953) , 
573- 574 . 
Lane, R., "Use of Empirical Research in Sociology," Christus Rex, 
8(1954), 234-241 . 
Lawler , L. R., Full Circle. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 1951. 
Lee, Alf'red Me . and Elizabeth B. (eds . ), Social Problems in America. 
New York: Henry Holt and Co ., (1949)1955· 
Lepley, Ray, Verifiability of Value . New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1944. 
Liguori, Mary, "The Concept of 'Social Process' in American Sociology," 
American Catholic Sociological Revi ew, 3(1942), 164-169. 
, Comment on article by Friedel , American Catholic Sociological 
--R=-e-v-=-iew, 3(1942), 137-138. 
Linton, Ralph, The Science of Man in the World Crisis . New York : 
Columbia University Press, 1945. 
Lundberg, George , Can Science Save Us ? New York : Longmans, Green and 
Co . , 1947 . 
, "The Concept of Law in the Social Sciences," Philosophy of 
---=-sc-=1-ence, 5(1938), 189-203. 
, "Contemporary Positivism in the Social Sciences, 11 American 
---,..So-c-=-iological Review, 4(1939) , 42- 55. 
, "The Natural Science Trend in Sociology, 11 American Journal 
--o-,f~Sociology, 61(1955), 191-202 . 
Lundberg, George, "Science, Scientists and Values," Social Forces, 
30(1952), 373-379. 
224 
, "Value- judgments in Sociology; Reply with Rejoinder," 
--~Am~e-rican Catholic Sociological Review, 7(1946), 203-204; 8(1947), 
47-48. 
Lynd, Roberts . , Knowledge For What? Princeton, N. J .: Princeton 
University Press, 1948. 
McGowan, Raymond A., "Social Justice and Sociology, n American Catholic 
Sociological Review, 1(1940), 68-73 . 
Machotka, Ota.ka.r, "Is Sociology a Natural Science?" American Journal 
of Sociology, 55(1949), 10-17 . 
Maciver, Robert M. , The More Perfect Union . New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1948 • 
. , "Sociology, " Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XIV, 232-247. 
----
McKinney, J . c., "Methodological Covergence of Mead, Lundberg and 
Parsons," Amer ican Journal of Sociology, 59(1954), 565- 574 . 
McSweeney, A. J . , The Social Role of Truth According to St. Thomas : 
A Study in Thomistic Social Philosophy. Washington, D. C. : The 
Catholic University of America Press , 1943. 
Manheim, Ernest , Review of Becker, Through Values to Social Interpreta-
tions, American Journal of Sociology, 57(1951), 198. 
, Review of Maquet , The Sociology of Knowledge, American Journal 
--o""""f,...-:oSo. ciology, 57(1952), 529-531. 
Ma.nnheim, Karl, Diagnosis of Our Time . London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1943. 
, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology (ed . Paul 
-----,K~e-c""'"'skemeti) • London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953 . 
, Ideology and Utopia ( tr . Louis Wirth and Edward Shils) . 
----,N,_e_w....,York: Harcourt, :&aCe and Co ., 1951. 
Maquet, Jacques, The Sociology of Knowledge (tr . John F. Locke) . Boston : 
Beacon Press, 1951 . 
Marciniak, Edward, "Some U. S. Approximations to the Industry Council 
Idea," American Catholic Sociological Review, 17(1956), 24-29. 
Marie Agnes of Rome, Sister, Review of Green, Sociology, American 
Catholic Sociological Review, 18(1957), 81. 
Maritain, Jacques, The Rights of Man and Natural Law (tr. Doris C. 
Anson) . New York: Charles Scribner 's Sons, 1943. 
225 
, True Hummani sm ( tr . M. R. Adamson) • London : Geoffrey Bles, 
-~{l::-::9=3:TT8' )1950. 
Martin, John M., "Scientific Parole Prediction," American Catholic 
Sociological Review, 14(1953), 162-166. 
Maynard, Theodore, The Story of American Catholicism. New York: 
The Macmillan Co. , 1941. 
Mead, George H., Mind, Self, and Society (ed . Charles W. Morris) . 
Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1934. 
Mead, Margaret, "The Comparative Study of Culture and the Purposive 
Cultivation of Democratic Values," Bryson, Finkelstein, and 
Maciver (eds.), Perspectives in a Troubled Decade, pp. 87-109. 
----
, Male and Female . New York: William Morrow and Co., 1949. 
Meng, John J., "cabenslyism: The First Stage, 1883-1891," Catholic 
Historical Review, 31(1946), 389-413. 
, "Cahenslyism: The Second Chapter, 1891-1910," Catholic 
--Hi;:r.-sTtoi'ical Review, 32(1946), 302-340. 
Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, ill.: 
The Free Press, (1949)1957. 
Middendorf, Cyril D. G., Review of Himes and Taylor, Your Marriage, 
American Catholic Sociological Review, 16(1955), 330-331· 
Mihanovich, Clement, "Demography and the Sociologist, " American Catholic 
Sociological Review, 6(1945), 42-45. 
, (ed . ), Social Theorists . Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing 
---::::----· Co., 1953. 
, "Sociology Yesterday and Today," The Social Studies, 31 (194o), 
--2=5=1--252. 
, ·~t the Sociologists Believe Regarding Human Origins and 
---:-V:-al-.:--ues," America, 82(1949), 226-227 . 
, ''Who's Who Among Catholic Sociologists," American Catholic 
----::s=-o-c~iological Review, 7(1946), 174-199. 
226 
Mihanovich, Clement, and Schuyler, Joseph B., Current Social Problems. 
Mil waukee : The Bruce Publishing Co. , 1950. 
Miller, David L. , "Norms, Values, and the Social Sciences," Southwestern 
Social Science Quarterly, 32(1951), 137-149. 
Mills, c. Wright, "Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of 
Knowledge," American J ournal of Sociology, 46(1940), 316- 330 . 
Mohan, Robert P. , A Thomistic Philosophy of Civilization and Culture . 
Washington, D. c.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1948. 
Montavon, Paul, "Ethics and the Social Sciences," Social Order, 8(1958), 
pp. 31-35 . 
Morris, Rudolph, "Problems Concerning the Institutionalization of 
Religion," American Catholic Sociological Review, 17(1956), 98-108. 
, Review of Rose, Sociology: The Study of Human Relations, 
--~Am~e-rican Catholic Sociological Review, 18(1957) , 79-80 . 
Muelder, Walter G. , "Norms and Valuations in Social Science," Wilder 
(ed . ), Liberal Learning and Religion, pp. 98-125. 
Mueller, Franz, Comment on article by Friedel, American Catholic 
Sociological Review, 3(1942) , 138-140. 
, "The Formal Object of Sociology," American Catholic 
--~S~o-c~iological Review, 1(1940), 55-61. 
, "Person and Society According to St . Thomas," Brauer (ed. ), 
--~T~h-omi- stic Principles in a Catholic School, pp. 184-263. 
, "The Possibility and Scope of a Supernatural Sociology," 
--~Am~e-rican Catholic Sociological Review, 1(1940) , 141-146. 
, "The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Christian Tradition," 
--~Am~e-rican Catholic Sociological Review, 4(1943), 144-157. 
, "The Social Question of the Shop, " American Catholic Socio-
--~1-o-g-=-ical Review, 9(1948) , 84-97 . 
-----,,-..-' "Some Remarks on the Logic and Gr8JIII'llar of Sociology," 
American Catholic Sociological Review, 10(1949), 2-13. 
-----,,..-~' ''Ttfuat Constitutes a Sociology of Religion?" American Catholic 
Sociological Review, 2(1941) , 147-152. 
Mukerjee, Radhakama.l, "Sociology of Values," Sociology and Social 
Research, 31(1946), 101-109. 
227 
Mulvaney, Bernard G., "The Department of Sociology of the Catholic 
University of America, 1894-1955," American Catholic Sociological 
Review, 16(1955), 266- 274. 
, "The Place of Empirical Sociology," American Catholic Socio-
--1.;-o-g-:-ical Review, 3(1942), 225- 230. 
, "Post -Depression Fertility in the U. S." American catholic 
--~S~o-c~iological Rev iew, 14(1953), 84- 93 · 
Mundie, Paul J., "The American Catholic Sociological Review," American 
Catholic Sociological Review, 1(1940), 5. 
, Review of Reuter, Handbook of Sociology, American Catholic 
--~S~o-c~iological Review, 3(1942), 53 · 
Muntsch, Albert, "A catholic Approach to Anthropology, II American 
Catholic Sociological Review, 2(1941), 159-165. 
Muntsch, Albert, and Spalding, Henry, Introductory Sociology. New 
York: D. C. Heath Co . , 1928. 
Murray, Raymond ,., . , Introductory Sociology. New York: Appleton-
Century Crofts, 1947. 
, "Presidential Address, 1939," American Catholic Sociological 
-~R=-e-v"":"'iew, 1(1940), 39- 42. 
, Sociology for a Democratic Society. New York: Appleton-
_ _,,--.,...· 
Century Crofts, 1950. 
Myrdal, Gunnar, An American Dilemma, 2 vols. New York: Harper and 
Bros . , 1944. 
, "Social Theory and Social Policy," British Journal of 
---=-so-c~iology, 4(1953), 210- 242. 
Nisbet, Robert A., "Conservatism and Sociology," American Journal of 
Sociology, 58(1952), 167-175. 
Nichols, James H., Democracy and the Churches . Philadelphia, Pa.: 
The Westminster Press, 1951 . 
Northrop, F. s . C. (ed.), Ideological Differences and World Order. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. 
-.__,..,....--' The Logic of Science and the Humanities. New York: The 
Macmillan Co . , 1947. 
' 
--1"""9,.,.4...,...6 . 
The Meeting of East and West. New York: The Macmillan Co . , 
228 
Northrop, F. s. c. (ed. ), The Taming of the Nations. New York: The 
Macmillan Co . , 1954. 
Nuesse, Celestine J , , The Social Thought of American Catholics. 
Westminster, Md.: The Newman Book Shop, 1945. 
, "The Sociologist as a Teacher," American Catholic Socio-
---.:1-o-g-:-ical Review, 5(1944), 211-217. 
, "Sociology and Catholic Education: Prospects for Capital 
---:D:-e-v-.elopment," American Catholic Sociological Review, 6(1955), 1 -11. 
Nuesse, Celestine J . , and Harte, Thomas J . (eds.), The Sociology of 
the Parish . Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co ., 1951. 
O'Brien, Mary c . , Catholic Sociology. New York: P. J . Kenedy and 
Sons, 1939. 
O'Connor, William T., Naturalism and the Pioneers of American Sociology. 
Washington, D. C. : The Catholic University of America Press, 1942 . 
O'Dea, Thomas, "The ' Residues' of Pareto: An Operational Definition 
of Natural Law," American Catholic Sociological Review, 16(1955), 
170-182. 
, "Sociology of Religion, 11 American Catholic Sociological 
-...,R~ev--=-iew, 15(1954), 73-103. 
O'Grady, John, Catholic Charities in the U. s . Hashington, D. C. : 
National Conference of catholic Charities, 1930. 
Ong, \-Tal ter J . , Frontiers in American Catholicism. New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1957 . 
Owen, D. R. G., Scientism, Man, and Religion . Philadelphia, Pa.: 
Westminster Press, 1952. 
Parsons, Talcott, Essays in Sociological Theo Pure and Applied. 
Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 19 9195. 
, "The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory," 
- --=r:-n....,..t-ernational Journal of Ethics, 45(1935), 282- 316 . 
, "Psychology and Sociology," Gillin (ed . ), For a Science of 
--..,:--..,.. Social Man, pp. 67-101 . 
, The Structure of Social Action. Glencoe, Ill. : The Free 
---=P:-r-e-ss, 1949 . 
229 
Parsons, Talcott, and Shils, Edward (eds . ), Toward a General Theory of 
Action. Csmbridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 1951. 
Passmore, J . A., "Can the Social Sciences Be Value- free?" Feigl and 
Brodbeck (eds .), Readings in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 674-676. 
Pemberton, Prentiss L., "An Examination of Some Criticisms of Talcott 
Parsons' Sociology of Religion," Journal of Religion, 36(1956), 
241-257. 
, "Frontiers in Studying the Religious Aspects of Human 
---~R~e~la~tions (Paper read at the Founder ' s Day Institute of Boston 
University, March 17, 1954). 
Perry, Ralph B., General Theory of Value. New York: Longmans, Green 
and co ., 192 • 
, "Opinions of Non-Scholastic Philosophers on Scholasticism, " 
--~Z~y~b-ura (ed. ), Present-day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism, pp. 3-6. 
Powderly, Terrence, The Path I Trod. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 194o. 
Renard, Henri, The Philosophy of Being . Milwaukee: The Bruce Pub-
lishing Co ., 1943. 
Riemer, Svend, ''Values and Standards in Research," American Journal of 
Sociology, 55(1949), 131-136. 
Riesma.n, David, "Toward an Anthropological Science of Law and the Legal 
Profession," American Journal of Sociology, 57(1951), 121-135 . 
Robinson, Leo J., "Toward a Juridicial Order," American Catholic Socio-
logical Review, 9(1948), 3-8. 
Rose, Arnold M., "Sociology and the Study of Values," British Journal 
of Sociology, 7(1956) , 1-17. 
, Theory and Method in the Social Sciences. Minneapolis : 
----=-u~n..,.i-versity of Minnesota Press, 1954. 
Ross, Eva J . , Basic Sociology . Milwaukee : The Bruce Publishing Co., 
1953. 
---,,.....,...,..' "Christian Social Concepts and the Sociologist," American 
Catholic Sociological Review, 2(1941), 90-96. 
---~-' Comment on article by Friedel, American Catholic Sociologi-
cal Review, 3(1942), 140-141 . 
Ross, Eva J., Comment on article by Hartoett,American Catholic 
Sociological Review, 4(1943) , 1o8-110. 
230 
, "Report on the Fourth International Congress of the Sociology 
--o"""f~Religion," American Catholic Sociological Review, 15(1954), 
31-32 . 
, Review of Williams, Catholic Social Thought, American 
--J.,...o_ur_nal of Sociology, 56(1950},206-207 . 
, "The Sociologists' Contribution to Postwar Reconstruction," 
--~Am~e-rican Catholic Sociological Review, 4(1943), 3-9. 
, "Sociology and the Catholic," American Catholic Sociological 
---=-Re-v~iew, 1(194o), 6-9. 
, Sociology and Social Problems . }.filwaukee : The Bruce 
----=Pu::-::""blishing Co . , 1947 . 
, A Survey of Sociology. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing 
---::::----Co . , 1932. 
Runes , Dagobert D. (ed. ), The Dictionary of Philosophy. New York : 
The Philosophical Library, n.d. 
Ryan, John A., A Better Economic Order. New York: Harper and Bros ., 
1935· 
, "The Bishops ' Program for Social Reconstruction, " American 
----,C~a~t~holic Sociological Review, 5(1944), 25-33· 
- ---
, Declining Li berty. New York : The Macmillan Co ., 1927. 
----
, Distributive Justice. New York: The Macmillan Co ., 1935. 
, "The New Scholasticism and Its Contributions to Modern 
----=T~h-o-ught, " Zybura ( ed. ) . Present- day Thinkers and the New 
Scholasticism, pp. 342-368. 
, "On the Anniversary of the Encyclicals," American Catholic 
----=s~o-c~iological Review, 2(1941), 83-89. 
- ---
, ~estions of the Day. Boston : Stratford, 1931 . 
Ryan, John A., and Boland, Francis J ., Catholic Principles of Politics . 
New York: The 1-lacmillan Co., 194o. 
Schmiedeler, Edgar, An Introductory Study of the Family. New York: 
D. Appleton- Century Co ., 1947. 
231 
Schnepp, Gerald, "The Future of Sociological Theory," Mihanovich (ed. ) . 
Social Theorists, pp. 369-420 . 
--...,~..-' Lee.ke.ge From a Catholic Parish. Washington, D. c.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1942. 
, Review of Bowen, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman, 
----,Am--e-rican Catholic Sociological Review, 15(1954), 42-43. 
, Review of Kirkpatrick, The Family as Process and Institution, 
----,Am--e-rican Catholic Sociological Review, 16(1955), 328-329. 
Schuyler, J. B., "The Parish Studied as a Social System," American 
Catholic Sociological Review, 17(1956), 320-337· 
Schwer, i-Tilhelm, Catholic Social Theory ( tr . B. La.ndheer) . St . Louis : 
B. Herder Book Co., 1940. 
Shaughnessy, Gerald, Has the Immigrant Kept His Faith? New York: 
The Macmillan Co . , 1929. 
Simon, Yves, "From the Science of Nature to the Science of Society," 
New Scholasticism, 27(1953), 28o- 304. 
Small, Albion \of ., "Points of Agreement Among Sociologists, 11 Publications 
of the American Sociological Society, 1(1907), 55-71 . 
Smith, Lawrence c., "Social Science and Va.lues 11 (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Nebraska, 1951) . 
Snell, Roberta, The Nature of Man in St . Thomas Compared with the 
Nature of Man in American Sociology . \o/ashington, D. C. : The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1942. 
Sorokin, Pitirim A. , Contemporary Sociological Theories. New York : 
Harper and Bros . , 1928. 
' --.,1~9::"r.4"::'"l.
The Crisis of Our Age . New York: E. P . Dutton and Co ., 
Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953. 
Stroup, Herbert, Social Work. New York : American Book Co . , 1953. 
Thomas, George F. , Christian Ethics and lwioral Philosophy. New York 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955. 
Thomas, John L. , The American Catholic Family. Englewood Cliffs, N. J .: 
Prentice- Hall , 1956. 
Thomas, w. I., and Znaniecki, Florian, The Polish Peasant in Europe 
and America, 5 vols . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1918-1920. 
Thorman, Donald J., "The Sociological Concept of Religion," American 
catholic Sociological Review, 12(1951), 148-155 . 
Timasheff, Nicholas S. , "On Methods in the Social Sciences," American 
Catholic Sociological Review, 6(1945), 169-176. 
, Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth. Garden City, 
-~N.,... ~y . : Doubleday and Co . , 1955. 
"Sociological Theory Today," American catholic Sociological 
Review, 11(1950), 25-33· 
Troeltsch, Ernst, The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches (tr . 
Olive Wyon), 2 vols. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931. 
Tsanoff, Radislov A., The Moral Ideals of Our Civilization . New York: 
E. P. Dutton and Co . , 1942. 
Urban, Wilbur M., "Science and Values," Ethics, 51 (1941), 291-306. 
U. S. Supreme Court, "The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences 
of Desegration: A Social Science Statement, " Appendix to Appel ants 1 
Briefs, School Segregation cases Nos. 8, 101, and 191 in the 
Supreme Court of the United States, October term, 1952. 
Vivas, Eliseo, The Moral Life and the Ethical Life. Chicago : University 
of Chicago Press, 1950. 
Vogt, Evon z., and O'Dea, Thomas F., "A Comparative Study of the Role 
of Values in Social Action in Two Southwestern Communities," 
American Sociological Review, 18(1953), 645-654. 
Von Hoff'nlan, N. , "The Church: Subject of Social Research," Social 
Order, 6(1956), 319-327 . 
Wach, J oachim, Sociology of Religion. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1944. 
Walhout, Donald, "Objectivity and Value," Journal of Philosophy, 
50(1953), 285-300. 
Weber, Max, The l-1ethodology of the Social Sciences (tr . E. A. Shils 
and H. A. Finch) . Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949. 
233 
Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital ism ( tr. 
Talcott Parsons) . New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930. 
, Theory of Social and Economic Organization ( tr. A. M. 
-___,.H,....e-n-=-derson and Talcott Parsons) . New York: Oxford University Press, 
1947. 
\-Teigel, Gustave, "American Catholic Intellectualism--A Theologi~' s 
Reflections," Review of Politics, 19(1957), 275-307. 
~·leinr~h, ~fax, Hitler's Professors . New York: Yiddish Scientific 
Institute, 1946. 
vleltfish, Gene, "Science and Prejudice, II Scientific Monthly, 61(1945) , 
210-212. 
vlhitehead, Alfred N. , AdventureSof Ideas . New York : The Macmillan 
Co . , 1933. 
, Science and the 1>1odern World. New York: The Macmillan Co., 
--..("""'19--25 )1937 . 
Wilder, Amos (ed.), Liberal Learning and Religion . New York: Harper 
and Bros ., 1951. 
Williams, Daniel D., What Present- day Theologians Are Thinking. New 
York: Harper and Bros . , 1952. 
lUlliams, Melvin J . , Catholic Social Thought . New York: Ronald 
Press, 1950. 
, "A Survey of Roman Catholic Sociological Theory in the 
---=u-:-n~i..,..ted States Since 1900" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Duke 
University, 1941). 
Willigan, Walter, Review of Green, Sociology, American Catholic 
Sociological Review, 14(1953), 49. 
Willigan, Walter, and O'Connor, John J ., Sociology. New York: Longmans, 
Green and Co . , 1946. 
Wilson, Logan, and Kolb, William L ., Sociological Analysis. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co ., 1949. 
Wirth, Louis, "Integrative Tendencies in International Relations, 11 
Bryson, Finkelstein, and Maciver (eds.), Perspectives in a 
Troubled Decade, pp. 267-278. 
Wolfe, B. , "American Catholics and Sociology," Franciscan Studies, 
24(1943), 105-112. 
Wolff', Kurt, "Notes Toward a Sociocultural Interpretation of Sociology," 
American Sociological Review, 11(1946), 545- 553· 
Woods, Sister Frances Jerome, Cultural Values of American Ethnic Groups . 
New York: Har:Per and Bros., 1956. 
Yelovich, Columban, "Content Analysis of' Certain Text Books in Regard 
to certain Problems of the Family" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, The 
Catnolic University of' America, 1955) . 
Yinger, J. Milton, Religion, Society and the Individual. New York : 
The Macmillan Co. , 1957 . 
Zimmerman, Anthony L., "The Alleged Danger of Innninent World Over-
population," American catholic Sociological Review, 18(1957), 
10-32. 
Znaniecki, Florian, Cultural Sciences, Their Origin and Development. 
Urbana, Ill. : University of Illinois Press, 1952 . 
Zybura, John S . (ed. ), Present- day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism. 
St . Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1926. 
ABSTRACT 
The problem of this dissertation is to investigate the role of 
norms in the sociological writing of Roman Catholics in America as a 
case study in the gimera.l problem of ethics and the social sciences. 
The investigation attempts to under stand the position of Catholic 
sociologists, criticize it, and from it draw implications for estab-
lishing a frame of reference for a coherent approach to the study of 
human society and its processes, which combines the empirical and the 
normative. The dissertation assumes that universally valid norms can 
be progressively known through a coherent approach to human experience. 
The problems of a science of man point repeatedly to the need and 
possibility of such an assumption. Three perspectives on norms are 
established, which provide the framework for the study: value-
judgments about the subject matter of sociology, values as social 
facts to be studied, and the formal relationship between sociology 
and ethics . After setting forth these perspectives in a brief analysis 
of contemporary sociology, the Catholic development of sociology and 
the major issues involved in this development are analyzed. The impli-
cations of Catholic sociological work for the problem of the disserta-
tion are set forth. The conclusion suggests an emerging point of view 
for a closer relationship between sociology and ethics. 
Catholic sociological writing takes ethical norms seriously and 
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bas made a contribution to an understanding of the genuine philosophi-
cal problems that exist for sociology. Furthermore, Catholic sociolo-
gists have both a scientific and ethical concern which have made the 
problem acute. Only recently has Catholic sociological writing passed 
into a phase in which sociology is being :freed :from the domination 
of philosophical and theological thought . This phase bas produced a 
searching analysis on the part of Catholics. Almost uni:t'ormly the 
present solution to the problem of sociology for the catholic is an 
affirmation of the needs to make biases clear and to be rigorous in 
both inductive and deductive methods in sociology. Catholic sociolo-
gists do not generally question the postulates of ethics. It is 
assumed that Catbol.ic ethics are normative in the realm of values. At 
this jucture in the developnent of sociology among catholics it appears 
that sociology is not conceived of as playing a dynamic role in the 
validation of norms. While such writing may treat norms tunctionall.y, 
this is to a limited degree because the ends of ethics are latent. 
The tunctional role is not thoroughgoing in the sense of providing 
material for the validation of norms. 
This study does not suggest that sociology assume the ethical 
task, but the criterion of coherence in orderly thinking requires that 
eJ.l experience be related synoptically in the discovery of truth. A 
more inclusive sociology is needed, :freed of both absolutistic and 
relativistic biases which beg ethical questions. It is further sug-
gested that sociology enter more vigorously into the dialectic that a 
coherent approach to truth implies. 
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